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NAPOLEON  BONAPARTE 

AND 

THE  SIEGE  OF  TOULON 


INAUGURAL-DISSERTATION 

ZUR 

ERLANGUNG  DER  DOKTORWURDE 

DER 

HOHEN    PHILOSOPHISCHEN    FAKULTflT 

DER 

RDPRECBMARLMNIVERSITAT  zu  HEIDELBERG 

VORGELEGT  VON 

CHARLES  JAMES   FOX 

AUS 

BOSTON,  MASS.,  U.  S.  A. 


WASHINGTON,  D.  C. 

LAW  REPORTER  COMPANY,  PRINTERS. 
1902. 


NAPOLEON  BONAPARTE 

AND 

THE  SIEGE  OF  TOULON 


INAUGURAL-DISSERTATION 

ZUR 

ERLANGUNG  DER  DOKTORWURDE 

DER 

HOHEN    PHILOSOPHISCHEN    FflKULTflT 

DER 

RUPRECHMARLS'UNIVERSITAT  ZU  HEIDELBERG 

VORGELEGT  VON 

CHARLES  JAMES  FOX 

AUS 

BOSTON,  MASS.,  U.  S.  A. 


UNIVE 

ilNGTON,  D.  C. 

LAW  REPORTER  COMPANY,  PRINTERS. 
1902. 


THE 


CONTEMPORARY    ACCOUNTS    AND 
BIBLIOGRAPHY. 

A.  CONTEMPORARY  ACCOUNTS. 

Reports  in  : *  Archives  de  la  Guerre  a  Paris;  Archives 
Nationales   a  Paris :    Manuscript   Department,  British 

Museum  :  Public  Record  Office  London. 
Periodicals:  Monitenr;  The  London  Gazette;    Gazeta 

de  Madrid. 

B.  BIBLIOGRAPHY. 

The    Naval    Chronicle,  July    to   Dec.    1793.    London, 

1799. 

Speeches  of  the  Hon.  W.  Pitt  4  vols.  London,  1806. 
Speeches  of  the  Hon.  C.  J.  Fox  6  vols.  London,  1815. 
Precis  historique  sur  les  evenements  de  Toulon,  d'lm- 

bert,  Paris,  1814. 
Notes  et  pieces  officielles  relatives  aux  evenements  de 

Marseilles  et  de  Toulon,  Abeille,  Paris,  1815. 
Revolution  royaliste  de  Toulon,  de  Brecy,  Paris,  1816. 
Parliamentary  History   of  England   Vol  30.    London, 

1817. 

Memoires  pour  servir  a  1'histoire  de  France  sous  Na- 
poleon ecrits  a  St.  Hel£nepar  Montholon  5  vols;  par 

Gourgard  2  vols.  Paris,  1823. 
Memoires  politiques  et  militaires  du  General  Doppet  1 

vol.  Paris,  1824. 
Memoires  de  Freron  Paris,  1824. 
Memoires  pour  servir  a  1'histoire  de  la  ville  de  Toulon 

en  1793,  Pons,  Paris,  1825. 
Historic    de    la   Revolution    franyaise   Tome   sixie"me 

Thiers,  Paris,  1834. 
Memoires  du  Prince  de  la  Paix  Don  Manuel  Godoy  4 

vols.  Paris,  1836. 
Biographic  de  Napoleon  Bonaparte,  Coston,  Paris,  1840. 

l  Many  of  the  reports,  especially  in  the  Archives  de  la  Guerre,  are  full 
of  orthographical  errors.  I  have  copied  them  exactly  as  I  found  them. 


176927 


IV          CONTEMPORANRY    ACCOUNTS    AND     BIBLIOGRAPHY. 

Extraits  de  Memoires  inedites  du  due  de  Bellune,  Paris, 

1846. 
Memoires  de  Claude  Victor  Perrin  due   de    Bellune 

Paris,  1847. 
Life  and  correspondence  of  Admiral  Sir  W.  Sidney 

Smith,  Barrow  2  vols.  London,  1848. 
Memorials  and   correspondence  of  C.  J.  Fox,  Russell 

London,  1853. 

Correspon dance  de  Napoleon  Vol.  1.  Paris,  1853. 
Journal   and  correspondence  of  William   Lord  Auck- 
land 4  vols.  London,  1862. 
Oestreich  und  Preussen  gegeniiber  der  Franzoesischen 

Revolution    bis  zum    Abschluss   des   Friedens  von 

Campio  Formio,  H.  Hueffer,  Bonn,  1868. 
Memoires  sur  la  guerre  des  Alpes  tires  des  papiers  du 

Comte  Ignas  Thaon  de  Revel,  Turin,  Rom,  Florence 

1871. 
Vertrauliche   Briefe  des  Freiherren  von  Thugut,  von 

Vivenot,  Band  I  Vienna,  1872. 
Life  and  Letters  of  Sir  Gilbert  Elliot  first  Earl  of  Minto, 

1751  to  1806  3  vols.  London,  1874. 
Life  of  Thomas  Graham  Lord  Lynedoch  A.  M.  Dela- 

voye  London,  1880. 
Bonaparte  et  son   temps,  1769-99.  3  vols.  Jung  Paris, 

1880-81. 
Campaignes   dans   les   Alpes   pendant  la   Revolution 

1792-93  Krebs  et  Morris,  Paris,  1891. 
Recueil  des  actes  du  Comite  de  Salut  Public  avec  la 

correspondance  officielle  des  representants  en  mission. 

F.  A.  Aulard  Paris,  1894. 

Memoires  de  Barras  4  vols.  Duruy  Paris,  1895-6. 
The  manuscripts  of  J.  B.  Fortesque  Esq.  Vol.  2  London, 

1894. 
Napoleon  Bonaparte  et  les  Generaux  Du  Teil,  Baron 

Joseph  du  Teil,  Paris,  1897. 

Toulon  et  les  Anglais  en  1793.  Paul  Cottin  Paris,  1898. 
La  Jeunesse  de  NapolSon,  Chuquet  Paris,  1899. 


PREFACE. 

The  siege  of  Toulon  in  1793  is  interesting  and  important, 
as  a  military  event  in  the  War  of  the  First  Coalition ;  as  a 
political  combination  of  the  European  Powers  during  the  early 
part  of  the  same  war;  and  as  a  personal  incident  in  the  life 
of  Napoleon  Bonaparte.  The  following  pages  are  the  result 
of  a  study  of  the  siege  in  which  I  have  tried  to  give  special 
attention  to  the  second  and  third  phases  of  the  question.  I 
have  come  to  the  conclusion  that  the  political  importance  of 
the  siege  was  considerable  and  that  the  English  entered 
Toulon  unexpectedly  and  intended  to  hold  it  simply  as  a 
pledge  of  indemnification  ;  and  secondly  that  the  role  of 
Bonaparte  was  very  important  and  that  he  by  directing 
the  course  of  this  siege,  had  here  for  the  first  time  an  influ- 
ence upon  the  events  of  his  time  and  consequently  enters 
history.  As  the  last  point  has  been  much  disputed  and  as 
the  others  have  not  yet  been  brought  out,  I  have  in  attempt- 
ing to  demonstrate  each,  given  as  much  as  possible  of  the 
material  used,  together  with  frequent  references,  allowing 
him  whom  the  subject  may  interest  to  draw  his  own  conclu- 
sions, hoping  however  that  they  will  coincide  with  those 
which  in  my  opinion  are  the  logical  and  just  ones. 

The  first  accounts  of  Napoleon's  actions  were  written  dur- 
ing, and  under  the  influence  of,  the  grandeur  of  the  Consul- 
ate and  First  Empire.  The  part  he  played  at  Toulon  was 
generally  considered  great'and  brilliant;  but  this  prevalent 
opinion  was  based  principally  upon  more  or  less  inexact  rem- 
iniscences of  those  who  took  part  in  the  siege  with  him. 
Everybody  accepted  without  going  into  particulars  that  the 
First  Consul,  or  Emperor,  began  his  career  at  Toulon,  where 
his  genius  first  attracted  attention.  At  the  Restauration  roy- 
alists who  had  served  at  Toulon  published  accounts  of  the 
siege,  which  with  regard  to  the  role  of  Bonaparte,  had  rather 
the  opposite  tendency.  But  as  their  principal  aim  was  to 


VI  PREFACE. 

bring  forward  their  own  actions  and  thereby  win  the  favor 
of  Louis  XVIII,  and  as  anti-Bonapartist  statements  needed 
then  no  foundation  on  fact,  these  writings  are  of  no  ob- 
jective value.  They  reflect  but  the  anti-Bonapartist  and 
pro-English  sentiment  of  the  Court  at  this  time.  Thiers 
throws  some  light  on  Bonaparte's  role  at  Toulon,  attributing 
principally  to  him  the  fall  of  the  city;  but  Thiers'  Work  was 
to  vast  to  permit  him  to  make  any  special  study  of  the  af- 
fair of  Toulon.  His  account  of  it  is  filled  with  errors.  The 
Memoirs  of  Barras  (not  published  until  1895)  furnish  ample 
but  quite  untrustworthy  material  to  those  who  wish  to  les- 
sen the  role  of  Bonaparte  at  this  siege.  This  same  spirit  of 
hostility  to  Napoleon  prevails  in  Jung's  "Bonaparte  et  son 
temps"  He  too  denies  the  importance  of  the  role  of  Bona- 
parte at  Toulon  but  he  does  not  go  much  into  particulars, 
nor  did  he  study  the  question  without  prejudice.  The  eager- 
ness with  which  he  seeks  an  opportunity  of  defaming  the 
name  of  Bonaparte  is  shown  where  he  himself  speaks  of 
Napoleon  (page  372  vol.  I)  as  an  officer  of  25  years  when  he 
wrote  the  "Souper  de  Beaucaire",  and  then  again  deliber- 
ately accuses  him  (page  396)  of  giving  a  false  age  in  stating 
that  he  was  25  after  the  siege  of  Toulon.  Krebs  and  Morris 
in  their  work  on  Campagnes  in  the  Alpes  give  a  good  gen- 
eral account  of  the  siege,  but  the  role  of  Bonaparte  is  passed 
by  with  the  mere  assertion  that  in  the  official  records  noth- 
ing is  found  to  prove  its  importance.  It  is  true  that  in  the 
documents  of  the  Archives  de  la  Guerre  at  Paris,  no  direct 
statement  can  be  found  that  Napoleon  Bonaparte  took  a 
very  important  part  in  the  entire  affair;  but  indirect  proofs 
are  by  no  means  wanting,  either  here  or  in  the  English  offi- 
cial reports.  The  two  latest  works  on  Toulon  are  those  of 
Cottin  and  Chuquet.  Cottin  leaves  the  role  of  Bonaparte 
rather  aside  and  using  the  English  sources,  writes  on  their 
action  at  Toulon.  His  work  has  the  value  of  publishing  im- 
portant documents  hitherto  inaccessible  in  printed  form; 
but  with  the  same  he  has  combined  much  doubtful  detail 


PREFACE.  VII 

derived  from  rather  untrustworthy  and  contradictory 
sources.  His  book  has  an  anti-English  tendency  and  fails  to 
bring  out  the  political  importance  of  the  affair  of  Toulon. 
Chuquet's  work,  an  enlargement  of  two  articles  published  in 
Cosmopolis,  is  of  rather  a  popular  character  but  it  publishes 
for  the  first  time  some  letters  of  Bonaparte  and  other  impor- 
tant pieces.  He  goes  into  detail  which  is  very  difficult  to 
control  and  the  sources  of  which  he  has  not  always  care- 
fully considered.  The  role  of  Bonaparte  is  emphasized,  but 
not  in  a  manner  convincing  enough  for  a  question  so  much 
in  dispute. 

In  publishing  this  small  volume  I  wish  to  take  advan- 
tage of  the  opportunitjr  to  express  my  sincere  gratitude  to 
all  my  Professors  at  Heidelberg,  and  to  mention  my  appre- 
ciation of  the  kindness  of  the  late  Professor  Erdmannsdorf- 
fer  and  Professor  Schafer,  whose  generous  aid  and  hospitality 
to  foreigners  I  shall  always  try  to  emulate. 


PART  I. 

CONDITIONS     UNDER    WHICH     TOULON     SUR- 
RENDERED TO  THE    ENGLISH  AND 
SIEGE  OP  TOULON. 


CHAPTER  I. 

FRANCE  IN  1793 — TOPOGRAPHICAL  DESCRIPTION  OF  TOU- 
LON— NEGOTIATIONS  PRECEEDING  SURRENDER — PROC- 
LAMATION OF  HOOD — HOOD'S  ENTRANCE — ARRIVAL  OF 
NEWS  IN  LONDON — POLITICAL  SITUATION  OF  ALLIES  AT 
TIME  OF  SIEGE — OPINIONS  ON  HOOD'S  DECLARATION — 
ENGLISH  IDEA  AS  TO  RETENTION  OF  TOULON. 

In  1793  the  French  Revolution  had  advanced  far  in  its 
impetuous  course.  In  its  commencement  ill  denned,  its 
course  hard  to  foresee,  and  uncertain,  it  had  at  its  culmina- 
tion formed  itself  into  a  definite,  cruel  and  reckless  system, 
the  Terror.  Power  had  passed  from  the  right  to  the  extreme 
left  of  the  National  Assembly,  and  there  into  hands  which 
were  capable  of  holding  and  using  it.  The  execution  of 
Louis  XVI,  the  crowning  act  of  the  Revolution  took  place 
at  the  beginning  of  this  year;  shortly  after  followed  the  re- 
volt in  the  Vendee  :  the  first  attempt  at  military  rule  was  de- 
feated as  Dumouriez  went  over  to  the  Austrians:  the  Giron- 
dists were  overthrown  by  their  more  reckless  and  energetic 
rivals:  then  followed  the  uprising  of  two-thirds  of  the  de- 
partments and  of  many  large  cities,  Lyons,  Marseilles,  Tou- 
lon and  Bordeaux.  The  situation  in  the  interior  of  France 
was  very  uncertain,  and  the  dangers  from  without  were 
great.  After  Neerwinden  Belgium  was  lost  and  the  Austrians 
advanced  victoriously  into  Northern  France.  The  Prussians 
retook  Mayence  and  put  an  end  to  its  revolutionary  exces- 
ses. The  Piedmontese  forced  their  way  over  the  Alps,  the 
Spaniards  came  over  the  Pyrenees.  The  English  were  every- 
where on  the  seas.  It  was  under  these  conditions  that  France, 
or  more  strictly  Revolutionary  France,  stood  alone  against 
the  nations  of  Europe  united  in  the  pursuit  of  their  differ- 
ent political  ambitions,  and  in  the  hope  of  future  advan- 
tages. For  whatever  may  have  been  the  origin  of  the  Revo- 

2192-1 


lutionary  Wars,  the  European  nations,  once  united  against 
France,  were  striving  after  their  own  interests,  and  these 
at  the  expense  of  France,  who  at  this  time  seemed  inevita- 
bly lost.  This  however  was  not  the  case.  Everyone  knows 
the  Peace  of  Campio  Formio  which  followed  that  of  Basel 
and  others,  yet  it  is  by  no  means  easy  to  explain  clearly  how 
the  Kepublicans  performed  the  seemingly  impossible  and 
forced  upon  the  entire  Continent  such  advantageous  terms. 
The  history  of  the  Siege  of  Toulon  gives  an  insight  into 
these  conditions,  for  one  might  almost  say  that  here  the 
War  of  the  First  Coalition  took  place  on  a  smaller  scale. 
The  same  forces  stood  opposing  each  other.  On  the  one  side, 
the  European  powers,  England,  Spain,  Sardinia,  Naples 
even  Austria,  as  well  as  the  French  Royalists  and  Emigres; 
on  the  other  the  enthusiastic,  almost  fanatical,  self-sacrific- 
ing, but  uncertain  Republican  army,  directed  by  a  few  in- 
genious leaders,  among  them  Bonaparte  and  Victor,  and 
supported  at  home  by  an  active  energetic  government  under 
the  organizing  genius  of  Carnot.  Everything  was  sacrificed 
to  the  object  of  the  war.  On  the  one  side  was  discord,  dis- 
trust, jealousy,  and  ill-directed  egotism.  The  best  energy  of 
the  European  nations  exhausted  itself  over  the  division  of 
spoils  which  were  still  to  be  won.  On  the  other  side  was 
geographic  and  political  unity,  together  with  a  fanatical  de- 
votion to  the  one  object.  All  passions,  the  ambition  of  the 
demagogue  and  of  the  soldier,  even  the  fear  of  the  Repub- 
licans, lead  to  the  same  end;  namely,  the  liberating  of 
France  from  the  foreign  invader.  On  the  one  hand  it  was  a 
question  of  obtaining  certain  advantages,  in  the  distribution 
of  which  lay  the  cause  of  future  disagreement ;  on  the  other, 
it  was  a  question  of  life  and  death  ;  and  this  struggle  for 
existence  was  carried  on  by  energetic  reckless  men  who  had 
risen  by  their  own  force  and  ability,  and  who  in  the  choice 
of  thier  means  were  unhampered  by  any  traditional,  relig- 
ious or  even  human  considerations. 

To  understand  a  siege  it  is  necessary,  first  to  have  an  idea 


of  the  topographical  and  other  military  conditions  of  the 
place  in  which  it  is  carried  on.  In  the  year  1793  Toulon, 
a  city  of  some  28,000  inhabitants,  was  enclosed  by  a  circle 
of  fortifications  which  dated  from  the  time  of  Vauban,  but 
which  had  been  continually  improved  and  were  now  in 
fairly  good  condition.  It  was  reputed  one  of  the  strongest 
fortifications  in  Europe.  On  the  land  side  Toulon  is  sur- 
rounded by  high  mountains  especially  the  massive  ridge  of 
Mount  Faron  on  the  north.  From  the  city  one  road  leads  to 
Marseilles  and  another  eastward  toward  Italy.  The  Riviere 
Neuve  flows  from  the  north  past  the  western  side  of  the 
city,  into  the  inner  of  the  two  harbors,  which  are  called  the 
Grande  and  Petite  Rade.  This  river  is  dry  in  the  summer. 
The  fortifications  on  the  north-west  were  Fort  Pomets  and 
the  Redoute  St.  Andre  (completed  but  not  armed) ;  on  the 
north-east,  Fort  Rouge,  Fort  Blanc,  and  the  intrenched 
camp,  Ste.  Anne.  Mont  Faron  also  protected  the  city  on  the 
north.  On  the  east,  to  defend  the  road  to  Italy  was  Fort  La 
Malgue.  According  to  Napoleon,  this  fort  was  very  carefully 
built.  It  protected  also  the  Grande  Rade.  Fort  Ste.  Catherine 
and  Fort  L'Artigues,  likewise  on  the  east,  were  supported 
by  Mont  Faron.  On  the  west  was  Fort  Malbousquet.  It 
was  merely  a  temporary  fortification, but  important  through 
its  position.  Fort  Missiessy  was  also  on  the  west,  on  the 
north  shore  of  the  Petite  Rade.  The  entrance  to  the  Grande 
Rade  was  covered  by  Fort  La  Malgue,  that  of  the  Petite 
Rade  by  Fort  Grosse  Tour,  on  the  eastern  side,  and  by  the 
coast  batteries,  Balaguier  and  Eguillette,  on  the  western 
side.  In  general,  more  importance  had  been  placed  on  the 
fortifications  on  the  east  of  the  city  than  on  those  on  the 
west.  It  was  supposed  that  all  attacks  were  to  come  from 
the  Italian  side. 

In  Toulon,  as  in  most  of  the  cities  and  many  of  the  De- 
partments, there  was  a  revolutionary  and  a  Royalist  party, 
each  striving  to  obtain  power.  In  Toulon  the  Republicans 
found  support  in  the  Republican  army  under  Carteaux. 


The  Royalists,  in  accordance  with  their  policy  at  that  time, 
sought  help  from  outside.  1  The  English  squadron  had 
been  seen  for  weeks  before  Toulon,  where  tur  Admiral, 
Lord  Hood,  stood  watching  the  large  French  fleet  in  the 
harbor.  To  destroy  this  formed  part  of  his  plan;  which  was 
to  win  and  hold  for  England  the  supremacy  of  the  Mediter- 
ranean. The  Royalists  of  Marseilles  and  Toulon  were  in  con- 
stant communication,  and  were  secretly  forming  plans.  A 
certain  undecided  portion  of  the  population  was  to  be  won 
over  to  their  side.  For  some  time  they  cherished  the  plan  of 
inviting  the  English  to  enter.  In  some  manner  the  English 
representative  in  Turin,  John  Trevor,  who  was  well  in- 
formed on  the  affairs  of  Italy  and  the  Mediterranean,  got 
news  of  this  intention  and  wrote  as  early  as  July  21  to  Hood, 
informing  him  of  the  possibility  of  an  appeal  for  help  from 
the  people  of  Toulon.  Hood  seemed,  however,  to  have  given 
the  matter  but  little  -attention.  His  object  was  still  the 
French  fleet.  A  few  days  before,  on  July  19,  he  had  sent  a 
Lieutenant  Cook  into  Toulon  to  negotiate  an  exchange  of 
prisoners;  permitting  him  to  wait  twenty-four  hours  for  a 
reply. 

Cook  returned  bringing  with  him  a  list  of  the  French 
ships  in  Toulon,  and  other  useful  information.  It  is  possi- 
ble, although  all  evidence  is  wanting,  that  Cook,  who  was 
Hood's  nephew,  entered  even  at  this  time,  into  communica- 
tion with  the  Royalists.  The  Royalists  resorted  to  a  trick 
to  win  over  the  still  undecided  portion  of  the  inhabitants. 
The  fear  of  a  bread  famine  was  held  out  before  the  people; 
although  there  were  provisions  for  three  months  at  hand. 
Thaon  de  Revel,  the  commander  of  the  Piedmontese  troops 
wrote:  u L'apprehension  de  la  famine  fut  la  consideration 
qui  decida  les  habitans.  Les  chefs  avaient  persuade  a  la 
multitude  que  bientot  elle  manquerait  de  pain  si  V  on  ne 

1  de  Bre"cy.  "Un  sentiment  presque  unaninie  inspira  le  projet  d'en- 
voyer  un  parlementaire  au  commandant  anglais  pour  lui  demander  son 
concours  et  son  assistance." 


traitait  avec  les  Anglais ;  quoique  dans  le  fait  il  y  eut  du 
grain  pour  plus  de  trois  rnois."  l  Nelson,  who  at  the  time  of 
the  siege,  was  sailing  in  and  out  of  the  harbor  of  Toulon, 
wrote  "  Famine  had  done  what  force  could  not  have  done."  2 
In  this  manner  the  people  were  deceived  and  won  over. 
Negotiations  with  Hood  commenced  first  from  Marseille, 
then  from  Toulon,  the  latter  being  of  much  more  interest 
to  the  English.  At  first  one  spoke  of  an  importation  of 
grain  into  Marseille,  finally  of  the  conditional  surrender  of 
Toulon  to  the  English. 

After  holding  a  Council  of  War  Hood  gave  out,  on  August 
23,  a  preliminary  declaration,  which  was  soon  followed  by 
a  proclamation.  Both  were  sent  to  Marseille  and  Toulon. 
The  declaration  said  :  That  if  the  people  of  Toulon  and  Mar- 
seille declare  openly  for  monarchy ;  if  the  vessels  are  dis- 
armed and  the  harbor  and  forts  put  provisionally  in  Hood's 
charge,  the  people  of  Provence  may  count  upon  the  assist- 
ance of  the  British  fleet:  the  rights  of  property  and  of 
the  individual  shall  be  protected  :  further,  that  Hood's  only 
object  is  the  restoration  of  peace  and  that  then  all  will  be 
returned  "  conformement  a  1'inventaire  qui  en  sera  fait". 
In  the  Proclamation  Hood  gives  a  "  tableau  fiedle"  of  the 
"malheureuse  condition"  of  the  French  nation  during  the 
last  four  years,  and  declares  that  the  European  nations  see 
no  remedy  to  such  evils  other  than  reestablishment  of  mon- 
archy in  France.  He  offers  his  protection  and  aid  to  estab- 
lish "un  gouvernment  regulieret  de  maintainirlapaix  et  la 
tranquillite  dans  1'Europe."  Hood's  proclamation  arrived 
too  late  in  Marseilles;  the  approaching  Republican  army 
made  it  impossible  to  continue  the  negociations.  In  Toulon 
the  most  stormy  debates  took  place  in  the  Sections  when 
Lieutenant  Cook  announced  Hood's  offer.  The  Royalists 
carried  off  the  victory,  in  spite  of  all  opposition  of  the  other 
party,  and  of  the  hostile  attitude  of  the  French  ships  in 

1  Memoirs. 

2  Letters  Sept.  14th.  Nelson  dispatches. 


the  harbor.  The  Sections  decided  for  the  entrance  of  the 
English,  but  under  several  conditions.  Among  others;  the 
present  constitution  was  to  be  replaced  by  the  monarchical 
government,  under  the  Constitution  of  1791 j1  civil  and 
military  officers  were  to  retain  their  places.  The  provis- 
ioning of  the  city  was  to  be  assured ;  an  inventory  was  to 
be  made  of  the  vessels  and  of  all  material  in  the  port.  These 
conditions  were  carried  back  by  Cook  to  Hood,  who  ac- 
cepted them.  His  present  fleet  was  however  not  strong 
enough  to  risk  entering  alone.  He  therefore  asked  assist- 
ance from  the  Spanish  Admiral  Langara  who  at  first  re- 
fused, but  consented  on  a  second  invitation  from  Hood,  who 
accompanied  this  invitation  with  a  copy  of  his  intended 
proclamation.  In  the  meantime  Hood  published  his  second 
proclamation  to  the  inhabitants  of  Toulon.  It  was  dated 
August  28th  and  declared  :  '  as  the  Sections  of  Toulon  have 
declared  Louis  XVII  as  their  legitimate  sovereign  and  for 
monarchy  according  to  the  constitution  of  1791,  he  takes 
possession  of  Toulon  and  will  guard  it  "en  depot  pour 
Louis  XVII  jusqu'  au  retablissementde  la  paixen  France". 
The  next  day  as  the  Spanish  fleet  appeared  in  sight  Hood 
sailed  into  the  harbor,  the  Spanish  following.2  The  sea- 
men of  the  French  fleet  were  divided  into  two  parties,  the 
Jacobins  and  the  Royalists.  The  first  showed  in  the  begin- 
ning a  determination  to  oppose  the  landing  of  the  English, 
but  were  held  in  check  by  the  Royalists  and  the  land  bat- 
teries. Finally,  threatened  by  the  English  and  Spanish,  the}^ 
found  it  better  to  take  advantage  of  a  chance  to  escape,  than 
to  offer  resistance.  The  crew  of  seven  ships  succeeded  in 
getting  away.  Hood  and  Langara  received  a  most  enthus- 
iastic reception  from  the  inhabitants  and  officials  of  Toulon. 
An  excellent  understanding  existed  between  the  two  ad- 

1  This  constitution  was  always  referred  to,  and  is  .spoken  of  in  the 
following  pages,  as  the  constitution  of  1 789. 

2  Journal  of  Samuel  Lord  Hood.    Admiralty  Records.    Public  Record 
Office. 


rairals.  A  thousand  marines  and  about  300  sailors  from  each 
fleet  were  landed  immediately  at  Fort  LaMalgue.1 

On  September  12th  the  news  of  the  fall  of  Toulon  reached 
London  by  way  of  Turin.  It  caused  in  government  circles 
quite  as  much  surprise  as  satisfaction.  It  was  decided  to  col- 
lect troops  and  send  them  to  Hood  without  deranging  the 
plans  of  campaign  in  general.  The  first  intention  was  to 
send  5000  British  troops,  raised  in  Ireland,  and  5000  Hes- 
sians.2 As  early  as  September  14th,  and  at  Pitt's  sugges- 
tion,8 instructions  were  sent  to  Sir  Morton  Eden,  the  English 
ambassador  at  Vienna  to  ask  for  Austrian  troops.  These 
were  promised,  but  never  arrived.  More  about  the  negocia- 
tions  concerning  the  will  be  given  later. 

Here  it  might  be  well  to  insert  an  account  of  the  political 
situation  of  Europe  at  this  time.  Three  important  questions 
preoccupied  more  or  less,  the  different  cabinets.  The  war 
against  the  Republic,  affairs  in  Poland  and  Austria's  re- 
sumed plan  of  exchanging  the  Netherlands  for  Bavaria. 
Nearly  all  the  nations  were  joined  in  the  struggle  with 
France  but  the  attention  of  several  of  them  Austria,  Prussja, 
Russia,  an  others  was  much  diverted  by  the  other  two  ques- 
tions. The  news  of  the  second  division  of  Poland  brought 
Thugut,  whose  anti-Prussian  policy  was  well  known,  into 
power  in  Vienna.  An  understanding  between  Austria  and 
England  was  the  result.  This  power,  (England)  as  well  as 
the  other  European  nations,  now  taking  for  granted,  (and 
under  existing  conditions  it  was  almost  pardonable)  that 
France  would  fall,  directed  its  best  thoughts  and  energy  to 
her  future  dismemberment,  arid  to  its  share  of  the  "Indem- 
nification." The  plans  of  the  English  government,  having 
taken  rather  a  definite  form,  full  instructions  were  sent  to 

1  Letter  from  Graham  to   Sir  William   Hamilton.     Correspondence. 
British  Museum.  Manuscript  Department.  Egerton  2638. 

2  Letter  Dundas  to  Sir  James  Murray.    Sept.  14.    War  Office.    British 
Army  on  Continent.  1793.  Record  Office. 

3  Letter  Pitt  to  Grenville.  Sept  7.  Manuscripts  of  J.  B.  Fortescue. 


8 

Eden  in  Vienna.  They  were  dated  Whitehall.  Sept.  7. l 
and  contained,  first,  an  account  of  Austria's  plans,  as  they 
have  been  stated  in  England,  namely  "  the  making  perma- 
nent acquisitions,  to  as  large  an  extent  as  they  are  practi- 
cable, in  the  Low  Countries,  in  Alsace  and  Loraine,  and  in 
the  intermediate  parts  of  the  frontier  of  France.  No  similar 
communication  has  as  yet  been  made  on  the  part  of  His 
Majesty,  but  the  circumstances  and  situation  of  affairs  have 
made  it  sufficiently  evident  that  whatever  indemnification 
is  to  be  acquired  by  this  country  must  be  looked  for  in  the 
foreign  settlements  and  colonies  of  France.  In  these  ob- 
jects the  interest  of  the  two  Courts  are  so  far  from  clashing 
that  His  Majesty  has  an  interest  in  seeing  the  House  of 
Austria  strengthen  itself  by  acquisition  on  the  French  fron- 
tier, and  the  very  circumstance  of  that  interest  should  make 
the  Emperor  see  with  pleasure  the  relative  increase  of  the 
naval  and  commercial  resources  of  this  country  beyond 
those  of  France As  to  the  Powers  who  are  al- 
ready engaged  in  the  war  it  does  not  appear  that  much  can 
be  done  by  Austria,  at  least  in  the  present  moment  towards 
securing  the  co-operation  of  Spain.  But  no  endeavours  will 
be  omitted  by  His  Majesty  for  that  purpose  ".  .  .  In 
speaking  of  the  coolness  between  Austria  and  Sardinia, 
"  the  idea  once  entertained  by  the  Court  of  Vienna  of  ex- 
tending the  frontier  of  the  Milanese  at  the  expense  of  the 
King  of  Sardinia  is,  I  trust,  abandoned,  but  if  brought  for- 
ward again,  must  be  strongly  discouraged  by  you  "  .  .  .  . 
As  regards  Prussia,  "  it  is  obvious  that  the  interest  of  the 
Emperor  is  as  much  concerned  as  that  of  His  Majesty  in 
securing  even  at  the  expense  of  some  sacrifice  the  co-opera- 
tion and  assistance  of  the  King  of  Prussia.  If  no  step  is 
taken  to  remove  the  increasing  jealousy  between  those  two 
courts  the  worst  consequences  may  be  expected  from  them" 
.  .  .  .  Then  follows  advice  to  Austria  to  renounce  her 

1  Foreign  Office.  Austria.    Sir  Morton  Eden.  Aug.  to  Oct.  93.    Public 
Record  Office. 


9 

claim  on  Bavaria  in  order  to  avoid  Prussia's  jealousy.  The 
Elector  might  then  take  an  active  part  in  the  war,  might 
send  troops  to  His  Majesty  "  who  would  not  be  unwilling 
to  incur  a  considerable  expense  for  an  object  of  so  much  im- 
portance to  the  common  cause."  ....  As  to  Russia, 
"  His  Majesty's  endeavours  to  obtain  the  active  co-operation 
of  that  power  have  proved  ineffective.  The  assistance  of  a 
body  of  troops  having  ultimately  been  refused  to  His  Maj- 
esty except  on  terms  which,  independant  of  other  objections, 
would  have  committed  this  country  with  respect  to  the  in- 
terior of  France  beyond  what  His  Majesty  judged  to  be 
advisable  or  prudent."  .  ..."  In  the  Mediterranean 
the  interests  of  this  country  are,  that  our  naval  superiority 
over  France  should  be  maintained  and  there  is  no  reason 
to  doubt  of  this  point  being  sufficiently  secured"  .... 
Here  Grenville  mentions  the  necessity  of  the  assistance  of 
12  or  15,000  Austrian  troops  for  affairs  in  the  Mediterranean. 
.  .  .  a  I  have  mentioned  to  you  His  Majesty's  disposi- 
tion to  connect  himself  by  a  defensive  alliance  with  the  Em- 
peror, and  I  have  stated  that  you  are  at  liberty  to  give  the 
strongest  assurances  on  this  head.  The  basis  of  such  an 
alliance  would  naturally  be,  as  I  have  explained  to  Count 
Starhenberg  the  same  with  of  the  ancient  system  by  which 
the  two  countries  were  formally  united  :  the  securing  a  bar- 
rier against  France,  the  retaining  the  Netherlands  under 
the  lawful  sovereignty  of  Austria,  the  securing  and  aug- 
mentation of  the  commerce  of  the  Maritime  Powers,  and 
the  Mutual  guaranty  of  all  possessions  antecedent  to  the 
war." 

The  foregoing  instructions  give  an  insight  into  political 
relations  at  this  moment.  The  following  extract  from  a  let- 
ter to  Grenville,  from  Lord  St.  Helens,  the  English  Ambas- 
sador at  Madrid,  completes  it  to  some  extent.  llt  was  dated 
Madrid,  August  28.  "I  understand  that  the  Duke  of  Alcudia 

1  Foreign  Office.  Spain.  Lord  St.  Helens  and  Consuls'  dispatches  Aug. 
to  Dec.  1793.  Public  Record  Office. 


10 

•has  testified  a  great  deal  of  Pique  and  Dissatisfaction  to  the 
Prussian  and  Austrian  Ministers  on  account  of  the  late 
capitulations  of  Mentz  and  Valanciennes  concerning  that 
from  the  vague  and  indefinite  terms  they  were  drawn  the 
French  government  will  consider  themselves  as  at  liberty  to 
employ  these  garrisons  in  their  armies  on  this  Frontier. 
There  appears  great  reason  to  hope  that  these  alarms  may 
prove  groundless.  However  this  seeming  want  of  attention 
to  the  interests  of  this  crown  on  the  part  of  the  Emperor 
and  the  King  of  Prussia  has  increased  the  sentiments  of 
jealousy  against  those  sovereigns,  which  have  been  so  long 
entertained  here,  and  which  I  observe  to  be  studiously  kept 
up  and  inflamed  by  the  agents  of  the  French  Princes. 
With  regard  to  England,  the  Spanish  Minister's  language 
is  still  friendly  and  cordial,  however,  I  am  told  that  some 
ill-intentioned  Persons  have  been  endeavouring  to  persuade 
him  that  we  have  acted  un-candidly  by  this  Court  in  con- 
cluding a  Treaty  with  Naples  without  their  knowledge,  and 
I  therefore  take  the  liberty  of  submitting  to  your  Lordship 
whether  if  that  Treaty  contained  nothing  of  a  secret  nature 
it  might  not  be  advisable  to  communicate  it  here  without 
loss  of  time "  .  .  .  . 

Here  is  the  political  situation  in  a  few  words.  England 
looked  for  indemnification  outside  of  Europe;  an  increase 
of  her  commerce  and  supremacy  over  France  in  the  Medi- 
terranean. Her  object  was  to  bring  the  war  to  a  fortunate 
termination  and  for  that  reason  to  hold  the  European  nations 
together.  She  was  willing  to  make  financial  sacrifices  for 
the  common  cause.  She  would  not  commit  herself  as  to  the 
future  government  in  France.  Austria  wished  to  increase 
her  possessions  in  the  Netherlands  and  in  Alsace;  she  was 
jealous  of  Prussia.  She  hoped  also  to  extend  her  Milanese 
territory,  and  there  was  jealousy  between  her  and  Sardinia. 
She  was  not  quite  so  decided  about  continuing  her  plan  of 
obtaining  Bavaria.  Spain  had  cause  of  ill-will  against 
Austria  and  Prussia.  Russia  continued  her  policy  of  refrain- 


11 

ing  from  any  active  part  in  the  war  against  France.  Eng- 
land had  signed  treaties  with  Sardinia,  Naples,  Hesse  and 
Baden,  by  which  they  agreed  to  furnish  her  troops.  Prus- 
sia's attention  was  turned  toward  Poland  and  she  was  already 
wavering  in  her  policy  of  war  against  the  Republic. 

The  English  government  was  not  quite  satisfied  with 
Lord  Hood's  declaration.  Grenville  wrote  to  Eden  Sept.  14. 
2  "Lord  Hood  has  been  induced  by  circumstances  and  by  the 
great  advantage  which  was  in  view,  to  go  further  with  re- 
spect to  the  Interior  state  of  France  and  to  the  Futur  Gov- 
ernment to  be  established  there,  than  was  in  contemplation 
according  to  the  ideas  stated  to  you  in  my  late  dispatch. 
You  will  explain  the  circumstances  to  the  Austrian  Minis- 
ter and  you  will  add  that  on  this  account  as  well  as  from 
the  Change  which  the  event  of  Toulon  produced  in  our  sit- 
uation it  may  perhaps  be  advisable  that  some  public  meas- 
ure should  be  taken  on  this  subject  by  this  court,  and  that 
of  Vienna  jointly.  The  ideas  on  this  subject  which  are  enter- . 
tained  by  His  Majesty's  Ministers  will  be  transmitted  to  you 
with  as  little  delay  as  possible."  In  Spain  the  news  of  Tou- 
lon's surrender  was  well  received.  St.  Helens  wrote  to  Gren- 
ville, Sep  6.  3"I  need  not  say  that  this  court  are  highly 
satisfied  with  these  advices,  and  above  all  with  Lord  Hood's 
invitation  to  Admiral  Langara  to  partake  in  his  success,  and 
that  they  profess  the  utmost  readiness  to  co-operate  with  us 
cordially  in  every  step  of  the  business."  The  news  of  Hood's 
entrance  was  also  welcomed  by  the  Royalists  and  Emigrants, 
and  for  a  time  it  was  supposed  that  other  cities  would  follow 
the  example  of  Toulon.  In  the  information  sent  to  the  For- 

1  Letter  Dundas  to  O'Hara.    18th  Dec.  Letters  from  Secry.  Dundas  to 
Lieut.  Gen.  Dundas.    1793-94.    British  Museum.    Mss.  Dept.  Additional 
27,594. 

"  By  treaty  26.  April.  Sardinian  Majesty  in  consequence  of  payment 
of  subsidy  has  bound  himself  to  furnish  his  majesty  20,000  troops  free  of 
any  further  expense." 

2  Public  Record  Office. 

3  St.  Helens.  Public  Record  Office. 


12 


eign  Office;  dated  Sept  20.  ^ne  reads  "On  croit  que  les 
Royalistes  a  Brest  dont  il  y  a  grand  norabre  feront  en 
sorte  que  la  flotte  renterra  sous  peu  de  jours  et  qu'oii  y 
proclamera  comme  a  Toulon  Louis  17  "  .  .  .  .  De  Saint 
Croix,  one  of  the  Emigrants  in  London,  wrote  to  Grenville, 
dated  London,  Sept.  15.  l  "  Lorsque  j'eus  avant  bier  1'hon- 
neur  d'ecrire  a  Votre  Excellence  je  ne  connaissais  point  les 
deux  proclamations  de  M.  L'Amiral  Hood.  Permettez-moi 
mi-lord  de  vous  en  exprimer  et  comme  francais  et  comme 
individu  toute  ma  reconnaissance.  Puissent  tons  les  cabi- 
nets adopter  ce  language:  il  y  a  plus  de  gloire  a  parler 
ainsi  qu'a  vaincre.  .  .  .  Vous  nous  rendez  Mylord  quel- 
que  corifience  et  quelque  securite:  vous  commandez  1'estime 
de  PEurope  et  vous  lui  donnez  un  grand  exemple." 

The  opinion  in  England  was  somewhat  divided  as  to  the 
advisability  of  retaining  Toulon,  even  temporarily,  but  all 
were  united  in  rejoicing  that  the  French  fleet  was  in  English 
hands.  It  was  even  suggested  that  upon  a  good  opportunity 
it  might  be  burned  and  the  town  given  up.  As  the  seige 
went  on  it  was  not  hard  to  see  that  the  question  of  what  was 
to  be  done  with  the  French  fleet  became  a  most  delicate  one. 
It  was  partly  upon  this  point  that  the  difference  arose  be- 
tween the  English  and  Spanish  Admirals,  and  later  their 
respective  Governments.  Lord  Sheffield  wrote  September 
15th  to  Auckland  2  "  I  see  no  use  of  encumbering  ourselves 
with  Toulon  unless  we  carry  home  the  French  fleet.  I 
should  certainly  have  taken  advantage  of  the  kind  of  resist- 
ance made  by  the  French  fleet,  by  hauling  into  the  inner 
road  and  would  have  burnt  them  all  to  save  further  em- 
barrassment." Pitt  speaks  of  the  taking  of  Toulon  as 
a  "  most  fortunate  event."  3  The  Marquis  of  Buckingham 
wrote  to  Grenville  Sept  15.  "  We  have  only  to  pray  that  the 

1  Foreign  Office.  Domestic  Papers.  March  to  Dec.  1793.  Public  Record 
Office. 

2  Auckland  Papers.  British  Museum.  Mss.  vol  12.  Additional  34,452. 

3  Letter  to  Grenville.  Sept  7.  Manuscripts  of  Fortescue. 


13 

patriots  may  besiege  Toulon  and  that  the  issue  of  the  con- 
test may  be  the  conflagration  of  the  docks  and  fleet." l  And 
on  Sept  29th.  "  You  must  be  prepared  to  meet  much 
opposition  to  the  idea  of  indemnification  which  the  emi- 
grants now  in  London  are  loud  in  reprobating.  At  the  same 
time  the  people  of  Brest  and  Toulon  can  not  be  very  anxious 
for  the  slices  which  may  be  required  from  France  on  the  side 
of  the  Pays  Bas  and  of  Lorain,  or  even  of  Piedmont;  and 
whether  they  are  or  no  it  is  good  to  habituate  people  early 
to  the  sound  of  such  a  proposition"  l  .  .  .  .on  Oct.  4th. 
"I  conclude  that  our  fleet  winters  at  Toulon  and  refits  with 
French  stores  taken  upon  a  valuation  ;  but  at  all  events,  I  hope 
that  you  will  retain  the  superiority  in  those  seas  even  over 
the  Spaniards,  whose  operations  except  those  of  Langara  do 
not  please  me"1  Nelson  wrote  Oct.  7th.  "Whether  we  shall 
be  able  to  maintain  our  most  extraordinary  acquisition  time 
only  can  determine,  however  one  hour  will  burn  the  French 
fleet " 2  .  .  .  .  The  plan  of  D'  Alcudia,  the  Spanish  min- 
ister was  3that  the  combined  squadrons  should  seize  the  first 
opportunity  of  forcibly  removing  all  the  Toulon  ships  to 
some  place  of  greater  security,  as  Port  Mahon  or  Carthagena. 
When  the  Comite  du  Salut  Public  heard  of  the  surrender 
of  Toulon  they  sent  off  the  following  laconic  note  to  the  u  Rep- 
resentants  du  Peuple"  with  the  Republican  army  at  Toulon. 
"  Citoyens  collegues  .  .  Nous  avons  appris  avec  indigna- 
tion la  perfide  trahison  de  Toulon  dont  vous  nous  informez 
par  votre  depeche  du  29  (sic)  Aout:  du  courage,  de  la  fer- 
mete  de  la  Constance:  nous  vaincrons  les  royalists,  les  des- 
pots et  les  traitres."  4 

1  Letter  to  Grenville.  Sept.  7.  Manuscripts  of  Fortescue. 

2  Nelson  Dispatches. 

3  St.  Helens,  to  Grenville  Oct.  2.  Record  Office. 

4  Reponse  du  Comite".  Aug.  28.  Re  cueil  Aulard. 


CHAPTER  II. 

ARRIVAL  OF  CASTEAUX  IN  MARSEILLES — FIRST  ENGAGE- 
MENT— ARRIVAL  OF  BONAPARTE — REPRESENTANTS  DU 
PEUPLE — EFFECT  OF  FIRST  BATTERIES — ATTACK  ON 
HEIGHTS  OF  GRASS E — ATTACK  ON  MOUNT  FARON — MIS- 
UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN  CARTE AUX  AND  LAPOYPE — 
ATTACK  ON  SABLETTES — ATTACK  ON  CAP  *BRUN — DE- 
PARTURE OF  CARTEAUX — BONAPARTE  DURING  ABSENCE 
OF  GENERALS — ARRIVAL  OF  DOPPET — ENGAGEMENTS 
ON  Nov.  15. 

Carteaux,  the  Republican  General,  entered  Marseilles  on 
August  25.  l  He  did  not  march  directly  on  Toulon  as  he 
was  waiting  for  reinforcements  from  the  army  of  Italy,  which 
were  approaching  from  the  east,  nor  did  he  dare  leave  Mar- 
seilles unprotected.  Toulon  was  threatened  from  the  east  and 
west  by  two  armies,  just  as  the  allies  arrived.  The  English 
especially  were  ill  prepared  in  a  military  way,  having  no 
soldier  of  a  higher  rank  than  captain.  2It  was  impossible  to 
do  much  towards  fortifying  the  town,  which,  especially  on 
the  western  side,  where  the  French  had  never  expected  an 
attack,  was  rather  exposed.  One  feared  somewhat  a  "coup 
de  main"  by  Carteaux,  aided  by  the  discontented  in  the 
town,  of  which  there  were  a  large  number.  From  the  begin- 
ning the  Republicans  were  not  idle.  "Nous  avons  donne 
Tordre  de  faire  sonner  le  tocsin  dans  toutes  les  communes 
du  department  du  Var  et  de  faire  marcher  tous  les  citoyens 
depuis  Page  de  16  ans  jusqu'atiO".  This  shows  a  praise- 
worthy activity,  but  to  allow  such  crowds  to  be  hurled  by 
incornpetant  generals  against  a  fortified  city  was  worse  than 
foolish. 

1  Lettre  de  Salicetti.  Aug  25.  R.  A. 

2  Letter.  T.  Graham  to  Sir  William  Hamilton.  British  Museum.  Mss. 
Egerton.  2638.  (14) 


15 

Carteaux's  advance  guard  occupied  the  passes  of  Ollioules 
on  the  29th  of  August.  The  English  and  Spanish  hearing 
of  it,  promptly  drove  the  Republicans  back.  This  was  the 
first  action  and  there  were  but  a  few  casualties.  This  position 
however,  was  important,  as  it  commanded  the  road  to  Mar- 
seilles, and  also  the  communications  with  La  Seyne,  a  vil- 
lage on  the  south-west  corner  of  the  Petite  Rade  ;  but  it 
was  too  far  from  Toulon  for  the  Allies  to  hold  it  in  their 
present  condition.  Carteaux  who  had  just  (Sept  4.)  been 
appointed  to  the  command  of  the  beseiging  army,  l  which 
was  to  be  independant  of  the  army  of  Italy,  made  prepara- 
tions to  retake  it.  On  September  7.  the  attack  took  place 
and  was  successful.  2  The  Allies  retreated  to  the  town  with 
a  small  loss:  the  Republicans  lost  but  one  man,  and  Don- 
martin,  who  commanded  the  artillery  was  severely  wounded. 
This  slight  success  of  the  Republicans  caused  a  somewhat  bad 
impression  in  the  town.  The  Republicans  now  closed  in  from 
the  east  and  west.  Carteaux,  who  commanded  the  western  di- 
vision in  person,  established  his  head-quarters  at  Ollioules 
and  extended  his  position  from  Faubregas  to  Baon-de-Qua- 
tres-Heures.  Lopoype,  who  had  come  from  the  Italian  Army, 
commanded  on  the  east.  His  head-quarters  were  at  Sollies- 
Farlede.  Lapoype  was  an  ex-marquis  whose  Jacobinisme 
was  much  less  to  questioned  than  his  ability  as  a  general. 
He  was  not  much  inferior  to  Carteaux  however,  especially 
in  this  kind  of  military  work.  His  wife  was  a  prisoner  in 
Toulon  and  this  fact  hampered  him  in  his  movements.3  The 
Republicans  were  very  weak  in  artillery,  and  some  of  it  had 
to  be  left  in  Marseille  "  pour  foudroyer  cette  ville  s'il  s'y 
manifestait  quelque  mouvement."  Now  they  were  even  de- 
prived of  their  chief  of  artillery,  Donmartin.  With  the  ma- 
terial at  hand  however,  Carteaux  had  erected  a  battery  on  the 

1  Arme"e  du  Siege  de  Toulon.  Archives  de  la  guerre. 

2  Lettre  de  Carteaux  a  I/apoype.  Sept  8.  Archives  de  la  guerre.  I^ettre 
Capt.  Cook  to  Gen.   Ed.  Smith.  Sept  7.   Barrow's  life  of  Sidney    Smith. 

3  Ivapoype  a  Bouchotte.  Sept  11.  Archives  de  la  Guerre. 


16 

west  side,  to  burn  the  fleet:  but  its  position,  far  out  of  range 
of  either  the  fleet  or  town,  was  laughable.1  Reinforcements 
continued  to  arrive  on  each  side  and  both  parties  pre- 
pared themselves  for  the  struggle.  Spain  was  especially 
prompt  in  sending  reinforcements.2  By  returns  taken  on 
Sep  12.  3  there  were  over  5000  troops  and  sailors  on  shore: 
of  these  3400  were  Spanish  and  about  1600  English.  This 
force  quite  exceeded  that  of  Carteaux  in  efficiency  and  proba- 
bly in  numbers.  Hood  wrote  on  Sept  14  the  a  Enemy  not 
yet  provided  with  artillery."  The  hopes  of  the  Allies  might 
well  rise,  for  who  could  have  suspected,  unless  it  was  the 
young  Corsican  himself,  and  at  this  very  moment  the  be- 
sieging army  had  received  a  most  formidable  reinforcement? 
On  September  16  or  17  4  the  direction  of  the  principal 

1  Carteaux  a  Lopoype.  Sept  8. 

2  Letters  from  St.  Helens.  Sept  18.  Record  Office 

3  Letter  from  St.  Helens  Sept  25.  R.  O. 

Graham  to  Hamilton.  Sept  14. 

Correspondence.  British  Museum.  Mss. 
Bgerton.  2638. 

4  The  exact  date  when  Napoleon  arrived  in  Toulon  is  difficult  to  place. 
He  says  in  his  Memoires  the  12th.  of  Sept.  Chuquet   believes    he  has 
proved  that  he  arrived   on  the  16th.  of   Sept.    (Page  171 — note)  "On 
ignorait  jusqu'ici  le  jour  ou  Bonaparte  arriva  devant  Toulon.  Ses  mem- 
oires  disent  tantot  le  12  Sept.  tantot  douze  a  quinze  jours  apres  la  prise 
d'Ollioules,  du  19  au  22  Septembre.   Mais  il  est  surement  le  15  a  Mar- 
seille (cf.  piece  LXIX ;  a  letter  from  Marseille,  dated  Sept  15)  et,  suivant 
une  lettre  de  Salicetti,  il  fait  le  17  a  Ollioules  les  preparatifs  d'une  attaque  ; 
il  est  done  arrive  le  16  au  quartier  general  du  Beausset.    N'  ecrit-il  pas 
d'ailleurs  pendant  les  siege  "  les  batteries  furent  etablies  trois  jours  apres 
son  arrivee  ?  "  Or  la  batterie  de  la  Montagne  date  du  19  Septembre."  In 
the  first  place  the  contradiction  in  Napoleon's  Memoirs  can  be  explained. 
There  are  accounts  of  Toulon  in  two  volumes  written  by  different  Generals. 
According  to  the  First  volume  Napoleon  arrived  12  or  15  days  after  the 
taking  of  Ollioules,  which  according  to  this  volume  took  place  on  Sept 
10  The  arrival  of  Bonaparte  would  therefore  have  taken  place  between 
the  22nd  and  25th  of  Sept,  and  not  the  19th  and  22nd  as  Chuquet  puts 
it.    This  volume  was  corrected  by  Napoleon,  but  he  probably  gave  no 
great  attention  to  such  details.  The  third  volume  was  dictated  by  Napot 
leon  and  contains  a  twice  as  lengthy  account  of  Toulon.    Here  he  says 
expressly  that  he  arrived  on  the  12th  of  Sept. 

As  to  the  date  of  the  battery  L,a  Montagne,  Chuquet  gives  it  (page 


17 

arm  of  Carteaux's  army  was  put  under  the  control  of  Napo- 
leon Bonaparte,  then  24  years  of  age,  and  a  captain  of  Artil- 
lery. A  new  period  in  Napoleon's  life  began  here.  In  after 
years  when  he  was  preoccupied  about  his  own  history,  he 
wished  that  it  should  begin  with  the  siege  of  Toulon.  This 
is  seen  especially  in  his  Memoirs  from  St.  Helena.  It  is 
usually  said  that  in  so  doing  his  object  was  to  pass  over  the 
preceding  period  in  Corsica,  which  would  not  tend  to  make 
him  popular  in  France.  This  may  no  doubt  be  partially 
true,  but  it  is  none  the  less  so  that  these  three  months,  be- 
fore the  walls  of  Toulon,  were  three  of  the  most  important 
in  his  life.  Here  his  entire  career  was  changed.  Others  be- 
sides himself  were  convinced  of  his  ability,  even  of  his  genius. 
He  was  thrown  into  close  contact  with  the  French  people; 
and  became  at  last  one  of  them.  His  ambition  was  freed 
from  the  little  island  of  Corsica,  and  bound  itself  to  the  des- 
tinies of  the  French  nation;  soon  afterwards  to  control  them. 

172)  as  Sept.  9.,  then  (page  179)  as  Sept  12,  and  finally  (page  206)  Sep- 
18.  The  evening  of  the  17th  is  the  proper  date,  as  on  the  morning  of  the 
1 8th  the  battery  fires  on  the  ships.  (Hood's  Journal)  On  the  16th  Dom- 
martin  was  still,  at  least  nominally,  head  of  the  artillery  (Carteaux  a 
Lapoype,  Archives  de  la  Guerre)  and  on  the  17th  Napoleon  directs  it. 
(Lettre  Salicetti — Sept  26.  R.  A.)  Salicetti  writes  "nous  arretames  le 
citoyen  Buonaparte  et  nous  lue  ordonnames  de  remplacer  Dommartin  ". 
It  is  quite  possible  that  Napoleon  was  employed  for  a  few  days  about 
Toulon  before  he  received  Dommartin 's  position.  He  must  have  first 
proved  his  ability  to  the  Representants  ;  or  have  influenced  them  in  some 
way  (he  knew  Salicetti)  before  receiving  the  position  which  should  other- 
wise have  fallen  to  Lieut-colonel  Sugney,  who  commanded  the  artillery 
under  Lapoype.  It  is  a  significant  fact  that  on  Sept  16,  Carteaux  writes 
to  Lapoype,  "  c'est  1'artillerie  qui  fait  toute  la  besogne",  as  if  it  were  a 
fact  of  which  he  has  just  become  convinced  :  also  in  direct  contradiction 
to  his  previous  ideas.  Napoleon  may  have  arrived  on  the  12th  and  yet 
have  returned  to  Marseilles  on  the  1 5th.  If  he  did  not  arrive  until  the  16th 
then  his  statement  that  he  found  almost  no  artillery,  is  incorrect,  be- 
cause just  at  this  time  some  artillery  at  least  begins  to  arrive.  ( Carteaux  a 
Lapoype,  Sept  16.  A.  G.)  Napoleon  probably  forwarded  it  himself  from 
Marseille  where  he  was  employed  at  the  arsenal.  By  the  September  19  Car- 
teaux is  aiding  him  as  he  writes  to  Bonaparte  (Letter,  A.  G. )  "Je  viens 
de  recevoir  votre  lettre  et  je  vais  envoy er  a  la  Municipalite  pour  vous 
procurer  tous  les  objets  que  vous  me  demandez  ". 
2192—2 


18 

At  the  end  of  these  three  months  he  was  no  longer  a  ne- 
glected captain  but  a  young  general  with  a  career  behind 
him,  as  well  as  a  far  greater  and  more  definite  one  before 
him.  He  had  had  an  insight  into  the  world  of  that  day,  and 
understood  the  political  situation  of  his  time.  The  means 
by  which  he  was  to  satisfy  his  ambition  were  no  longer 
vague  dreams  of  the  imagination  but  definite  and  deep-laid 
plans  founded  on  an  experience  of  men  and  a  knowledge  of 
conditions.  His  actions  in  Corsica  must  have  now  appeared 
to  him  as  youthful.  Feeling  that  he  had  matured  in  these 
three  months  it  was  no  wonder  that  he  should  have  believed 
that  his  career  commenced  at  Toulon. 

When  Napoleon  arrived  he  found  the  army  in  a  most 
pitiable  state ;  very  little  artillery l  and  what  there  was  placed 
in  a  position  harmless  to  the  enemy;2  the  Generals  without 
a  plan,  or  rather  with  a  new  one  each  day,  but  most  of  them 
useless.3  The  staff  did  not  even  have  a  map  of  the  town  and 
surrounding  country.4  Napoleon  saw  what  any  other  in- 
structed officer  would  have  seen,  that  the  first  object  was  to 
attack  the  fleet  in  the  harbor,  and  soon  selected  the  best  po- 
sition for  doing  so.  He  set  to  work  immediately  but  before 
long  he  had  a  misunderstanding  with  Carteaux,  who  knew7 
little  about  artillery.  However,  Bonaparte  had  very  wisely  as- 
sured himself  of  the  all-powerful  Representants  du  Peuple; 
with  one  of  these,  Salicetti,  a  Corsicau,  he  had  been  in  per- 
sonal connection  before.  In  fact,  in  September  Salicetti  had 
caused  Napoleon's  brother  Joseph  to  be  appointed  Commis- 
saire  de  Guerre  with  the  rank  of  Lieutenant-Colonel. 

These  representants  du  peuple  were  characteristic  of  this 
period  of  the  Revolution.  Sent  out  to  the  armies  and  into 

1  Letter  from  Barras,  6  Sept.  R.  A. 

"         "     I/apoype  to  Carteaux  Sept.  14,  A.  G. 

2  Letter  from  Albitte  9  Sept.  R.  A. 

3  L/etter  from  Lapoype  to  Bouchotte,  11  Sept.  A.  G. 

"         "     Carteaux  to  Lapoype— 14  Sept.  A.  G. 

"         "  "        to  Mtre.  de  la  Guerre — 15  Sept.  A.  G. 

4  Carteaux  au  Ministere  de  la  Guerre,  Sept  12  and  Sept  15.  A.  G. 


19 

the  cities  by  the  Central  Government,  their  duty  was  to 
watch  the  Generals,  spur  them  on,  and  excite  the  patriotism 
of  the  people ;  also  to  send  frequent  information  to  the  Gov- 
ernment in  Paris.  They  were  all  powerful,  and  at  the  same 
time  quite  independent.  All  mistakes  were  attributed  to  the 
Generals,  for  whom  the  guillotine  was  not  an  unusual  pen- 
alty; the  representants  simply  appointed  new  ones  in  their 
places.  They  incorporated  the  idea  of  the  absolute  suprem- 
acy of  the  civil  power  over  military  and  all  other.  No  other 
instances  of  a  similar  character  are  found  in  history.  Sali- 
cetti,  Barras,  Gasparin,  Albitte  and  others  were  at  Toulon; 
Salicetti  during  the  entire  siege.  Little  they  suspected  that 
the  young  artillery  officer,  who  courted  their  favor,  flattered 
their  pride,  and  won  their  confidence,  would  in  a  few  years 
change  the  face  of  things,  overturn  the  despotism  of  the 
demagogue,  and  erect. in  its  place  a  quite  as  despotic  mili- 
tary power  but  less  unjust,  creative  and  lawgiving.  The 
beginning  of  this  transition  was  seen  in  the  Italian  cam- 
paign of  1796-97,  when  General  Clark  sent  out  to  watch 
the  young  General  Bonaparte,  decided  to  cast  in  his  lot  with 
Napoleon  rather  than  with  the  Directory.  Napoleon  got 
an  excellent  insight  into  the  ways  of  these  representatives 
at  Toulon,  which  no  doubt  aided  him  much  in  winning 
over  Clark. 

On  September  17  l  Napoleon  erected  his  first  battery.  The 
next  day  it  began  to  take  effect,  and  the  first  serious  attack 
commenced.  On  the  18th  and  19th  the  ships  of  the  Allies 
and  this  battery  had  a  tremendous  engagement.2  On  the 
20th,  the  second  battery  was  erected  and  "fired  with  more 
effect  on  the  ships";  "Gunboats  suffered  considerably  and 
the  St.  George  had  21  men  killed  and  wounded  by  the 
bursting  of  one  of  her  lower  deck  guns,  the  land  batteries 
were  silenced  before  two  o'clock,  but  altogether  we  had  lost 

1  Lettre  Salicetti,  Sept.  26.  R.  A. 
Letter  Mulgrave-Gazette. 

2  Hood's  journal,  September  18th. 


20 

about  70  men  wounded  or  killed.  Lord  Hood  became 
anxious  about  the  shipping  and  that  evening  it  was  deter- 
mined to  occupy  the  heights  of  Grasse".1  On  September  20 
the  following  was  inserted  in  Lord  Hood's  journal.  "  The 
floating  battery  No.  1  hauled  off,  having  received  much 
damage."  This  is  the  official  record  of  Napoleon's  first  hos- 
tile act  against  the  British.  On  September  21st  "  Cannonade 
still  in  the  northwest  arm".  "Mr.  Gourly  and  people  re- 
turned from  the  Floating  battery  No.  3,  it  being  sunk  by  the 
Enemy's  shot  in  the  N.  W.  arm  ". 

Napoleon's  first  batteries  had  been  firing  but  a  day  or  so 
when  the  possibility  of  being  forced  to  leave  the  harbor  was 
brought  forcibly  home  to  the  two  Admirals.  The  question 
immediately  arose  what  was,  in  such  a  case,  to  be  done  with 
the  French  fleet.  From  now  on  this  question  remained  a  source 
of  contention  between  the  Admirals,  and  also  between  their 
respective  courts.  This  difference  had  disastrous  results  and 
Napoleon's  cleverly  placed  batteries  were  the  cause  of  it.  It 
was  his  first  act  that  had  any  influence  upon  the  events  of 
his  time,  and  it  took  place  within  the  first  few  days  of  his 
arrival  before  Toulon.  On  October  3rd  the  Duke  of  Alcudia 
wrote  to  St.  Helens.  "As  the  case  tho'  remote  may  possibly 
occur  in  which  the  Spanish  and  English  squadrons  may  be 
obliged  to  abandon  the  anchorage  of  Toulon  from  there 
being  so  much  molested  by  bombs  and  red  hot  shells,  as  not 
to  be  able  to  remain  there,  His  Majesty's  pleasure  upon  this 
point  has  been  signified  to  Admiral  Langara  by  the  Minis- 
ter of  Marine  on  the  1st  instant,  leaving,  however,  to  the 
prudent  discretion  of  the  admiral,  to  settle  and  resolve  in 
concert  with  Lord  Hood  whatever  may  according  to  existing 
circumstances,  be  found  most  advisable."2  This  is  an  official 
record  of  Napoleon's  work  during  the  first  few  days  at  Tou- 
lon. In  the  same  letter  the  Spanish  Minister  proposed  that 
in  case  it  became  necessary  to  leave  the  port,  "Admiral 

1  Letter  from  Thomas  Graham,  September  25th.  Life  of  Graham. 

2  St.  Helens.  R.  O.  Published  by  Cottin. 


21 

Langara  shall  sail,  with  all  french  ships  that  can  be  put  to 
sea  to  the  islands  of  Hieres,  or  whatever  other  place  he  may 
appoint  in  concert  with  Lord  Hood,  as  most  convenient, 
carrying  in  them  all  the  artillery,  ammunition,  arms  and 
stores  which  they  can  bring;  leaving  a  manifest  or  protest 
to  the  government  of  Toulon,  if  the  latter  should  not 
abandon  the  place  that  all  ships  of  the  french  navy  shall 
be  kept  and  taken  care  of,  to  be  delivered,  at  a  proper  op- 
portunity, to  their  lawful  sovereign".  "This  instruction" 
writes  St.  Helens  "  was  prepared  in  consequence  of  the  in- 
formation that  had  been  received  from  thence  stating  that 
the  enemy  had  succeeded  in  establishing  a  battery  which  in 
some  sort  commanded  the  harbors  and  roads".1  It  will  be 
seen  that  the  "  manifest  or  protest"  referred  to  by  Alcudia 
was  apparently  all  that  was  to  be  left  to  the  people  of  Tou- 
lon who  had  confided  themselves  to  the  English  and  Span- 
iards. Alcudia  further  proposed  that  such  ships  as  could  not 
be  removed  should  be  sunk  or  set  on  fire.  As  this  was  later 
on  actually  done,  it  will  be  seen  bow  the  Spanish  regarded 
their  own  proposal,  (see  part  II).  I  do  not  mean  to  imply 
in  the  least  that  the  English  were  any  more  sincere  in  their 
dealings  with  the  people  of  Toulon  or  that  they  had  any 
more  scruples  in  disposing  of  the  French  fleet.  Hood  wrote 
to  London  that  he  used  the  French  ships  against  the  bat- 
teries thinking  it  better  that  they  should  be  sunk  than  his 
own.2 

To  prevent  the  enemy's  batteries  from  being  placed  in  a 
still  more  dangerous  position,  on  the  heights  of  Grasse, 
Admiral  Gravina  and  Lord  Mulgrave,  the  English  com- 
mander landed  at  midnight  Sept.  21st  with  about  500  men 
at  Balaguier,  and  gained  the  wooded  heights  above  without 
seeing  any  of  the  enemy.  A  post  was  established  before  day- 
break on  the  most  commanding  point:  in  the  afternoon  it 

1  St.  Helens  to  Grenville.  Oct.  9th.  R.  O. 

2Hood  to  Philip  Stephens.  Oct.  7.  Admirals  dispatches  Mediterranean 
1793.  R.  O. 


22 

was  attacked  by  600  men  who  approached  under  cover  of 
the  wood.  They  were  repulsed.  The  next  day  more  troops 
were  sent  out,  woods  were  cut  down  in  abatis,  and  the  post 
was  well  supplied  with  cannon.  There  were  now  800  men 
on  the  spot.  Here  the  Allies  gained  a  most  deceided  advan- 
tage; they  had  seized  and  fortified  the  most  vulnerable 
point  surrounding  Toulon,  and  the  harbor.  Napoleon  on 
his  arrival  had  recognized  the  importance  of  this  position 
and  went  to  Carteaux  "  pour  lui  offrir  de  le  faire  entrer  dans 
Toulon  avant  huit  jours,  s'il  voulait  faire  occuper  en  force 
la  position  du  Caire  (the  Heights  of  Grasse)  de  maniere  que 
1'artillerie  put  sur-le-champ  placer  des  batteries  a  1'ex- 
tremite  des  caps  de  1'Eguillette  et  de  Balaguier".1  Carteaux 
whose  favorite  tactics  were  the  use  of  the  arme  blanc  failed 
to  see  the  importance  of  this  position  and  allowed  the  allies 
to  proceed  him.2  Finally  when  he  did  make  the  attack,  it 
was  done  in  such  a  half-spirited  manner  as  to  be  easily 
repulsed.  Napoleon  took  no  part  in  this  attack,  but  on  the 
very  same  day  his  battery  sunk  one  of  the  floating  batteries 
of  the  enemy.  He  as  well  as  the  Represantants  du  peuple 
were  loud  in  accusing  Carteaux  and  lamenting  his  failure 
to  take  the  position.  "Pourquoi  ne  1'avons-nous  pas  fait? 
Parceque  le  general  que  nous  avions  cru  comprendre  et 
adopter  notre  plan  n'y  avait  aucune  confiance  quoique  celui 
que  vous  aviez  envoye  de  Paris  ftit  exactement  le  meme: 
parce  ceux  qui  1'entourent  sont  encore  plus  ignorants  et 
plus  entetes  que  lui :  parceque  ni  les  uns,  ni  les  autres  n'ont 
aucune  connaissance  ni  des  hommes  qu'ils  menent  ni  des 
machines  militaires,  ni  de  leurs  effets:  parce  que  toute 
1'armee  n'ayant  trouve  jusqu'a  present  aucune  resistance 
dans  son  expedition  est  toute  decouragee  de  celle  que  lui 
presente  Toulon — si  1'absence  de  Carteaux  (it  was  supposed 
that  he  was  going  to  the  Army  of  Italy)  nous  donne  un 

1  Memoires  de  Napoleon. 

2  Attack  on  Hauteurs  de  Grasse.  Hood's  Journal.  Letter  of  Mulgrave 
in  Gazette.  Letter  from  Graham,  Life  of  Graham.  Memoires  and  Cor- 
respondence of  Napoleon.  Salicetti  to  Comite"  Sept.  26  R.  A. 


23 

general  et  des  officiers  superieurs  qui  sen tent  mieux  1'im- 
portance  de  la  point  des  Vallons  nous  tenterons  encore  d'en 
chasser  les  Anglais".1  Napoleon  wrote  on  Nov.  14th  to  the 
Minister  of  War,  referring  to  this  attack  :2  "  Dans  ce  moment 
la  (while  his  batteries  were  fighting  the  enemy's  ships)  les 
ennemis  comprenant  1'insuffisance  de  leur  artillerie  navale 
risquerent  le  tout  pour  le  tout  et  debarquerent  a  1'Eguillette ; 
ils  ussent  du  etre  ecrase  dans  leur  descent;  la  fatalite  ou 
notre  ineptie  voulut  qu'elle  leur  reussit.  Peu  de  jours  apres 
ils  y  eurent  des  pieces  de  24,  un  chemin  convert  et  des  palis- 
sades,  quelques  jours  apres,  des  secours  considerables  leur 
arriverent  de  Naples  et  d'Espagne.  Je  compris  que  1'affaire' 
de  Toulon  etait  manquee  et  qu'il  fallait  se  resoudre  a  un 
siege  ". 

From  here  up  to  the  first  of  October  nothing  of  great  im- 
portance happened.  The  fleet  and  land  batteries  continued 
an  artillery  duel;  reinforcements  arrived  gradually  for  each 
side.  Part  of  the  French  squadron  was  put  in  commission 
under  the  French  Admiral  Trogoff.  Toulon  was  declared  a 
free  port  and  well  supplied  with  provisions,  chiefly  from 
Spain  and  the  Spanish  islands.  On  Sept  23  the  Republicans 
heard  the  fire  of  21  guns  from  each  ship  of  the  fleet.  It  was 
in  honor  of  the  coronation  of  Louis  XVII.3 

On  Oct.  1  Carteaux  received  the  following  note.  "Les 
troupes  de  la  Republique  viennent  d'enlever  la  montague 
du  Faron,  ses  retranchements  et  sa  redoute.  Signe  La 
Poype".4  The  commanding  position  of  Faron  was  of  great 
importance  and  La  Poype  decided  to  attack  it.  From  the 
northern  side  it  was  considered  inaccessible,  except  at  Pasde 
la  Masque,  where  one  might  reach  the  top  by  a  narrow  zig- 
zag path  ;  the  English  considered  a  strong  post  of  sixty  men 
sufficient  to  hold  this  pass.  On  the  night  of  Sept.  30  La 

1  lyettre  de  Salicetti,  Sept.  26th.  R.  A. 

2  Correspondance  de  Napoleon. 

3  Hood's  Journal. 

4  Lettre  de  Salicetti.  Oct.  1.  R.  O. 


24 

Poype  formed  his  three  attacking  columns.  The  one  on  the 
right  was  to  ascend  the  northwest  end;  it  was  under  the 
command  of  Victor.  La  Poype  commanded  the  center  col- 
umn, which  was  to  attack  at  Pas  de  la  Masque;  the  column 
on  the  left  was  to  make  a  false  attack.  Victor  led  his  column 
up  the  hill,  along  the  ridge  of  the  mountain  eastward  to 
Pas  de  la  Masque;  he  drove  the  picket  back  into  the  re- 
doute  of  Faron,  assailed  this  on  all  sides  at  once,  and  cleared 
it  out  just  as  the  enemy  had  run  up  their  signal  for  help. 
While  La  Poypes  triumphant  note  was  on  its  way  to  Car- 
teaux  the  alarming  news  of  the  taking  of  Faron  reached 
the  town.  Reinforcements,  of  the  best  troops  and  in  large 
numbers,  as  well  as  field  pieces  should  have  been  hurried 
to  Victor  and  his  men.  But  this  was  not  done.  A  few  men 
did  arrive  before  the  end  of  the  day,  but  they  were  such  as 
did  more  harm  than  good.  The  ridge  of  Faron  is  formed  by 
several  heights  running  east  and  west.  A  deep  ravine  run- 
ning northward  from  Toulon  cuts  deep  into  Mount  Faron 
perpendicularly;  it  runs  almost  through  to  the  northern  side 
leaving  only  a  narrow  ridge  connecting  the  heights  on  the  east 
and  west  of  this  valley,  which  is  called  Valbourdin.  On  the 
south-western  side  of  the  ascent  was  Fort  St.  Antoine  and  on 
the  south-eastern  Fort  Faron.  The  Allies,  in  contrast  to  the  Re- 
publicans, showed  the  greatest  activity  and  determination. 
At  7  o'clock  the  news  reached  the  town :  a  council  of  war 
was  held  and  the  immediate  attack  determined  upon.  At  8 
o'clock  the  troops  started.  English,  Spanish  Piedmontese 
and  Neapolitans,  good  troops  and  of  four  nationalities, 
started  forward  to  attack  Victor  and  his  small  force.  The 
result  would  not  have  been  at  all  certain,  had  Victor  been 
able  to  rely  upon  his  troops;  they  were  new,  of  inferior 
quality  and  such  as  are  easily  panic-stricken.  Lord  Mul- 
grave  and  Colonel  de  Revel  lead  the  English  and  Pied- 
montese column  up  the  south-west  side  of  the  mountain. 
On  the  most  western  ridge  they  met  about  200  of  the  enemy, 
whom  they  drove  back,  aided  by  the  guns  of  Fort  St. 


25 

Antoine.  The  Republicans  retreated  eastward  leaving  a  few 
prisoners  in  the  hands  of  the  English.  As  they  discovered 
the  Spanish  column  under  Gravina,  supported  on  the  right 
by  the  Neapolitans  who  approached  up  the  Valbourdin,  they 
saw  the  possibility  of  their  being  cut  off  and  quickened  their 
march  eastward.  The  English  learned  from  the  prisoners 
that  the  French,  about  1500  strong  were  drawn  up  on  the 
eastern  end  of  Faron.  They  continued  along  the  ridge  to 
Valbourdin,  and  found  Victor's  force  arranged  in  the  form 
of  a  triangle  one  side  facing  west,  the  other  south.  The  re- 
doute  of  Faron  lined  with  men,  was  in  his  rear,  and  be- 
tween this  redoute  and  his  lines  was  placed  the  reserve.  The 
valley  Valbourdin  widens  off  to  the  south-east  in  descend- 
ing and  thus  protected  Victor's  left  flank.  Mulgrave  got  his 
men  under  cover  before  the  narrow  ridge,  about  15  yards 
wide,  which  connects  the  height  east  and  west  of  Valbourdin. 
To  attack  the  French  he  had  to  cross  this  valley.  It  was  de- 
cided to  send  Gravina,  who  had  been  approaching  on  the 
west  side  of  Valbourdin,  accross  to  the  east  to  attack  the  left 
•of  the  enemy.  He  turned  off  to  the  right,  but  in  starting  to 
cross  he  received  a  heavy  fire  from  the  French.  This  forced 
him  to  cross  further  down.  The  English  waited  for  him  to 
take  up  his  position  against  the  left  of  the  enemy.  This  he 
did,  following  his  advanced  guard  which  was  led  by  a  Span- 
ish sergeant  who  greatly  distinguished  himself.  At  first  the 
left  of  Victor's  force  was  exposed  to  a  flank  fire  from  the 
English  and  he  moved  part  of  it  around  to  the  right.  As 
Gravina's  column  came  up  Victor's  left  had  to  be  protected 
again  and  reinforced.  When  Gravina  engaged  it,  it  began  to 
waver,  and  by  doing  so  gave  the  English  and  Piedmontese 
the  signal  to  advance  over  the  narrow  pass.  This  double  at- 
tack by  a  superior  force  was  too  much  for  the  French.  They 
broke  and  retreated  in  the  wildest  disorder.  The  two  attack- 
ing columns  entered  the  redoute  of  Faron  at  the  same  mo- 
ment. The  French  were  persued  and  many  of  them  were 
dashed  to  pieces  in  falling  over  the  cliffs.  The  small  English 


26 

force  in  Fort  Faron  seized  this  chance  to  fall  upon  the 
flank  of  the  retreating  Frenchmen.  Victor  with  the  few 
men  he  was  able  to  keep  around  him,  retreated  in  good 
order.  In  spite  of  his  defeat  he  was  the  hero  of  the  day. 
"  Le  chef  de  bataillon  Victor,  a  qui  on  avait  confie  ce  poste 
s'est  conduit  a  merveille  et  dans  1'occupation  et  dans  la 
resistance  qu'il  a  faite  ;  il  aete  nomine  chef  de  brigade,  une 
voix  unanime  s'est  levee  pour  lui."  One  of  the  English 
officers  wrote  UA  M.  Victor  is  said  to  have  been  killed.  He 
was  reckoned  a  good  officer  and  all  his  dispositions  that  day 
were  in  the  style  of  a  man  who  understood  his  business." 
Victor  distinguished  himself  later  on  during  the  siege. 
The  Republican  loss  on  this  day  is  very  hard  to  give.  The 
Allies  lost  about  100  men.  Gravina  was  wounded  "  in  the 
course  of  his  able  arid  spirited  exertions  at  the  head  of  the 
Neapolitans  grenadiers".  All  the  troops  fought  well,  writes 
Mulgrave,  "  I  should  do  injustice,  should  I  particularize  any 
corps  or  any  nation."  The  retaking  of  Mount  Fafon  was 
very  important  to  the  Allies.  "  Hood  was  glad  it  was  as  it 
gave  an  opportunity  of  recovering  it  so  handsomely."1 

This  failure  on  the  part  of  La  Poype  increased  the  ill- 
feeling  between  him  and  Carteaux2.  Carteaux  relieved  him 
of  his  command.  La  Poype  however  was  the  brother-in- 
law  of  Freron,  the  Representant  du  peuple,  and  for  this 
reason  he  was  soon  reinstated.  From  now  up  to  the  end  of 
October  the  Republican  army  was  in  the  most  pitiable  state3; 
there  was  jealousy  between  the  commanding  generals,  and 
ill-will  between  Carteaux  and  the  Representants.  On  Oct. 
12  Salicetti  wrote  "Carteaux  a  besoin,  outre  la  bonne 
volonte,  des  moyens  personnels,  et  nous  ne  lui  connaissons 

1  For  the  attack   on  Faron.  Memoires  de  Thaon  ;  de  Victor.  Letters 
from  Graham.    Mulgrave  in  Gazette.    Letter  from  Hood,   in  Admirals' 
Dispatches,  Mediterranean  1793,  R.  O.    Lettre  de  Gasparin  et  Salicetti 
Oct.  4.  R.  A. 

2  Lettre  Carteaux  a  La  Poype.  Oct.  3.  A.  G. 

3  Lettres  de  Ricord,  Oct.  8  :  de  Salicetti,  Oct.  10,  12,  23,  27  :  de  Freron- 
Oct  20.  R.  A. 


27 

pas  d'autres  que  sa  reputation."  On  Oct.  6th  Carteaux  wrote  1 
"Mais  elites  ail  Ministre,  vous  qui  connaissez  ma  franchise 
que  si  Ton  croit  quelqu'un  plus  capable  que  moi  pour  rem- 
plir  cette  mission,  que  c'est  avec  reconnaissance  que  je  ced- 
erai  un  fardeaux  que  la  trahison  la  plus  noire  m'a  rendu 
insupportable,  car  quel  nom  voules  vous  que  je  donne  a 
une  Phrase  qui  dit  tout  simplement  que  je  1'eusse  voulu  les 
Anglais  ne  seraient  plus  a  Toulon  et  que  peut  penser  de 
moi  le  comite  de  Salut  Public,  a  qui  Ton  fait  entendre  que 
c'est  pour  avoir  rejette  son  plan  que  les  Anglais  ne  sont 
pas  chasses." 

The  Republican  soldiers  were  raw  recruits,  uncertain, 
undisciplined  and  poorly  armed ;  many  ofthe  troops  who  ar- 
rived had  no  arms  at  all.2  Salicetti  and  Gasparin  went  them- 
selves to  Marseilles  and  with  great  difficulty  obtained  3000 
guns.  The  one  redeeming  feature  of  the  Republican  army 
was  the  artillery.3  Napoleon  showed  the  greatest  activity,  col- 
lecting cannon,  powder,  and  material  of  every  kind.  He  was 
untiring  in  his  efforts  and  definite  in  his  purpose.  His  first 
two  batteries  have  already  been  spoken  of.  La  Montague 
opened  fire  on  Sept  18;  Les  Sans  Culottes,  on  the  the  20th. 
"'Situee  au  bord  de  la  mer  a  la  pointe  du  Bregaillon ;  elle  a 
fait  son  effet,  elle  a  chassse  tous  les  pontons,  les  bombardes 
et  les  fregates  qui  se  tenaient  sur  la  gauche  de  1'Eguillette". 
These  two  batteries  cleared  the  petite  rade  north  of  I/Eguil- 
lette.  The  village  La  Seyne  was  thus  protected.  The  next 
battery,  Les  Sablettes  was  erected  against  Fort  Mulgrave, 
which  continued  to  be  Napoleon's  object  of  attack.  Les 
Sablettes  opened  fire  on  Oct.  7 

The  Allies  decided  to  attack  it.  They  had  learned  from  a 

1  L,ettre  de  Carteaux  a  1'adjoint  du  Mtre  de  la  Guerre,  Archives  de  la 
Guerre. 

2  Lettre  de  Veyrenne  a  Carteaux  Oct.  6.  Lettre  de  Carteaux  au  Min 
istre  de  la  Guerre.  Oct.  7.  Proclamation  de  Carteaux.  Oct.  8.  Archives 
de  la  Guerre. 

3  Lettres   de  Carteaux.  Sept.   29.  Oct.  18.  A.  G.  Lettre   de   Salicetti 
Sept.  25.  A.  G. 


28 

deserter  who  knew  the  watchword,  that  it  was  defended  by 
troops  of  the  last  conscription.  At  half  past  two  in  the  morn- 
ing of  Oct  9,  400  English  and  Spanish  left  Fort  Mulgrave 
to  attack  the  battery.  Led  on  by  a  French  deserter,  who 
answered  the  sentinels,  they  entered  the  battery;  the  first 
sentinel  was  killed,  all  who  resisted  were  bayoneted.  The 
enemy  was  completely  routed,  after  making  a  short  stand. 
They  numbered  about  300.  The  English  spiked  the  guns, 
sawed  the  gun-carriages  and  destroyed  the  ammunition 
which  was  found  in  quantities  At  4  o'clock  they  marched 
back,  having  lost  but  4  men  killed  and  7  wounded.  The 
Republicans  lost  7  men  killed  and  10  wounded;  also  a  few 
prisoners  among  them  3  officers  and  the  lieutenant  of  artil- 
lery who  commanded  the  battery.  The  damage  was  not  very 
great.  "  A  trois  heures  aprSs  midi  la  batterie  se  trouve  par- 
faitement  retablie  et  en  etat  de  jour.  Vous  avez  ci.  joint  des 
proclamations  que  les  enemis  ont  laissees  en  profusion  en 
abandonnant  la  batterie.  nos  soldats  ne  croient  pas  au  ten- 
dre  interet  des  puissances  coalisees  pour  la  dynastie  que 
nous  avons  culbute  due  trone." 

1  Napoleon's  activity  continued,  new  batteries  were  con- 
stantly being  erected.  Hood's  record  for  these  days  is  full 
of  "  heavy  cannonading  between  the  ships  and  batteries." 
"  The  enemy's  gun  and  rnortar  Batteries  are  constantly 
playing  upon  our  posts  and  shipping  without  our  having 
the  means  of  driving  them  to  a  greater  distance."2  At  this 
time  the  Allied  forces  amounted  to  about  twice  the  number 
of  the  besieging  army:  their  troops  were  undoubtedly  better. 
Why  they  did  not  make  some  successful  sallies  is  hard  to 
explain.  In  the  meantime  however  the  number  of  con- 
scripts raised  in  the  Var  amounted  to  about  13,000  young 
men ;  and  fresh  battalions  arrived  daily.  Were  they  all 

1  Attack  of  Sablettes.  Gasparin.  Oct  7.  R.  A.  Memoires  de  Napoleon 
Mulgrave  in  Gazette.  Hood  in  Gazette. 

2  Letter  from  Hood  to  John  Trevor.    Public  Record  Office.    Foreign 
Office.  Sardinia.  1793.  Oct  to  Dec.  Letters  from  Trevor  to  Grenville. 


29 

armed,  it  would  perhaps  have  been  possible  to  have  made 
an  attack  one  of  the  posts.  As  it  was,  the  artillery  was  the 
only  arm  which  annoyed  the  Allies  in  the  least.  The  Petite 
Hade  was  gradually  cleared  of  the  ships,  which  were  taken 
back  to  a  safer  position. 

On  Oct.  13th.  news  arrived  of  the  fall  of  Lyons.  The 
besieging  army  celebrated  it  in  true  republican  style.  Extra 
rations  of  eau-de-vie  were  distributed.  There  was  dancing, 
music  and  singing.  Whole  battalions  danced  around  in 
rings.  The  news  was  announced  to  the  town  by  the  shot  and 
shell  from  a  new  battery  which  Napoleon  had  just  com- 
pleted :  Breguart,  about  300  yards  south  of  Les  Sablettes 
"elle  balaye  les  rives  de  la  droite  de  1'Eguillette  et  toute 
cette  partie  de  la  Grande  Rade."1  The  Allies  decided  to  stop 
this  rejoicing  and  the  next  day,  they  made  a  sortie.  Thaon 
de  Revel  termed  it  "une  etourdie  militaire".  At  11  o'clock 
in  the  morning  3000  of  the  Allies  took  up  a  defensive  posi- 
tion behind  the  Riviere  Neuve.  100  men  were  sent  out  to 
Hauteur  des  Arennes  to  discover  the  movements  of  the 
enemy.  A  patrol  of  800  men  was  sent  out  on  the  left. 
These  advance  bodies  got  too  far  forward  and  in  protecting 
their  retreat  a  general  action  came  on.  The  Allies  retired  to 
their  position,  and  awaited  the  attack  of  the  Republicans, 
but  as  night  came  on  they  retired  to  Fort  Malbousquet.  In 
giving  an  account  of  this  engagement  Carteaux  praised 
Almeras  highly.  2"L'intelligence  et  les  talents  du  citoyen 
Almeras  ont  force  nos  ennemis  a  se  reployer  ".  He  did  not 
mention  Bonaparte,  nor  can  I  find  anywhere  a  justification 
for  Chuquet's  saying  that  he  led  the  troops  on  this  day. 
3  Carteaux  praised  the  work  of  the  batteries  in  the  same 
letter,  however  "Tant  qu'a  nos  Batteries  elles  font  le  rneil- 
leur  effet  possible  surtout  la  batterie  des  Sans-culottes  .  .  . 
elle  coupe  de  temps  en  temps  quelques  mats  et  maltraite  les 
freegates  ". 

1  Correspondance  de  Napoleon. 

2  "  Carteaux  au  M.  de  la  Guerre,  Oct.  18,  A.  G. 

3  Chuquet — page  188. 


30 

The  next  day,  October  15,  it  was  the  Republican's  turn  to 
take  the  offensive.  Lapoype  made  an  attack  on  Cap  Brun,1 
but  after  a  stubborn  fight  was  driven  back.  The  post  was 
supposed  to  be  in  safety,  but  before  long  a  second  and  much 
stronger  column  advanced,  covered  by  the  artillery.  This 
time  the  Allies  were  soon  driven  from  the  post ;  four  English 
officers  fell  in  defending  it.  Once  more  a  hurried  Council  of 
War  was  held  at  Toulon  on  the  news  of  the  loss  of  the  post. 
"  On  delibera  a  Toulon  si  Ton  attaquerait  le  Cap  Brun  de 
vive  force,  ou  si  Ton  obligerait  1'ennemi  a  1'evacuer  par  un 
rnouveinent  qui  menaca  de  les  envelopper  ".  It  was  decided 
to  outflank  the  Republicans.  The  position  of  the  enemy  was 
reconnoitred  and  it  was  found  that  they  had  abandoned 
Cap  Brun,  forming  their  whole  line  on  a  height  further  to 
the  east,  their  left  covered  by  Castle  Ste  Marguerite,  which 
had  two  twelve  pounders  turned  toward  the  land.  Field 
pieces  could  be  seen  well  distributed  along  the  front  of  the 
enemy's  line.  The  Allies  inarched  under  the  protection  of 
the  guns  of  Fort  Faron  to  La  Vallette,  leaving  behind  them 
140  men  with  two  18  pounders,  who  with  the  guns  from 
Fort  Faron  were  to  block  the  Vallon  Favieres  and  prevent 
the  enemy  from  sending  reinforcements  by  this  pass  from 
their  post  at  Tourris  and  Revest.  From  La  Vallette,  they 
started  for  the  Hauteurs  de  Thouars,  a  position  commanding 
La  Garde,  and  which  would  have  given  the  allies  control  of 
the  entire  plain  and  of  all  the  roads  to  the  east  of  Toulon. 
From  this  position  the  Republicans  might  have  been  forced 
miles  away  from  the  east  side  of  the  city.  The  Republicans 
saw  their  danger  and  moved  in  all  haste  from  their  position 
toward  La  Garde.  Owing  to  the  mistake  of  the  guide,  and 
to  the  rather  slow  manoeuvres  of  the  Spanish  and  Neapoli- 
tan infantry  which  headed  the  column,  the  Republicans 
reached  La  Garde  at  the  same  time  as  the  Allies  gained  the 
heights  of  Thouars.  The  battle  now  resolved  itself  into  a 
heavy  cannonade  from  each  side.  "  Les  Fran^ais  firent  un 
l  Attack  on  Cap  Brun.  Thaon.  Elphinstone  in  Gazette. 


. 


V  X 

31 

mouvement  comme  pour  couper  au.x  allies  le  chemin  de 
Toulon  mais  leur  cavalerie  mise  en  desordre  par  le  canon, 
se  retire  bientot.  Les  dragons  de  la  Reine  espagnole  manoeuv- 
rirent  avec  audace  et  succes".  160  of  these  cavalrymen 
had  just  arrived  three  days  before.  When  night  came  on 
the  noise  of  the  artillery  and  wagons  leaving  La  Garde  was 
distinctly  heard,  and  as  the  Republicans  did  not  answer  the 
heavy  guns  of  the  allies,  it  was  supposed  that  they  had 
evacuated  the  place.  A  few  men  were  sent  ahead  "  pour  s'en 
assurer,  mais  le  feu  violent  qui  en  partit,  fit  connaitre  qu'il 
etait  encore  occupe".  The  object  of  the  allies  had  been  ac- 
complished and  they  returned  to  Toulon.  This  was  the  only 
fight  around  Toulon  of  skillful  manoeuvring  where  all  three 
arms  were  employed. 

The  operations  dragged  on  slowly,  but  the  outlook  for  the 
Republicans  was  not  bright.  Freron  and  Barras  wrote  from 
Marseilles :  "  A  present  les  ennemis  se  sont  renforces  et  se 
renforcent  tous  les  jours.  Carteaux  n'a  aucune  des  connais- 
sances  militaires  propres  a  s'emparer  d'une  des  places  les 
mieux  fortifiees  de  la  Republique" — Reinforcements  were 
looked  for  from  Toulon.  In  these  days  of  depression  Bona- 
parte was  the  only  one  who  was  active.  On  October  18th  he 
opened  a  new  battery,  Des  4  Moulins,  situee  a  700  toises  de 
la  redoute  anglaise."1  For  the  same  day,  can  be  read  in 
Hood's  Journal :  "  A  heavy  fire  commenced  from  Hauteur 
de  Grasse  and  ships  in  the  N.  W.  Arm."  The  garrison  of  Fort 
Mulgrave  began  to  see  the  danger  of  their  position.  For 
three  days  they  kept  up  a  continual  fire  on  Napoleon's  bat- 
teries, but  failed  to  destroy  any  of  them.  And  on  October  22 
they  were  attacked  by  still  another;  La  Grande  Rade,  "elle 
fait  le  meme  effet  que  celle  du  Breguart ".  Hood's  attention 
was  continually  called  to  Fort  Mulgrave.  On  October  23  he 
wrote  in  his  Journal;  "Made  the  General  signal  to  assist 
Camel  with  boats".  This  short  sentence  is  proof  that  the 
Camel  approached  too  close  to  Bonaparte's  battery.  About 

1  Correspondance  de  Napoleon. 


32 

this  time  the  powder  became  rather  scarce  and  the  batteries 
were  not  so  noisy.  In  the  meantime  Napoleon  was  busily 
employed  on  four  or  five  new  ones;  all  in  different  stages 
of  completion. 

The  constant  yet  somewhat  unjust  complaints  against  Car- 
teaux  had  at  last  taken  effect,  and  on  October  21  he  received 
notice  that  he  was  to  be  replaced  at  Toulon  by  General 
Doppet,  who  had  commanded  at  Lyons.  From  now  on  until 
the  departure  of  Carteaux  on  November  7  the  siege  rather 
dragged,  although  the  monotony  was  broken  now  and  then 
by  a  day  of  "heavy  cannonading",  as  it  was  termed  in 
Hood's  Journal.  No  great  harm  seems  to  have  been  done. 
On  October  30th  the  Terrible  "  signalled  for  assistance," 
but  in  general  the  ships  keep  at  a  safe  distance.  The  last 
week  in  October  troops  and  cannon  began  to  arrive  from 
Lyons  and  Grenoble,  as  well  as  many  troops  from  the  new 
levies;  for  the  Representants  were  quite- busy  dispatching 
raw  and  useless  recruits  to  the  walls  of  Toulon.1  On  Octo- 
ber 25  Salicetti  and  Gasparin  received  news  from  Doppet 
informing  them  that  he  had  sent  off  3,000  troops.  As  they 
had  expected  20,000  this  information  gave  them  a  good  deal 
of  alarm,  which  they  quickly  made  known  to  the  Comite 
de  Salut  public.  The  Allies  also  received  reinforcements, 
which  added  to  the  discouragement  of  the  Republicans. 
Discipline  in  the  Republican  army  was  still  bad  and  deser- 
tion frequent.  At  last  on  November  5  some  good  troops  ar- 
rived from  Lyons.  Two  days  afterwards  Carteaux  left,  com- 
plaining bitterly  against  Doppet  "  qui  n'a  point  de  talents 
militaires,"  2  and  against  Lapoype  "qui  s'est  conduit  de 
maniere  a  faire  soup^onner  sa  fidelite  "  J  He  accused  even 
the  Representants ;  something  which  was  very  dangerous  to 
do  in  that  day.  "  Quel  role  me  fait-on  jouer?  Les  forces  de 
Lyons  devoient  sans  retard  marcher  sur  Toulon,  il  semble 

1  Letters  under  date  of  November  2.  A.  G. 

Letters  from  Oct.  22  to  Nov.  5  from  Representants.  R.  A. 

2  Lettre  de  Carteaux  au  Ministre  de  la  Guerre.  Nov.  5th.  A.  G. 


33 

qu'urie  main  les  retienne  et  je  suis  oblige  de  surveiller  jour 
et  nuit  une  troupe  fatigue  de  trois  mois  de  Bivouac,  et  lors- 
que  les  moyens  d'agir  avec  efficacite  arriveront  ceux  qui 
m'ont  lies  les  bras  viendront  pour  que  je  leur  c£de  la  place, 
ils  se  sont  bien  gardes  de  hater  les  secours — ils  n'ont  ecoute 
que  leur  ambition  et  la  chose  publique  ne  pouvant  &tre 
sauve  par  eux,  ils  n'ont  pas  voulu  qu'un  brave  homme  la 
sauve  'V  Carteaux  was  quite  right  in  saying  that  he  was 
being  removed  just  at  the  moment  when  things  were  taking 
a  brighter  turn.2 

On  Nov  5th.  the  Minister  of  War  sent  word  to  Doppet  that 
he  was  to  go  to  the  Pyrenees  :  Carteaux  was  to  be  put  in  com- 
mand of  the  Army  of  the  Alpes  to  hold  the  Piedmontese  in 
check  :  and  General  Dugommier  was  to  take  command  at 
Toulon.  3  Doppet  did  not  arrive  until  the  13th.  From  the 
6th  until  this  time  Lapoype  held  the  command.  The  real 
head  of  the  army  however  was  Salicetti,  with  whom  at  this 
time  Napoleon  had  the  greatest  influence.  He  therefore 
practically  had  his  hands  free  and  if  he  felt  that  he  was  him- 
self capable  of  directing  an  attack  on  Toulon  he  might 
through  the  influence  of  Salicetti  attempt  it ;  in  spite  of  the 
fact  that  Doppet  had  given  Lapoype  instructions  to  remain 
on  the  defensive.  4It  seems  in  reality  as  if  such  an  attack  was 
made  altho  it  is  impossible  to  get  positive  proof  of  it.  The 
following  is  found  in  Pon's  Memoires.  It  is  said  to  have 
happened  on  Nov.  9;  "La  matinee  1'ennemi  attaquait  le 
camp  Balaguier  rnais  sans  succes.  L'apr£s-midi  il  feignait 
de  marcher  sur  Malbousquet  et  Saint-Antoine  dans  le  temps 
que  le  General  Lapoype  simulait  une  attaque  contre  le  Cap 
Brun.  puis  tout  &  coup  se  porta  de  nouveau  sur  Belaguier 
avec  12  a  1500  homines  et  fit  encore  une  fois  contraint  de 
se  retirer.  II  revint  a  la  charge  ver  les  sept  heures  du  soir 
avec  2  13  3000  hommes.  Le  camp  menace  venait  de  recevoir 

1  Lettre  de  Carteaux  a  1'Adjoint  au  Ministre  de  la  Guerre.  Nov.  4.  A. 

2  Lettre  de  Salicetti.  Nov  9.  R.  A. 

3  Mtre.  de  la  Guerre  au  Gen.  Doppet.  Nov.  5.  A.  G. 

4  Lettre  Salicetti.  Nov.  9.  R.  A. 
2192—3 


34 

des  troupes  fraiches  et  des  munitions.  On  laissa  les  repub- 
licans s'approcher  des  retranchements  et  au  moment  ou  ils 
croyaient  se  rendre  maitres  un  feu  tr£s  vif  de  mousqueterie 
et  une  decharge  a  mitrallle  de  1'artillerie  les  forcerent  a 
abandonner  precipitamment  le  champ  de  bataille  qui  resta 
couvert  de  inorts  et  de  blesses  ".  This  is  rather  a  circum- 
stantial account  and  is  strengthened  by  the  following  which 
Salicetti  wrote  on  Nov.  9th.1  "  II  nous  arrive  enfin  des  muni- 
tions, des  pieces  d'artillerie  de  I'arm^e  de  Lyon.  .  .  . 
nous  sorames  maitres  d'une  position  ou  nous  sommes  occu- 
per  a  nous  fortifier,  d'ou  nous  pourrons  incendier  les  ede- 
fices  de  1'infame  Toulon,  en  les  designant  au  doigt  .  .  . 
on  se  prepare  a  attaquer  les  ennemis  en  m£me  temps  dans 
la  rade,  dans  la  ville  et  dans  plusieurs  forts".  In  other 
words  Salicetti  said  they  had  just  received  more  munitions 
and  artillery,  that  they  occupied  a  strong  position  ;  (he  must 
have  referred  to  the  heighs  upon  which  the  Battery,  the 
Convention,  was  situated,  and  that  they  were  planing  the 
very  kind  of  an  attack  which  according  to  Pons  was  made. 
In  Hood's  Journal-  Nov  9.  "  Terrible  made  signal  for  as- 
sistance, made  Royal  and  Robust  signals  for  their  boats  to 
go  to  the  assistance  of  the  Terrible".  Here  at  least  is  proof 
that  the  attack  upon  the  Rade  was  made.  It  seems  quite 
probable  that  this  was  the  work  of  Bonaparte  who  had  in- 
duced Salicetti  to  risk  an  attack.  As  Lopoype  and  probably 
all  the  officers  were  involved  in  it ;  as  it  was  a  failure ;  and 
as  it  was  carried  out  against  orders,  it  is  not  surprising  that 
there  should  be  no  official  account  of  it.  The  affairs  of  the 
Republican  Army  were  carried  on  in  such  a  loose  manner, 
that  even  such  an  attack  might  be  passed  over  without  being 
noticed.  The  attack  was,  according  to  Pons'  description,  a 
spirited  one,  but  it  proved  somewhat  premature  and  at  all 
events  a  failure.  During  this  period  before  the  arrival  of 
Doppet,  Napoleon  had  been  especially  active  in  the  erec- 
tion of  batteries :  the  material  for  these  was  furnished  by 

1  Recueil  Aulard. 


35 

Lyons  and  Grenoble.  On  Nov.  9th.  Salicetti  wrote  "  On 
terminera  la  nuit  prochaine  une  batterie  qui  produira  dans 
la  Grande  Rade  le  m£me  effet  que  les  Sans-Culottes  dans  la 
Petite".  Nov  12.1  u  le  22  au  23  Brumaire  la  batterie  des 
Sablettes  a  fait  une  feu  terrible  sur  la  redoute  des  Anglais, 
a  fait  sauter  un  magazin  a  poudre  et  tu6  beaucoup  de  monde 
par  Peclat  des  bombes  qui  ont  pris  feu.  Demain  une  nou- 
velle  batterie,  dite  les  hommes-sans-peur  fera  feu  sur  la  Bat- 
terie ennerni.  une  autre  dite  la  convention  nationale  battera 
Malbousquet ".  Nov  13th  2"0n  travaille  avec  ardeur  a  la 
construction  de  nouvelles  batteries.  A  I'arrive'e  du  general 
nous  esperons  de  frapper  de  grands  coups  et  d'avoir  des 
nouvelles  importantes  a  vous  cornmuniquer".  Hood  wrote 
on  Nov  13th.  3"  their  batteries  approach  by  degrees  both 
toward  the  town  and  the  fleet  and  it  is  of  the  highest  im- 
portance that  the  garrison  should  be  made  strong  enough 
to  go  out  and  destroy  their  works  ".  As  is  seen,  by  the  arrival 
of  Doppet  Bonaparte's  branch  of  the  army  had  made  the 
greatest  progress  :  Napoleon  had  selected  the  position  of,  and 
started  to  erect,  every  battery  which  was  used  up  to  the  fall 
of  Toulon.4  Therefore  to  him  and  to  him  alone  belongs  the 
credit  of  the  principal  arm  of  the  besieging  army  at  Toulon. 

Doppet  arrived  on  November  13th.  He  saw  at  once  that 
he  did  not  possess  the  necessary  qualifications  for  carrying 
on  a  seige  such  as  that  of  Toulon  and  Consented  to  stay 
only  if  it  would  be  under  the  orders  of  Dugommier.  Luck 
would  have  it  however  that  the  few  days  in  which  he  was 
in  command  were  rather  exciting  ones. 

On  November  15  an  engagement  took  place.  The  follow- 
ing is  Napoleon's  account  of  it.  6  The  soldiers  of  the  battalion 

1  Lettre  Salicetti.    Nov  12th.    Archives  de  la  Guerre.    (Not  published 
in  Recueil  Aulard. ) 

2  Lettre  Salicetti.  R.  A. 

3  Letter  to  John  Trevor.  Record  Office.  Sardinia. 

4  Letter  Nov  14th.  Correspondance  de  Napoleon.  Here  the  future  posi- 
tion of  every  battery  afterwards  erected  is  mentioned. 

5  Salicetti.  November  17th.  R.  A. 
0  Memoires  de  Napoleon. 


36 

Cote  d'  Or  stationed  opposite  Fort  Mulgrave,  seeing  the  Span- 
iards ill-treat  a  French  prisoner,  seize  their  arms  and  rush 
to  his  assistance.  Other  battalions  follow  and  soon  a  whole 
division  is  engaged.  Doppet  and  Bonaparte  rush  to  the 
Scene.  "  Le  vin  est  tire,  il  faut  le  boire  "  says  Napoleon  "in 
advising  Doppet  rather  to  continue  the  action  than  to  with- 
draw the  troops.  Doppet  allows  him  to  direct  the  attack. 
Bonaparte  places  himself  at  the  head  of  the  tirailleurs  who 
cover  the  hill,  and  forming  two  columns  tries  to  penetrate 
into  the  Fort  at  its  gorge.  O'Hara,  the  Governor  of  Toulon, 
sees  the  action  and  hastens  to  Fort  Mulgrave  to  urge  on  his 
troops,  he  makes  a  sortie  which  is  vigorously  supported  by  a 
cannonade  from  the  ships  and  Fort.  Doppet,  seeing  one  of 
his  aids  killed  at  his  side,  gives  the  signal  for  retreat.  Na- 
poleon is  furious  and  galloping  toward  Doppet  exclaims, 
"Toulon  est  manque,  et  un  .  j  .  f  .  .  .  .  a  fait  battre  la  re- 
traite."  Such  is  Napoleon's  account  which  Cottin  xputs  aside, 
and  then  relates  how  it  was  "en  realite."  In  the  War  Ar- 
chives a  contempory  and  detailed  report  of  this  engagement 
exists  and  I  shall  give  it  about  in  full.  It  will  be  seen  that 
it  is  quite  reconcilable  with  Napoleon's  account. 

2 "Rapport  du  Citoyeii  Brule,  Chef  du  2ie  Bon  de  la  Cote 
d'Or,  commandant  la  division  ditte  de  la  Plaine  a  1'armee 
Revolutionnaire  pres  Toulon. 

1  Cottin.  page  266. 

2  Cottin's  authorities  are  Thaon  de  Revel:  Boullement  de  Lachenaye. 
Journal  de  Vernes.  Raports  Napolitains.   (He  admits  that  the  Journal  de 
Vernes  is  inexact:  Thaon  de  Revel's  account  does  not  conflict  with  Na- 
poleon's: I  found  the  Raports  Napolitains  in  London,  but  put  them  aside 
as  scanty  and  containing  nothing  of  value).    With  these  Cottin  relates 
how    it   was  "en  realite*."  Napoleon's  account  is  corroberated  by  the 
report  of  Brule*,  the  account  of  Doppet  (letter  Nov  17th.  Archives  de  la 
Guerre)    and   a  letter  from   O'Hara  under   date  of  Nov   15th.   in  the 
Gazette.  Attacks  on  this  day  were  frequent.  Doppet  writes,  "L'ennemi 
voyant  commencer  des  travaux  trop  pres  de  lui  et  s'  clever  des  batteries 
qui  rendroient  la  prise  des  siennes  moines  difficiles  a  pris  le  parti  de  faire 
a  chaque  instant  des  sorties  du  cote*  de  nos  travailleurs  "  .  .  .  "  Le  me  me 
jour  (15th  Nov.)  nous  avons  etc*  attaque  a  notre  droite  du  cote*  des  Sab- 
lettes  au  centre  du  cote  de  Malbousquet,  et  a  la  gauche  du  cote*  du  fort 
St.  Antoine.  non  contentes  de  les  repousser,  nos  troupes  ont  a  la  gauche 
et  a  la  droite  poursuivi  1'ennemi  jusque  dans  ses  retrenchements,  cepen- 
dant  cette  affaire  e*tant  ge"nerale  n'ayant  eu  ni  donne"  aucune  plan  d'at- 


37 

Le  25e  jour  du  2°  Mois  de  la  de  annee  2  de  la  Republique 
frari9aise  une  patrouille  ennemie  s'etant  presentee  devant  la 
Seine  nos  postes  avancees  furent  &  sa  rencontre.  Le  combat 
s'engage  entre  elles.  Ces  patrouilles  se  grossirent  de  Part  et 
d'autre  de  manieire  qu'au  bout  de  trois  quarts  d'heures  on 
eut  dit  que  c'etait  deux  armees  au  lieu  de  Patrouilles.  Moi 
sousigne  m'etaut  transporte  sur  les  lieux  je  ralliai  les  troupes 
de  la  Republique  et  ordonnai  la  charge.  Alors  nos  troupes 
fond£rent  sur  Fennemi  avec  un  tel  acbarnement  que  je  ne 
pus  les  empecher  d'aller  jusqu'a  la  redoute  ennemie.  M'y 
etant  transporte  moi-m&me  je  jugqai  qu'il  aurait  ete  impru- 
dent de  tenter  un  assaut  puisque  ce  poste  ne  nous  aurait 
ete  d'aucune  utilite  pour  le  moment  attendu  Pimpossibilite  de 
pouvoir  le  conserver.  En  consequence  je  ordonnai  la  retraite 
qui  s'effectua  dans  le  meilleur  ordre  possible.  Nous  avons 
perdus  dans  cette  affaire  qu'a  dure  5  heures  10  &  12  homines 
qui  sont  morts  sur  le  champ  de  bataille  et  environ  15 
blesses.  .  .  .  L'ennemi  a  eu  environ  60  ou  70  hommes  tues 
dont  la  pluspart  out  ete  tues  dont  leur  redoute,  nous  leur 
avons  fait  aussi  un  prisonnier."  Here  the  chief  of  the  Bat- 
talion Cote  d'Or  admits  that  his  men  got  away  from  him, 
and  it  is  quite  possible  that  while  he  was  sounding  the 
retreat,  Napoleon  was  trying  to  form  the  scattered,  but  still 
advancing  troops  into  column  to  enter  the  fort.  It  is  also 
not  surprising  that  Napoleon  thought  Doppet  had  given 
orders  to  sound  the  retreat ;  which  lie  may  also  have  done. 

taque,  les  forces  etant  de  plus  trop  divisees  pour  en  esperer  en  avancant 
des  avantages  reels  et  durables  chaque  chef  de  colonne  fit  engager  ses 
postes  a  sa  troupe  ".  This  shows  that  Doppet  had  no  plan  of  attack,  that 
each  chef  directed  his  own  affair,  and  that  regarding  the  engagements  in 
such  a  light,  it  is  quite  possible  that  Doppet  sounded  the  retreat  when 
he  found  his  soldiers  too  far  advanced.  Cottin  says  the  "1'objectif  re*el 
des  republicans  e*tait  toujours  Balaguier,  centre  lequel  Doppet  lanca 
d'abord  50,  puis  500,  enfin  1500  hommes  ".  The  attack  on  Balaguier  was 
the  all  important  one,  but  it  was  not  Doppet  who  directed  it,  nor  were 
the  other  attacks  false  ones,  made  by  Doppet,  as  Cottin  puts  it.  Napoleon 
took  part  in  the  attack  of  Balaguier,  and  nothing  can  be  found  to  dis- 
prove his  account  of  it. 

O'Hara  writes,  "  Mulgrave  vigorously  and  repeatedly  attacked  by  a 
large  corps  of  the  enemy. ' ' 


38 


CHAPTER  III. 

DUGOMMIER — MARESCOT — COUNCIL  OF  WAR — BONAPARTE'S 
PLAN — MARESCOT'S  INFLUENCE  UPON  THE  SIEGE — AT- 
TACK ON  CONVENTION — ARTILLERY  BEFORE  FINAL  AT- 
TACK— ATTACK  ON  EGUILLETTE — COUNCIL  OF  WAR — 
DEPARTURE  OF  ALLIES — DESTRUCTION  OF  THE  SHIPS — 
ENTRANCE  OF  REPUBLICANS — BONAPARTE  AND  THE 
MASSACRES. 

On  Nov.  17  Dugommier  arrived.  He  was  far  a  better  gen- 
eral than  Carteaux,  Lapoype,  or  Doppet.  Fifty-five  years 
old,  he  had  seen  some  service.  He  was  formally  an  officer 
in  a  marine  battery;  he  took  part  with  some  distinction  in 
the  Seven  Years  War,  and  also  in  the  American  War  of 
Independence.  Then  he  retired  to  his  estate  in  the  West 
Indies,  from  whence  he  had  been  sent  as  a  deputy  to  Paris ; 
later  he  re-entered  the  army,  was  made  brigadier  general  in 
Oct.  1792.  In  the  Italian  army  he  likewise  distinguished 
himself,  became  general  of  division :  in  short  he  was  a  good 
soldier. 

An  old  artillery  general,  Du  Theil,  arrived  two  hours 
after  Dugommier.  Doppet  and  Albitte  had  brought  him  to 
take  charge  of  the  artillery,  but  he  was  forced  to  remain  a 
few  days  in  Marseilles,  and  consequently  did  not  arrive  with 
Doppet.  About  this  time  a  decided  and  continual  improve- 
ment took  place  in  the  condition  of  the  besieging  army. 
Reinforcements,  artillery  and  ammunition  arrived  in  great 
quantity :  these  came  principally  from  Lyons.  The  taking 
of  this  city  had  a  great  effect  upon  the  attack  of  Toulon,  as 
it  permitted  about  all  the  forces  employed  there  to  be  turned 
against  the  Allies  in  Toulon.  There  was  however  difficulty 
in  finding  provisions  for  the  Republican  army,  and  toward 
the  end  of  the  siege  this  question  became  one  of  great  im- 
portance.1 

On  Nov.  24  the  chef  de  bataillon,  Marescot,  a  friend  of 
Carnot's  arrived,  "  pour  diriger  le  genie  ".  The  next  day  he 
i  L€ttres  de  Salicetti.  Nov.  9  to  13.  R.  A. 


39 

wrote  to  Carnot;  "  J'ai  ete  visiter  les  attaques  qui  ne  sont  autre 
chose  que  quelques  batteries  provisoires  dresse"es  par  les  of- 
ficiers  d'artillerie  destinees  a  combattre  les  batteries  avancees 
des  rebelles  et  a  favoriser  les  premieres  operations  qui 
doivent  avoir  lieu  le  plus  tot  possible  'V  This  was  his  first 
impression,  a  little  later  he  wrote  somewhat  differently.  On 
Jan  9th.  1794  in  a  Relation  de  la  prise  de  Toulon  he  wrote 
"  nos  dispositions  d'attaque  n'etaient  autre  chose  que  des 
batteries  provisoires  placees  avantageucemeiit  par  le  chef  de 
bataillon  Bonaparte,  commandant  en  second  de  Partillerie  ".2 
Here  he  admitted  that  the  batteries  were  placed  "avantag- 
eusement"  and  by  Bonaparte.  His  terming  them  "  batteries 
provisoires"  was  quite  wrong;  he  probably  meant  that  in 
their  construction  they  had  not  all  the  complete  details  such 
as  would  appeal  to  the  eyes  of  an  engineer.  This  was  the 
case,  but  under  the  circumstances  (dirth  of  workmen  etc.) 
was  quite  unavoidable.  It  will  be  seen  what  success  the 
engineers  had  in  trying  to  complete  these  batteries.  Their 
positions  were  their  strong  points  and,  as  it  has  been  seen, 
the  course  of  the  siege  proved  this  to  Marescott. 

On  Nov  25th.  Dugommier  held  a  council  of  war:  the  Rep- 
resentants,  the  generals,  Bonaparte,  Marescot  and  others 
were  present  There  has  been  a  good  deal  written  about  the 
plan  of  attack  followed  at  Toulon ;  attempts  made  to  prove 
that  Napoleon  was  its  originator,  as  well  as  to  prove  the  con- 
trary ;  yet  no  one  seems  to  have  laid  stress  upon  the  fact 
that  on  Nov  14,  therefore  10  days  before  the  council  of  war, 
Bonaparte  in  a  letter  to  the  Minister  of  War,3  proposed  a 
plan  of  attack  which  corresponded  in  almost  every  detail 
with  that  decided  upon  in  the  Council :  As  Napoleon  drew 
up  the  proces  verbal  of  the  council,  both  the  plans  are  pub- 
lished in  his  Correspondance.  The  war  council  decided :  to 
make  the  principal  attack  on  Eguillette:4  to  attack  Mal- 

1  Letter  from  Marescot.  Nov  25th.  R.  A. 

2  Relation  de  la  prise  de  Toulon,  e*crit  le  9  Janvier  1794.  par  le  Ge*ne*ral 
Marescot,  Archives  de  la  Guerre. 

3  Correspondance  de  Napole*on. 

4  L,ettre  25  Novembre.  Correspondance  de  Napoleon. 


40 

bousquet  with  the  batteries  la  Convention  and  la  Poudriere, 
so  to  deceive  the  enemy  as  to  the  point  of  attack,  and  to  pre- 
pare the  way  for  the  infantry  "  si  les  evenements  en  permet- 
tent  1'attaque":  to  establish  a  battery  against  Cap  Brun  to 
deceive  the  enemy  as  to  the  point  of  attack ;  to  take  Faron: 
all  attacks  were  to  be  made  at  the  same  time  :  the  "  division 
de  droite"was  to  attack    Eguillette  and  to  make  a  false 
attack  on  Malbousquet  (this  "  false  "  attack  was  to  be  carried 
out  if  possible)  the  "division  de  gauche"  was  to  make  the 
attack  on  Faron  and  a  false  attack  on  Cap  Brun.  Much  of 
the  plan  related   to  the  batteries.  It  was  decided ;  to  erect 
batteries  "  a  Fextremite  du  promontoire  de  1'Eguillette,  afin 
d'obliger  Fescadre  a  evacuer  la  rade  et  in6me  de  la  bruler, 
si  un  vent  contraire  s' oppose  a  sa  sortie":  to  erect  one  against 
Cap  Brun;  another  "  de  6  mortiers  a  grande  portee  centre 
Toulon  "  between  la  Convention  and  Malbousquet :  to  estab- 
lish a  "  redoute  de  protection  sur  la  gauche  de  la  montagne 
de  la  Convention  pour  emp£cher  que  1'ennemi  favorise  par 
le  feu  des  redoutes  de  Sainte  Antoine  ne  tourne  et  n'el£ve 
la  batterie  de  la  Convention  ".  Napoleon  wrote  in  his  above 
mentioned  letter  of  Nov  14th.   "Chasser  les  ennemis  de  la 
rade  est  le  point  preliminaire     ....     pour  se  rendre 
maitre  de  la  rade  il  faut  se  rendre  maitre  de  la  pointe  de 
1'Eguillette.  Au  meme  moment  que  nous  serious  maitres  de 
la  pointe  de  1'Eguillette,  il  faudrait  bombarder  Toulon  avec 
8  ou  10  mortiers.  Nous  sommes  maitres  de  la  hauteur  des 
Ar£nes  qui  n'en  est  pas  a  900  toises  et  nous  pourrons  facile- 
men  t   nous   approcher  a  800   toises  sans  passer  la  riviere 
iieuve :  dans  le  meme  temps   Ton   placerait  deux   batteries 
devant  le  fort  Malbousquet,  et  une  contre  le  fort  1'Artigues. 
.     .     .     Aujourd'hui    il    serait    possible    que    quoique    la 
flotte  fut  oblige  d'evacuer  la  rade  la  garnison  tint  encore  et 
soutint  le  siege.  Alors  les  2  batteries  que  nous  aurions  etab- 
lis  contre  Malbousquet  seraient  promptement  renforc6es  par 
une   troisieme :  les   mortiers  qui   pendant  3  jours  auraient 
bombarde"  Toulon  se  tourneraient  pour  ruiner  les  defenses 


OF 

_[ORN\J 
41 

de  Malbousquet.  Le  fort  ne  resistera  pas  48  heures  et  rien 
ne  nous  arrete  alors  jusqu'au  front  de  Toulon.  Nous  atta- 
quons  le  front  compose  par  le  bastion  du  Marais  et  le  bas- 
tion de  Farsenal  par  une  attaque  brusque"e  qui  nous  conduit 
tout  de  suite  a  la  deuxieme  parallele  favorises  par  les  batteries 
placets  au  Malbousquet  et  par  celles  placees  sur  le  revers 
des  Are"nes.  Nous  serious  gene's  dans  cette  operation  par  le 
fort  FArtigues  mais  4  mortiers  et  les  6  pieces  de  canon  qui 
y  aurait  6t6  place's  au  premier  moment  de  Fattaque,  y  res- 
teraient  et  feraient  alors  un  feu  plus  vif "  .  .  .  .  Then 
he  continued  "La  prise  de  FEguillette,  Fexpulsion  des  An- 
glais des  rades  et  le  bombardement  et  dans  le  m6me  temps 
attaquer  le  Faron".  From  carefully  comparing  these  two 
plans,  it  will- be  seen  that  Napoleon's  was  practically  the 
same  as  the  one  decided  upon  in  the  council  of  war.  Napo- 
leon did  not  speak  of  the  false  attack  against  Cap  Brun,  and 
proposed  batteries  to  be  erected  against  Fort  Artigues  and 
not  against  the  redoute  Sainte  Antoine,  as  it  is  mentioned 
in  the  final  plan.  With  these  two  exceptions  they  are  about 
identical.  This  shows  conclusively  that  Napoleon  was  quite 
decided  as  to  the  proper  plan  of  attack  before  the  arrival  of 
Dugornmier.  It  is  wrong  however  to  say  that  Bonaparte  was 
the  sole  originator  of  this  plan,  or  to  attribute  any  great 
merit  to  him  if  he  had  been.  There  were  at  least  three  vital 
points  around  Toulon ;  the  most  vital  was  certainly  Fort  La 
Malgue ;  this  the  Republicans  could  not  well  attack  as  it  was 
strong  for  two  reasons :  the  English  had  first  landed  there, 
and  used  it  as  a  point  of  protection  for  their  fleet ;  again  all 
the  Forts  on  the  east  side  of  Toulon  had  been  better  built, 
as  it  was  from  the  east  that  any  possible  land  attack  on 
Toulon  was  supposed  to  come.  Faron  was  also  a  position  of 
great  importance.  This  had  been  recognized  at  once  by  the 
Republicans,  but  their  attack  upon  it  had  failed  in  the  end. 
Lastly  the  Eguillette :  this  was  also  a  splendid  point  of  at- 
tack and  the  easiest  to  approach.  Napoleon  had  recognized 
this  immediately;  but  any  well  instructed  officer  would  have 


42 

done  so.  That  Carteaux,  who  understood  nothing  about  the 
use  of  artillery  and  whose  tactics  consisted  in  using  the  Bay- 
onette,  had  not  seen  this,  is  not  so  surprising. 

Someone  had  however  sent  this  advice,  the  attacking  of 
Eguillette,  from  Paris.  Salicetti  wrote  on  Sept  26th.  to  the 
Cornite  du  Salut  Public,  1  accusing  Carteaux  for  having 
allowed  the  English  to  get  possession  of  Eguillette.  "  Le 
general  que  nous  avions  cru  comprendre  et  adopter  notre 
plan  n'y  avait  aucune  confiance  quoique  celui  que  vous 
avez  envoye  de  Paris  fut  exactetnent  le  meme  ".  On  Sept 
25th.  he  wrote  to  the  Minister  of  War.  "  Nous  1'aurions 
force  de  quitter  la  rade,  si  ce  general  avait  voulu  executer 
le  plan  que  nous  lui  avons  propose  et  qui  etait  celui  du 
comite  de  Salut  Public  ".2  The  idea  of  attacking  the  Eguil- 
lette came  therefore  from  Paris.  Bonaparte,  as  was  natural 
had  seen  that  it  was  the  best  point  to  attack  and  his  bat- 
teries were  erected  against  it,  and  did  the  greatest  part  to- 
ward taking  it.  The  Republican  Army  had  however,  after  the 
council  of  war,  a  plan  which  was  agreed  upon  by  all ;  it 
was  no  longer  Bonaparte's  idea  only.  Every  one  went  to 
work  to  carry  it  out.  The  condition  of  the  army  was  how- 
ever far  from  satisfactory  in  many  ways.  Barras  wrote  from 
Marseilles  on  Nov  19th.  "  La  situation  de  Tarmee  n'est  pas 
satisfaisant "  Victor  said  in  his  Memoires  "  Notre  armSe 
etait  jeune,  pleine  d'ardeur,  mais  il  n'etait  point  facile  de  la 
soumettre  aux  lois  d'une  exacte  discipline".  Marescot  le 
chef  du  genie,  had  the  greatest  difficulty  in  trying  to  carry 
out  his  elaborate  plans  of  a  "  si£ge  en  r£gle  ".  The  workmen 
were  wanting,  implements  were  hard  to  obtain,  and  he  met 
with  little  encouragement  on  all  sides.  Finally  however  he 
became  convinced  that  one  must  proceed  in  the  most  prac- 
tical manner,  and  get  along  without  that  which  it  was  im- 
possible to  obtain:  but  when  at  last,  he  was  convinced  of 
this  fact  the  siege  was  about  over;  consequently  Marescot, 

1  Recueil  Aulard. 

2  Archives  de  la  Guerre. 


43 

even  as  chef  du  genie,  had  no  influence 'upon  the  direction 
of  the  siege.  Dec  10  he  wrote  "  je  vois  que  chacun  ici  est 
persuade  qu'il  ne  sera  pas  necessaire  de  devellopper  des 
attaques  regulie*res  pour  reduire  Toulon,  j'  aime  a  le  croire 
et  m£me  je  le  presume  " ;  and  after  frequent  complaints  to 
his  friend  Carnot  of  the  insufficiency  of  the  material  neces- 
sary for  his  branch  of  the  army  he  ended  by  admitting  that 
up  to  Dec.  10  he  had  done  nothing.1  Those  who  strive  to 
deminish  the  role  of  Bonaparte  at  Toulon  lay  stress  upon 
the  fact  that  Marescot  arrived  at  the  same  time  as  Dugom- 
mier;  and  to  direct  the  siege. 

One  branch  of  the  army  continually  and  regularly  in- 
creased, and  that  was  the  artillery.  From  now  on  to  the  end 
it  will  be  seen  how  the  Republican  artillery  kept  up  a  con- 
stant and  effective  fire  upon  the  entire  western  side  of 
Toulon,  until  the  Allied  fleet  sailed  from  the  harbor  in 
haste.  Nelson  wrote  on  Dec  1st.2  "shot  and  shells  are  very 
plentiful  all  over  the  harbor.  I  wonder  more  damage  has 
not  yet  been  done  ".  General  O'Hara  I  hope  will  be  able 
to  drive  the  French  from  the  heights  near  the  harbour  or 
we  shall  be  unpleasantly  situated,  not  that  I  think  Toulon 
is  in  the  slightest  danger.  At  all  events  we  can  destroy  the 
French  fleet  and  Arsenal  in  a  very  short  time". 

On  Nov  28th  the  battery  La  Convention  was  opened 
upon  Fort  Malbousquet ;  it  apparently  did  no  very  great 
damage;  but  its  commanding  position  worried  the  Allies  a 
great  deal,  and  it  was  decided  to  make  a  sortie  and  try  to 
destroy  it.3  About  3000  troops,  British,  Spanish,  Neapoli- 
tan Piedmontese  and  French  refugies  left  the  garrison  about 

1  Marescot  a  Carnot.  Dec.  10th.  Archives  de  la  Guerre. 

2  Nelson's  Dispatches. 

3  Attack  on  Convention. 

Lettre  du  General  Gamier.  Nov  30th.  Archives  de  la  Guerre. 

Lettre  de  Salicetti.  Nov.  30th.  Letter  from  Elliot. 

Thaon.  Letter  to  Sir  W.  Hamilton,  Correspondence.  British  Museum 
Mss.  Egerton2638. 

Relation  de  Marescot.  Lettre  de  Dugommier,  Archives  Nationales 
A.  F.  1,281.  Letters  from  Hpod  and  Dundas  in  Gazette. 


44 

four  in  the  morning,  and  supported  by  field  artillery  and 
the  guns  of  Malbousquet,  marched  upon  the  Hauteur  des 
Arenes.  The  Republicans  were  taken  more  or  less  by  sur- 
prise and  driven  back  in  great  confusion.  The  Allies  how- 
ever instead  of  forming  on  the  height  and  preparing 
themselves  for  a  counter  attack  which  was  certain  to  come, 
pursued  the  French  along  the  road  towards  Ollioules,  or 
stopped  to  plunder.  Even  the  spiking  of  the  guns  was  car- 
ried out  slowly  and  imperfectly.  The  news  of  the  success  of 
the  Allies  was  soon  spread  through  tho  camp.  General  Gar- 
nier,  who  commanded  in  this  division,  was  making  a  stub- 
born retreat  with  the  few  reliable  men  which  he  could 
gather  around  him,  when  Dugommier,  Bonaparte  and  others 
soon  carne  on  the  scene  with  reinforcements.  The  Allies 
were  attacked  with  decision  by  superior  forces,  in  the  flank, 
and  at  a  moment  when  they  were  in  confusion.  Threatened 
to  be  cut  off  from  the  town  they  retreated  in  great  haste 
and  disorder,  the  Republicans  following  close  on  their  heels. 
The  Piedmontese  went  back  in  less  disorder  than  the  others,and 
they  were  also  about  the  only  ones  prepared  to  make  a  stand 
on  the  Heights  :  alone,  however,  they  could  do  nothing.  The 
Allies  brought  their  field  pieces  back  from  the  Riviere  Neuve 
with  great  difficulty,  as  the  Republicans  followed  them  so 
closely,  and  with  such  determination  right  up  to  the  works 
of  Malbousquet,  which  they  tried  to  enter  by  repeated  at- 
tacks. The  guns  of  this  fort  and  those  of  the  Redoute  Ste. 
Antoine  forced  them  to  retire.  "  Le  combat  a  6t6  bien 
chaude"  wrote  Salicetti ;  and  Napoleon  "La  matine  a  6t6 
belle".  The  fight  was  clearly  to  the  advantage  of  the  Re- 
publicans, as  the  Convention  and  three  other  batteries  were 
blazing  away  harder  than  ever  in  a  day  or  so;  and  the 
Allies  in  their  attempt  lost  about  700  of  their  best  troops 
killed,  wounded,  or  taken  prisoners :  among  the  latter  was 
General  O'Hara  and  about  17  officers.  O'Hara  was  at  first 
with  the  reserve  on  the  Riviere  Neuve,  but  after  the  Allies 
had  taken  the  Convention,  he  advanced  for  some  unknown 


45 

reason  to  the  battery,  received  a  wound  in  the  arm  and  as 
the  Allies  fell  back  he  was  left  behind  and  a  few  Republican 
soldiers  from  the  bataillon  d'lsere  made  him  prisoner.  It 
was  not  only  around  the  Hauteur  des  Arenes  but  on  the 
entire  western  side  that  the  fight  took  place.  The  Republican 
batteries  hurled  shot  at  Fort  Mulgrave  and  at  the  fleet,  both 
of  which  answered  in  the  most  spirited  manner.  The  artil- 
lery played  an  important  part  in  driving  the  Allies  back 
from  the  Convention,  as  well  as  in  protecting  Garnier's  re- 
treat at  the  beginning  of  the  engagement.  Just  what  part 
Napoleon  took  in  this  affair  is  hard  to  say,  as  accounts  are 
so  conflicting.  But  at  all  events  tliere  is  absolute  proof  that 
he  distinguished  himself.  l "  Parmi  ceux  qui  se  sont  le  plus 
distingue"s  et  qui  m'ont  le  plus  aid6  a  rallier  et  a  pousser  en 
avant,  ce  sont  le  citoyens  Buonaparte  commandant  1'artil- 
lerie,  Arena  et  Cervoni,  adjudants  g6n6raux  ".  Salicetti'wrote 
on  this  day,  "  Le  general  Mouret,  Gamier  et  Buonaparte  se 
sont  dans  cette  occasion  conduits  d'une  maniere  distin- 
guee  ".2  It  will  be  noticed  that  he  was  mentioned  by  Dugomier 
first  among  those  who  aided  him,  and  that  by  Salicetti  he 
was  mentioned  with  two  of  the  generals,  and  lastly,  that  he 
is  the  only  one  who  is  named  in  both  reports. 

The  next  two  weeks  were  spent  in  preparing  the  batteries 
and  in  frequent  artillery  duels.  This  arm  had  at  last  as- 
sumed most  formidable  proportions3,  thanks  to  the  activity 
of  Bonaparte  in  procuring  material  of  every  description  from 
Marseilles,  Lyons,  Grenoble,  Biancon,  etc.,  and  to  his  judge- 
ment in  selecting  the  positions  of  his  batteries.  Victor  wrote 
that  by  Dec.  6.  194  bouches  a  feu  were  turned  against  Tou- 
lon; "  orcespuissantsmoyens  e"taient dirige"s par  Bonaparte; 
car  le  Ge"n6ral  Dutheil  emervill6  de  la  justesse  et  de  la  su- 
periorite  de  ses  vues  s'6tait  complement  effac6  devant  lui  ". 
4  Some  idea  of  the  amount  of  work  required  in  the  artillery 

1  Lettre  de  Dugommier.  Nov.  30.  Archives  de  la  Guerre. 

2  Lettre  de  Salicetti  Nov.  30  R.  A. 

3  Letter  from  O'Hara.  Archives  Nationales  AF  II  9. 

4  Memoires  de  Victor. 


46 

may  be  gathered  frim  the  following  report  of  Dutheil  to  the 
Minister  of  War,  on  December  2nd.  l  "  Personnel  de  1'artil- 
lerie — il  faudrait  6  officierssuperieurs,  autants  d'adjutants 
majors,  undirecteur  du  Pare,  un  sous  directeur,  un  commis- 
saire  des  guerres  un  propos^  du  payeur  general,  20  conduc- 
teurs  des  charrios  il  n'y  a  pas  le  quart  de  cannoniers 
necessaires.  .  .  .  il  faudrait  au  moins  8  commissairesde 
plus.  Les  cannoniers  auxiliaires  n'ayant  que  de  la  valeur  et 
aucune  instruction.  .  .  .  Poudrede  la  Guerre — Gassendi 
chef  de  Bataillon  envoy6  par  les  representans  du  peuple  dans 
toutes  les  places  jusqu'a  Metz  et  Strasbourg  pour  notre  appro- 
visionnement  de  siege  anonce  que  c'est  la  partie  qui  nous 
rnanquera  le  plus,  quelque  soit  ses  efforts  pour  nous  en  pro- 
curer   "  The  question  of  infantry  cartridges  was  a  most 

vital  one.  Bonaparte,  and  later  Duteuil  were  loud  in  de- 
nouncing the  wasteful  expenditure  here,  especially  in  the 
affair  of  November  30.  At  last  Salicetti  took  most  severe 
measures  for  stopping  this.  Even  as  late  as  December  10 
Dugommier  wrote  to  the  Minister  of  War  "La  poudre  et 
les  autres  munitions  de  guerre  exigent  encore  ta  sollicitude. 
Je  t'ai  mande  que  nous  Stions  bien  loin  de  la  quantity  cal- 
cul6e  raisonablement  et  n6cessaire  a  notre  but."  A  day  or  so 
before  the  attack  of  the  Convention  three  new  batteries  were 
opened.  The  Convention;  the  Homme-sans-peur,  "  situe"e  sur 
un  mamelon  doming  par  le  camp  anglais  (Fort  Mulgrave) 
Le  general  en  a  arret6  la  construction  par  ce  qu'il  croyait 
1'infanterie  trop  faible  pour  s'y  soutenir".  ;  and  the  Petite 
Rade,  destinee  a  6loigner  les  batiments  de  la  cote  et  des 
voisinages  de  la  poudriere".2  On  December  1  the  Poudriere 
opened  fire  on  Malbousquet.  "  Observed  a  great  deal  of  can- 
nonading and  musketry  at  the  different  Posts  &  more  es- 
pecially near  Fort  Malbousquet ",  Such  was  the  account  of 
it  in  Hood's  Journal. 

Dugommier  became  more  and  more  enthusiastic  over  the 

1  Archives  de  la  guerre. 

2  Correspondance  de  Napoleon. 


47 

artillery.  On  November  30  he  wrote  to  the  Minister  of  War 
"J'attends  la  perfection  de  deux  batteries  qui  doivent  jouer 
tin  beau  role  dans  cette  journSe".1  Dec.  4,  "Les  batteries 
necessaires  a  1'execution  du  dernier  plan  sont  presque  entiere- 
ment  acheve"es  -  -  Nous  sommes  pauvres  en  artilleurs." 
Dec.  10 — "Chaquejour  notre  position  s'ameliore  par  la  per- 
fection des  batteries  necessaires  a  1'attaque  des  postes  exte- 
rieures  qu'occupe  1'ennerni  et  mdique"s  dans  mon  plan 
d'attaque.  Je  voudrais  pouvoir  t'en  dire  autant  des  autres 
moyens  qui  doivent  contribuer  &  nos  succes."  About  this 
time  the  batteries  La  Fariniere,  to  the  right  of  the  Convention, 
and  Jacobins  to  the  left  of  Hommes-sans-Peur,  and  directed 
against  Fort  Mulgrave,  were  opened  on  the  enemy.  On  Dec. 
13,  Lord  Hood  wrote  that  there  was  nothing  of  importance 
since  the  30th  of  November,  but  that  new  batteries  were  going 
up  on  all  sides,  and  that  two  of  them  "  did  us  some  mischief, 
on  the  9th  and  10th."  "  We  shall  soon  have  more  men  in 
the  hospital  than  are  fit  for  service".2  Dundas  wrote  on  De- 
cember 12  "The  enemy  have  increased  number  of  mortars 
which  have  much  annoyed  our  two  posts  of  Cap  Brim  and 
Fort  Mulgrave".3  On  December  12  a  new  Council  of  War 
was  held,  where  it  was  decided  to  continue  the  old  plan. 
Dugommier,  however,  seerned  to  doubt  its  success;  his  views 
were  too  pessimistic  for  a  good  general.  On  December  13 
he  wrote  to  the  Comite  "  La  moitie"  de  cette  armee  est  nulle, 
sans  etre  connaisseur  il  ne  faut  que  voir  pour  en  etre  con- 

vaincu  " Les  officiers  ne  valent  pas  leur  sub- 

ordine"s.  Les  trois  quarts  ne  s'occupent  que  de  leurs  plaisirs 
et  de  la  nouvelle  existance  dont  ils  jouissent".4  Duteil 
seemed  to  be  in  the  same  state  of  uncertainty  and  on  Decem- 
ber 14  he  wrote  to  the  Minister  of  War  telling  of  the  canon- 
iers  which  were  wanting  etc.4  Napoleon  was  confident.  And 
holding  an  important  position  in  the  principal  arm  of  a 

1  Archives  de  la  Guerre. 

2  Hood  in  Gazette  under  date  of  December  13. 

3  Dundas  in  Gazette  under  date  of  December  12. 

4  Correspondance  de  Napoleon. 


48 

great  siege,  with  64  officers  and  1600  men  under  him,  and 
but  one  old  artillery  general,  with  whom  he  was  in  the  best 
understanding  over  him,  seeing  his  many  and  well  placed 
batteries  taking  a  constantly  increasing  effect  on  the  enemy 
he  could  not  but  feel  certain  of  success.  On  December  24 
after  the  siege  was  over  he  wrote  to  Dupin"  Je  t'ai  -annoncS 
de  brillants  succes  et  tu  vois  que  je  te  tiens  parole".1  On 
December  14  the  final  cannonading  commenced,  "  A  heavy 
cannonade  from  and  against  Fort  Mulgrave"as  Hood  wrote 
in  his  Journal.  The  principal  point  of  attack  was  Fort  Mul- 
grave,  and  it  was  bombarded  for  three  days.  Thaon  wrote 
"  Le  feu  etait  continuel  et  si  violent  que  Ton  comptait  jus- 
qu'a  7  bombes  en  Fair  a  la  fois — La  cannonade  6tait  vio- 
lente.  Tout  e"tait  en  jeu.  La  perte  journaliere  eiait  forte  et 
les  troupes  harasses  de  fatigue.  Un  feu  continuel  de  5  bat- 
teries de  canon  et  de  mortiers  durait  depuis  3  jours  et  3 
nuits  contre  les  ouvrages  de  Balaguier.  On  s'attendait  a  une 
attaque,  on  envoya  un  renfort  de  350  hommes  a  Balaguier.'' 
Further  on  he  said  "  les  defenses  avaient  6t6  fort  endomma- 
gees  par  le  feu  ennemi".  Victor  wrote  in  his  memoirs  "  1'en- 
nemi  ne  restait  point  inactif.  Apres  le  feu  terrible  et 
continuel  que  Ton  faisait  depuis  plusieurs  jours  sur  ses  pos- 
tes  principaux,  il  s'attendait  a  une  attaque  generale".  Dun- 
das  wrote  "works  (of  Mulgrave)  suffered  much.  The 
number  of  men  killed  &  disabled  was  considerable."2  Lan- 
gara  wrote  that  Fort  Mulgrave  "  which  they  had  bombarded 
and  cannonaded  from  different  quarters  with  the  utmost 

vivacity   during  the  three  preceding  days3 "  Smith 

wrote4  "Asa  prelude  to  the  general  assault  the  enemy  di- 
rected an  uninterrupted  fire  of  shot  and  shells  against  the 
Post  of  the  Hauteur  de  Grasse  for  several  days  &  nights. 
The  troops  being  unsheltered  from  the  shells  suffered  much 
and  were  so  harrassed  that  it.  is  not  to  be  wondered  at  that 

1  Correspondance  de  Napoleon. 

2  Dundasto  Henry  Dundas,  Dec.  20.  Correspondence  of  Smith -Barrow. 

3  Langara  to  Alcudia.  Dec.  21 .  St.  Helens.  R.  O. 

4  Smith  to  Hamilton.  Dec.  24.  Correspondence  of  Smith-Barrow. 


49 

they  were  not  able  to  resist  the  attack."  I  have  quoted  so 
much  on  the  events  and  state  of  the  army  from  the  arrival 
of  Dugommier  up  to  the  final  attack  on  Fort  Mulgrave,  to 
show  that  in  the  siege  of  Toulon  the  artillery  played  by  far 
the  greatest  part;  that  it  was  the  one  arm  which  inspired 
Dugommier  with  more  or  less  confidence;  that  furthermore, 
it  received  from  the  corps  of  engineers  under  Marescot  prac- 
tically no  support,  and  very  little  from  the  infantry,  which 
was  bad  from  the  officers  down;  and  that  in  the  successful 
attack  on  Fort  Mulgrave  the  greatest  part  of  the  credit  falls 
to  the  artillery  which  for  three  days  preceding  had  gradu- 
ally destroyed  the  work  and  harrassed  the  garrison  to  such 
an  extent  that  they  were  driven  out  by  inferior  infantry, 
and  in  spite  of  the  fact  that  an  attack  was  expected. 

The  final  attack  on  Fort  Mulgrave  took  place  on  Decem- 
ber 17  l  It  had  a  garrison  of  about  700  men,  made  up  of 
English,  Spanish  and  Neapolitans.  On  the  evening  of  16th, 
about  7,000  of  the  best  Republican  troops  were  gathered  at 
La  Seyne.  The  plan  was  to  make  the  attack  in  two  columns, 
of  about  2,000  nien  each,  with  a  third  column  of  about  the 
same  number  as  a  reserve.  Victor  commanded  the  column 
which  was  to  move  along  the  coast  of  the  promontory  and 
attacking  the  fort  on  its  right  side,  cut  off  all  help  which 
might  be  sent  from  Balaguier  or  Eguillette.  The  second 
column  commanded  by  Brul6  was  to  march  against  the 
front  of  the  redoute.  The  reserve  column  was  to  hold  itself 
ready  to  come  to  the  assistance  of  whichever  column  needed 
it.  It  was  a  very  stormy  night,  and  at  the  last  moment 
there  was  some  hesitation  as  to  whether  the  attack  should 

1  For  the  final  attacks,  and  departure  of  the  Allies  ; 

Memoirs  de  Victor,  Thaon,  Napoleon.  Relation  de  Marescot.  Hood's 
Journal.  Letters  :  Salicetti  a  Albitte,  Archives  Nationales  AF  II  2151 
Langara  to  Alcudia,  Dec.  21.  St.  Helens  R.  O.  Dugommier  au  M.  de  la 
Guerre  Dec.  18.  A.  G.  Barras  Dec.  16.  A.  G.  and  Dec.  18.  Recueil  Aulard. 
Dundas  in  Gazette.  Cook  to  Auckland  Dec.  20.  and  Elliot  to  same,  Dec. 
24  Correspondence  Auckland.  Hood  to  Henry  Dundas  Dec.  20  ;  Smith 
to  Hood  Dec.  20 ;  David  Dundas  to  Henry  Dundas  Dec.  20  ;  and  Smith 
to  Hamilton  Dec.  24.  Correspondence  of  Smith  ?  Barrow. 
2192-4 


50 

be  delayed  until  the  next  day  or  not.  The  Representants 
and  Dugommier  each  seemed  anxious  to  shift  the  responsi- 
bility. Bonaparte's  advice  was  to  go  ahead,  as  bad  weather 
was  not  at  all  disadvantageous  for  such  an  attack.  The  ex- 
citement caused  by  uncertainty  and  impatience  at  last  seized 
them,  and  between  one  and  two  in  the  morning  the  signal 
was  given.  The  plan  of  attack  was  quite  forgotten.  The 
fort  was  to  be  taken,  and  both  columns,  forming  into  one, 
rushed  forward  in  the  true  Republican  revolutionary 
manner  straight  for  the  fort.  To  the  noise  of  the  storm,  the 
cannon,  and  the  Marseillaise,  was  added  at  the  first  resist- 
ance the  usual  cries  of  sauve  qui  pent !  &  la  trahison  !  In  this 
way  the  cowardly  tried  to  excuse  their  dastardly  retreat. 
The  others,  who  were  fortunately  the  greater  part,  pushed 
on  up  to  the  reboute,  where  they  were  met  with  a  deter- 
mined resistance.  Victor  was  wounded,  and  already  Dugom- 
mier cried  "je  suis  perdu!"  and  started  for  the  reserve 
column.  It  was  already  on  its  way,  led  on  by  Bonaparte 
and  an  artillery  captain  Muiron,  who  knowing  the  ground 
well,  lead  the  advance  guard.  By  a  third  and  last  effort 
they  entered  the  fort,  and  after  a  few  minutes  deadly  fight 
in  the  dark,  the  enemy  retreated  to  Balaguier  and  Eguil- 
lette.  At  4  o'clock  the  news  reached  Hood  that  Fort  Mul- 
grave  was  taken.  Bonaparte  put  Marmont,  the  future  due  de 
Raguse  in  charge  of  the  artillery  of  the  captured  post  and 
directed  him  to  turn  the  guns  against  the  ships.  In  the 
morning  when  the  other  troops  at  Balaguier  and  Eguillette 
discovered  the  enemy  in  possession  of  Mulgrave  they  crowded 
"  to  the  water  like  the  herd  of  swine,  that  ran  furiously 
into  the  sea  possessed  of  the  devil."  *  The  ships  and  mortar 
boats  of  the  Allies  bombarded  Fort  Mulgrave,  but  before 
long  the  Courageux  made  the  signal  "  wanting  boat  to  tow". 
Smith  wrote,  "  The  idea  of  sauve  qui  pent  now  seemed  to  pos- 
sess everybody,  the  fleets  of  the  different  nations  alarmed 
at  the  idea  of  being  burnt  by  red  hot  shot  or  shells  from 
1  Account] of  Sir  Sidney^Smith. 


51 

Fort  Mulgrave,  Balaguier  and  Eguillette  (now  in  possession 
of  the  enemy)  weighed  anchor  and  crowded  out  of  the  road 
in  such  haste  as  to  alarm  the  troops  on  shore  lest  they 
should  be  left  behind." 

This  same  morning  Faron  was  attacked  on  three  sides  at 
once,  east,  west  and  north.  After  some  resistance  and  the 
usual  "  sauve  qui  peut!"  and  "£  la  trahison",  after  which  the 
cowardly  no  longer  impeded  the  advance,  the  Republicans 
succeeded  in  establishing  themselves  there.  "  Lapoype  tant 
calomnieS  s'est  aussi  parfaiternent  bien  cornporte"".  Thaon  de- 
scribed this  success  as  "aussi  funeste  qu'incroyable".  Na- 
poleon, after  making  his  dispositions  at  Fort  Mulgrave, 
proceeded  to  turn  his  batteries  on  Fort  Malbosquet,  for  al- 
though he  felt  certain  that  the  Allies  would  soon  evacuate 
the  city,  he  was  determined  that  his  shot  and  shells  should 
hasten  their  departure.  Fre"ron  wrote  Dec  18  "Us  ont  pris 
des  mesures  pour  mettre  leur  flotte  a  1'abri  de  nos  canons 
et  de  nos  bombes  qui  n'ont  cess6  de  les  accableV'.  This 
constant  Artillery  fire  had  a  most  demoralizing  effect  upon 
the  Allies.  In  the  night  of  the  17th.  they  abandoned  Fort 
Malbousquet  and  Fort  Pomets  and  very  soon  all  the  outside 
posts  were  in  the  hands  of  the  Republicans  except  Fort  Mul- 
grave which  the  Allies  were  forced  to  hold  to  protect  the  em- 
barcation. 

As  soon  as  the  news  reached  Hood  that  Mulgrave  was 
taken  a  hurried  council  of  war  was  called,  on  the  morning 
of  the  17th.  Hood,  Langara,  Gravina,  Dundas,  Elliot, 
Thaon  de  Revel  and  others  were  present.  The  question  was 
whether  after  the  loss  of  Balaguier  and  Faron  it  was  advis- 
able to  hold  the  town.  Hood  and  Gravina,  counting  upon 
the  reinforcements  promised  from  Gibraltar,  and  on  the  5000 
Austrian  troops  who  were  on  their  way,  voted  for  resistance, 
but  gave  in  at  last  to  the  opinion  of  the  majority ;  which 
was  to  abandon  the  city.  It  was  decided  ;  that  the  garrisons 
of  Malbousquet  and  Misiessy  should  hold  out  to  the  last  ex- 
tremity to  cover  the  retreat;  to  inform  the  inhabitants  that 


52 

the  powers  would  use  all  means  to  carry  away  those  who  de- 
sire to  leave  the  city ;  to  embark  the  sick  and  wounded  at  once; 
to  carry  off  the  French  vessels  which  remained  armed  during 
the  siege  and  to  destroy  the  others,  as  well  as  the  magasins 
de  la  Marine  and  the  arsenal.  Immediately  afterwards  prep- 
arations were  made  for  the  embarkation  although  it  was  not 
until  the  next  morning,  Dec.  18  that  the  time  was  set.  At 
first  the  inhabitants  of  the  town,  kept  in  ignorance  of  the 
intended  departure,  were  quiet  and  orderly.  The  next  day 
things  began  to  change.  As  the  Republicans  drew  nearer 
and  nearer,  as  the  troops  were  seen  getting  ready  for  depart- 
ure in  such  large  numbers,  and  especially  as  the  shot  and 
shell  began  to  create  havoc  in  the  town  and  harbor,  it 
dawned  upon  the  inhabitants  what  was  taking  place.  Then 
the  wildest  confusion  reigned,  some  rushing  to  the  shore  for 
boats,  others  donning  the  red  cockade,  and  vowing  vengeance 
upon  their  fellow-citizens,  who  still  remained  royalists. 
Blood  was  shed  in  the  streets  between  the  rival  factions.  This 
state  of  affairs  was  rendered  more  terrible  by  the  fire  of  the 
enemy.  It  will  be  remembered  that  Napoleon  turned  his  bat- 
teries against  Malbousquet  after  the  fall  of  Mulgrave.  He  had 
said,  a  month  before,  that  under  such  conditions  Malbousquet 
would  not  hold  out  48  hours.  That  evening  it  was  evacuated, 
in  spite  of  the  formal  orders  of  the  council  of  war,  that  it  was 
to  be  held.  The  further  work  of  the  artillery  is  well  de- 
scribed by  Thaon  de  Revel.  "  L'ennemi  travailla  a  des  bat- 
teries pendant  tout  la  journSe  et  la  nuit  (of  the  17th)  et  les 
fit  jour  de  bonne  heure.  (on  the  18th)  Les  Frangais  maitres 
de  1'artillerie  qui  6tait  a  Malbousquet  canonnaient  et  bom- 
bardaient  la  ville.  Ils  avaient  de  m£me  des  enclouS  et  tourne 
contre  les  Allies  toutes  les  bouches  a  feu  des  postes  aban- 
donnSs.  C'  6tait  un  feu  infernal  et  continuel  contre  la  ville, 
la  rade  et  le  port".  It  was  decided  on  the  morning  of  the 
18th  to  embark  at  12  o'clock  that  night ;  but  the  constant 
advance  of  the  Republicans  upset  the  plans  of  the-  Allies 


53 

somewhat  and  caused  them  to  hasten  their  departure.1  It 
took  place  in  comparatively  good  order ;  the  troops  were  all 
taken  off  without  the  loss  of  a  man.  This  was  not  the  case 
with  the  refugees ;  they  hurried  in  large  and  terrified  crowds 
to  the  water's  edge :  the  war  ships  and  all  boats  in  the  har- 
bor were  put  at  their  disposal,  but  still  many  were  lost  in 
their  wild  flight  by  overcrowding  the  boats,  and  some  of  the 
boats  were  sunk  by  the  shells  of  the  enemy.  The  fact  that 
90  anchors  were  picked  up  in  the  harbor  afterwards  shows 
how  quickly  the  boats  must  have  departed.  The  whole  affair 
was  a  terrible  sight.  Elliot  wrote  to  Lady  Elliot  Dec  20. 
"  There  has  seldom  been  crammed  more  misery  and  more 
terror  in  a  short  space  than  we  have  witnessed  these  last 
four  days"  .  .  .  Fortunately  the  weather  was  good.  "Had 
the  weather  been  such  as  it  has  been  ever  since  that  is  to 
say  blowing  strong  from  the  eastward  we  must  have  all, — 
fleet,  army  and  refugees  inevitably  perished  ".  On  the  Eng- 
lish and  Spanish  fleet  were  about  6000  refugees,  who  had 
been'taken  from  the  town.  Some  French  accounts  of  Toulon 
contain  long  literary  descriptions  of  the  horrors  of  this  day, 
and  do  not  hesitate  to  follow  them  with  a  sharp  condemna- 
tion of  the  action  of  the  Allies,  especially  the  English,  in 
not  taking  off  all  the  inhabitants.  In  the  first  place  all  de- 
tailed accounts  of  these  incidents  are  more  or  less  untrust- 
worthy; to  discriminate  between  the  behavior  of  the  Allies 
is  quite  wrong  as  no  proof  exists  that  the  English  were  any 
less  anxious  to  help  the  refugees  than  the  Spaniards:  they 
each  had  about  an  equal  number  on  their  fleets.  De  Brecy, 
directeur  des  douanes  royales  at  Toulon,  who  was  one  of  the 
fugitives  wrote  "  L'Amiraux  Hood,  Goodal  et  Parker,  Elliot 
et  d'autres  firent  des  offres  les  plus  gene"reuses  aux  fugitifs. 
Le  gouvernment  anglais  payait  en  outre  tous  les  secours 
accordes  aux  fugitifs  a  Livourne,  Tile  d'Eibe  et  la  Corse  ". 

Hood  in  Gazette  under  date  Dec  20.  "  It  became  unavoidably  neces- 
sary that  the  retreat  should  not  be  deferred  beyond  that  night  as  the 
enemy  commanded  the  town  and  ships  by  their  shot  and  shell ". 


54 

As  to  taking  them  all  off  on  such  short  notice  it  was  next  to 
impossible.  Again  these  writers  might,  with  more  justice 
and  far  greater  success,  criticise  and  condemn  the  cruelty  of 
the  Republican  army  which  made  such  a  measure  necessary 
in  a  civilized  country  at  the  end  of  the  18th  century.  It  is 
true  that  Fox  criticised  the  action  of  the  English  bitterly, 
but  it  was  part  of  the  plan  of  the  opposition.  "We  do  not 
know  to  what  number  but  it  is  certain  that  thousands  of 
poor  wretches  who  have  been  deluded  by  our  promises  are 
now  left  by  us  to  the  guillotine.  It  must  be  a  strong  case  of 
necessity  which  can  justify  such  a  proceeding  .  .  ." 

One  thing  remained  still  to  be  done  before  leaving  the 
city,  namely,  to  burn  or  destroy  the  ships,  which  could  not 
be  taken  away,  and  the  Arsenal.  Sir  Sidney  Smith  and  the 
Adjutant  of  the  Spanish  navy  were  ordered  to  perform  this 
duty.  According  to  the  agreement  in  the  council  of  war  it 
was  to  be  done  at  the  last  moment,  but  they  started  either  a 
little  too  late  or  the  Republicans  advanced  a  little  too 
quickly.  At  all  events  Smith  did  not  complete  his  work 
and  the  Spaniard  did  his  stupidly.  As  Smith  approached 
the  Arsenal,  preparing  to  burn  everything,  he  found  a  num- 
ber of  the  inhabitants,  principally  prisoners  who  had  liber- 
ated themselves,  ready  to  dispute  him.  The  shouts  of  the 
Republicans  could  be  heard  not  far  off  and  the  musket  balls 
of  the  people  in  the  town  took  effect.  This  delayed  him 
somewhat,  as  did  also  a  rather  stupid  act  on  the  part  of  the 
Spaniards.  They  had  been  ordered  to  sink  the  ships  in  the 
basin,  but  finding  it  impracticable,  they  blew  up  two  of  the 
Frigates  and  in  so  doing  sank  two  English  gun  boats,  which 
were  near,  killing  a  lieutenant  and  several  seamen.  Smith 
wrote  to  Hood  "Having  now  set  fire  to  everything  within 
our  reach,  exhausted  our  combustible  preparations  and  our 
strength  to  such  a  degree  that  the  men  absolutely  dropped 
on  the  oars,  we  directed  our  course  to  join  the  fleet  running 
the  gauntlet  under  a  few  ill  directed  shot  from  the  forts 
BalguS  and  Aiguette".  Langara  wrote  "In  like  manner 


55 

were  blown  up  two  Frigates  loaded  with  4000  Quintals  of 
Powder,  on  each  of  which  a  chemin  de  sou  fire  was  placed 
by  the  Adjutant  to  the  Squadron  Don  Francisco  Riquelme 
who  acquired  in  that  service  the  most  distinguished  honor, 
as  did  likewise  the  other  two  officers  who  were  exposed  dur- 
ing a  considerable  time  to  the  fire  of  Musquetry  from  the 
Insurgents  belonging  to  the  Town". 

On  the  morning  of  the  19th  the  Republicans  entered  Tou- 
lon. What  the  remaining  inhabitants  of  the  town  had  to 
expect,  is  well  shown  by  what  the  Representants  wrote  the 
day  preceeding.  Barras  wrote  "  L'inf&me  Toulon  est  &  nous 
rien  ne  peut  le  soutraire  aux  vengeances  nationales.  De- 
main  le  royaume  de  Louis  XVII  n  'aura  pas  un  pouce  de 
terre".  ^icord,  Freron  and  Robespierre  jeune  wrote  "de- 
main  nous  serons  dans  Toulon  occup^s  a  venger  la  Repub- 
lique"  2The  Republicans  found  a  great  deal  of  booty  and 
many  provisions  in  Toulon.  These  were  increased  each  day  by 
the  ships  which  sailed  in,  thinking  the  city  still  in  the  hands 
of  the  Allies.  The  booty  was  gathered  together,  sold  and 
the  money  divided  among  the  soldiers.  In  the  meantime 
the  executions  took  place.  In  general  it  was  a  repetition  of 
the  punishment  of  Lyons;  since  thousands  of  the  citizens 
left  with  the  Allies,  those  who  remained  behind  had  to  take 
their  place,  in  spite  of  their  remonstrances  and  declarations 
of  republicanism.  The  Representants  wrote  on  Dec  20th3 
"  La  vengeance  nationale  se  deploie.  L'on  fusille  a  force. 
Deja  tous  les  officiers  de  la  marine  sont  extermine's.  La  Re- 
publique  sera  vengee  d'une  maniere  digne  d'elle.  les  manes 
des  patriotes  seront  apais6es".  As  to  the  vessels  which  came 
in  daily;  "Tout  ce  qui  est  etranger  sur  ses  batiments  est 
fait  prisonnier  tout  ce  que  est  fran9ais  est  fusill£  ".  Therep- 
resentants  were  in  their  element.  Nowhere  did  they  display 
their  activity  more  than  in  "  avenging  the  Republic  ".  After 

1  Barras  18th  Dec.  R.  A. 

2  Ivetter  18th  Dec.  R.  A. 

3  Recueil  Aulard. 


56 

about  a  week  they  seemed  to  have  had  enough.  On  January 
5th  they  wrote  l "  Hercule,  dit-on,  eut  plus  de  peine  a  net- 
toyerles  etables  d'Angias  qu'a  dompter  les  lions  etlesmon- 
stres.    Pour]  nous   nous  preferons   mille  fois  de  nouvelles 
redoutes  a  attaquer  plutot  que  d'etre  condamn6s  a  purger  ce 
sol  impur  et  grangrene.  Nous  se  somines  entoures  que  de 
ruines,   de  supplices,  de  vengeances,  de  pleurs  et  de  larmes 
que  la  rage  du  de"sespoire  et  non  le  repentir  fait  repandre". 
The  enemies  of  Bonaparte,  and  of  his  name,  have  tried 
to  connect  him  with  these  orgies  of  the  Representants.  In 
1814  the  Baron  d'Imbert  published  in  a  pamphlet  on  the 
siege  of  Toulon,  which  was  nothing  more  than  a  praise  of 
himself  and  other  refugies,  together  with  a  bid  for  the  favor 
of  Louis  XVIII,  the  following  letter  as  written  by  Bona- 
parte. "  Lettre  de  Bonaparte  a  la  Convention.  Citoyens  Rep- 
resentants, C'est  du  champ  de  bataille,  marchant  dans  le 
sang  des  traitres  que  je  vous  an  nonce  avec  joie  que  vos  or- 
dres  sont  execute's,  et  que  la  France  est  veng6e.  Ni  1'age,  ni 
le  sexe  n'ont  e"te"  Spargnes:  ceux  qui  avaient  seulement  Ste" 
blesses  par  le  canon   republican  out  e"te"   de'p&ihe's  par  le 
Glaive  de  la  Iibert6  et  par  la  bayonette  de  I'6galit6.  Salut  et 
admiration.  Signe",  Bonaparte,  citoyen  sans-culottes.  Others 
have  said  that  of  course  Bonaparte  must  have  taken  part  in 
the  massacres  as  the  artillery  was  used  to  execute  the  peo- 
ple "en  masse".  They  seemed  to  forget  that  there  were  160 
other  artillery  officers  under  him.    The  above  letter  is,  it 
seems  to  me,  most  decidedly  a  false  one.  Why  should  Bona- 
parte write  to  the  Convention?  Why  should  he  sign  himself 
simply  "  Bonaparte  "  as  if  he  were  known  to  all  of  them  ? 
Again  had  he,  adopting  the  plan  of  the  Representants,  de- 
cided to  distinguish  himself  in  this  manner,  he  would  surely 
have  received  some  mention  from  the  Representants,  at  least 
from  his  friend  Salicetti.    Further,  there  is  absolutely  no 

1  Recueil  Aulard. 


57 

other  indication  that  he  was  a  party  to  these  executions.1 
Like  most  of  the  officers,  he  propably  looked  upon  them  in 
a  cold  half  indifferent  way,  with  some  pity  for  the  victims 
and  much  contempt  for  the  patriotic  murderers.  It  must  not 
be  expected  that  Bonaparte,  brought  up  in  the  atmosphere 
of  the  revolution,  absorbed  in  his  own  ambition,  and  looking 
on  revolution  as  the  means  of  satisfying  it,  should  regard 
such  scenes  with  the  same  amount  of  human  compassion 
as  one  would  expect  to  find  in  a  man  today.  A  letter  which 
he  wrote  at  this  time,2  seems  to  indicate  that  he  looked  upon 
such  measures  as  so  much  a  matter  of  course,  as  not  to  men- 
tion them,  one  way  or  the  other;  but  that  the  first  few  days 
he  spent  in  examining  the  fortifications,  and  the  naval  and 
military  stores  of  Toulon.  "Les  Anglais  n'ont  fait  que  per- 
fectionne"  et  augmente  les  fortifications  de  la  place,  ainsi  Tou- 
lon est  plus  dans  le  cas  de  se  defendre  aujourd'hui  que 

jamais Je  m'occupe  &  faire  construire  lesfoures 

&  re"verbere.  .  .  .  nous  avons  trouve"  dans  Toulon  la 
meme  artillerie  qui  y  etait  avant  leur  entree,  il  nous  reste 
encore  15  vaisseaux."  These  few  lines  indicate  that  he  was 
occupied  with  quite  different  things  than  "  avenging  the  re- 
public ".  The  15  vessels  of  which  he  spoke  formed  part  of 
those  which  took  him  later  from  this  very  port  over  to 

Egypt. 

1  The  Due  de  Raguse  says  in  his  memoires  that  Napoleon  opposed  this 
general  execution  of  the  people. 

2  Correspondance  de  Napoleon. 


PART  II. 

DIPLOMATIC    CORRESPONDENCE    OP    THE 

ALLIES    AND    RESULTS    OP    THE 

FALL    OF    TOULON. 


CHAPTER  I. 

DISPUTE  BETWEEN  HOOD  AND  LANGARA — COMMISSIONERS 
AT  TOULON — INSTRUCTIONS  TO  COMMISSIONERS — DEC- 
LARATION PUBLISHED  AT  TOULON — CORRESPONDENCE 

WITH  AUSTRIA  AS  TO  DECLARATION — CORRESPONDENCE 
WITH  SPAIN  AS  TO  DECLARATION — ENGLAND'S  OBJECT 
IN  HOLDING  TOULON — PUBLICATION  OF  DECLARATION. 

Toulon  came  into  possession  of  the  English  so  unexpect- 
edly that  Hood  and  others  were  quite  unprepared  with  in- 
structions relative  to  such  an  event.  As  Spain  was  much 
nearer,  Langara  received  instructions  early  and  the  Spanish 
Court  took  such  prompt  measures  as  to  procure  them  certain 
advantages  which  the  English  were  afterwards  unwilling  to 
admit.  Consequently  there  arose  between  these  two  powers 
disputes  which  lasted  during  the  entire  siege,  and  which 
were  beginning  to  take  dangerous  proportions  just  as  the 
fleets  were  forced  to  leave  the  harbor.  Dundas  wrote  to 
O'Hara,  Dec.  20  ullt  must  be  remembered  that  from  the 
manner  in  which  Toulon  came  into  Bis  Majesty's  possession 
it  was  impossible  to  be  prepared  with  a  force  adequate  to  his 
wishes  or  to  the  importance  of  the  acquisition  ;"  and  on  the 
same  day  to  Dundas  l  "you  must  be  aware  that  Toulon  came 
into  our  hands  at  a  moment  when  it  was  impossible  for  us 
to  have  made  any  preparations  for  such  an  event."  That  the 
English  were  not  quite  satisfied  with  Hood's  declaration  has 

l  Letters  from  Sec.  Dundas  to  Lieut.  Gen.  Dundas  1793-4  British  Mu- 
seum Mss.  Addit.  27,594. 


59 

been  seen.  At  first  the  English  Admiral,  Goodall,  was  ap- 
pointed governor  of  the  town,  and  the  Spanish  admiral,  Gra- 
vina,  commander  of  the  garrison.  Hood  wrote  September  14 
luWe  derive  great  assistance  from  Gravina  who  is  the  best 
sailor  general  imaginable;  quick,  intelligent,  but  not  pre- 
tending to  much  military  skill ;  and  agreeing  most  cordially 
with  the  English."  The  Spanish  believed  that  the  command 
of  the  troops  was  to  remain  in  their  hands.  St.  Helens  wrote, 
September  25;  2"They  (the  Spanish  troops)  are  to  be  ac- 
companied by  the  marechal  de  Camp  Don  Rafael  de  Valdes 
(brother  to  the  minister  of  the  marine)  who  is  to  take  the 
chief  command  of  the  troops  on  shore  in  the  room  of  ad- 
miral Gravina.  I  heartily  wish  that  he  may  succeeed  equally 
well  in  maintaining  a  good  understanding  between  the 
troops  of  the  two  nations."  The  English  however  did  not 
care  to  have  their  forces  (including  those  of  their  allies)  un- 
der the  command  of  a  Spanish  General  and  resorted  to  un- 
derhanded methods  to  avoid  it.  General  O'Hara  was  to  be  sent 
as  governor  to  Toulon,  and  on  September  21  he  was  ap- 
pointed a  lieutenant-general ;  which  rank  made  him  supe- 
rior to  the  Spanish  commander  whom  he  must  consequently 
supercede.  3In  the  meantime  the  dispute  broke  out  between 
Hood  and  Langara.  Langara  wrote  to  Hood  October  19; 4 

"Notwithstanding  that  the  king  is  very  well  satisfied  with 
the  good  conduct  of  rear-admiral  Gravina  during  the  time 
that  he  has  been  commandant  general  of  the  combined 
Troops  at  Toulon  His  Majesty,  not  to  deprive  the  fleet  of  a 
general  of  his  merit  has  resolved  to  relieve  him  from  that 
command  and  that  he  should  return  to  his  ship  to  be  em- 
ployed in  other  important  services,  and  has  named  Major- 
General  Don  Raphael  Valdes  to  succeed  him  in  the  Com- 
mand. I  communicate  it  to  your  Excellency  for  your  due 

1  St.  Helens  to  Grenville  Sept.  25.  R.  O. 

2  Record  Office. 

3  Dundas  to  O'Hara  Nov.  30  Dundas  to  Gen.  Dundas  Dec.  20.  British 
Museum  Mss. 

4  St.  Helens  to  Grenville  No.  8  R.  O. 


60 

information  and  I  hope  that  you  will  be  pleased  to  give  the 
necessary  orders  as  I  have  done  for  his  being,  acknowledged". 
Hood  answered;  "I  return  to  your  Excellency  a  thousand 
thanks  for  your  obliging  communication  of  the  arrival  of 
Don  Valdes  to  take  upon  him  the  command  of  his  Catholic 
Majesty's  troopes  in  the  room  of  our  most  esteemed  friend 
admiral  Gravina  and  have  not  a  doubt  but  the  service  of 
the  common  cause  in  which  Spain  and  England  are  so  very 
cordially  united  will  as  cordially  be  carried  on.  I  beg  to  offer 
to  your  Excellency  my  sincere  congratulations  that  Admiral 
Gravina  is  going  on  so  exceeding  well". 

It  will  be  seen  that  the  difference  lay  between  Langara's 
"  commandant  general  of  the  combined  troops  "  and  Hood's 
"  the  command  of  his  Catholic  Majesty's  troops  "  ;  yet  neither 
admiral  approached  the  question  directly.  A  few  days  latter 
however,  Oct.  23,  Langara  informed  Hood  that  Gravina  had 
been  promoted  to  the  rank  of  lieutenant-genneral  of  the  fleet 
and  that  the  king  had  confirmed  him1  "the  general  com- 
mand of  the  allied  forces,  in  the  possesssion  of  which  he  has 
been  by  the  agreement  between  your  Excellency  and  me  ". 
Major-general  Valdes  was  to  command  the  Spanish  troops. 
Hood  no  longer  answered  in  an  evading  manner,  but  ex- 
pressed himself  so  clearly  as  by  no  means  to  contribute  to  a 
good  understanding  between  the  admirals:  "  No  one  can 
more  sincerely  rejoice  than  myself  at  my  much  esteemed 
friends  promotion,  but  his  Sardinian  and  Sicilian  Majesty 
having  been  graciously  pleased  to  confide  their  respective 
troops  entirely  to  my  disposal  or  to  act  under  such  british 
officer  as  I  may  judge  fit  to  put  them  I  am  very  much  at  a 
loss  to  conceive  upon  what  ground  Admiral  Gravina  can 
take  upon  him  the  title  of  commander  in  chief  of  the  com- 
bined forces  at  Toulon ;  more  especially  as  the  town  and  its 
dependant  forts  were  yielded  up  to  the  British  alone  and 
taken  possession  of  by  me.  I  shall  therefore  feel  it  my  duty 
to  put  the  Sardinian  and  Sicilian  troops  together  with  the 

l  Record  Office.  Better  published  by  Cottin. 


61 

british  under  the  command  of  major  general  O'Hara,  the 
moment  he  arrives  (who  is  now  off  the  port)  eventually  subject 
to  such  orders  as  I  may  see  fit  to  give".1  Then  followed  a 
long  letter  from  each  of  the  admirals ;  Langara  declared 
that  from  the  day  they  went  on  shore  together,  on  Sept.  2, 
it  was  agreed  that  the  command  should  be  divided.  Hood 
claimed  that  Toulon  surrendered  to  him  alone.  This  was 
true,  as  the  English  officers  had  been  on  shore  and  had  ar- 
ranged for  the  surrender  before  the  arrival  of  the  Spaniards; 
and  the  English  fleet  entered  as  soon  as  the  Spanish  was 
seen  in  the  distance ;  Hood  did  not  dare  enter  before.  It  was 
also  true  however  that  the  Spaniards  considered  themselves 
on  an  equal  footing  with  the  English  and  had  exerted 
themselves  from  the  beginning  upon  this  understanding. 
St.  Helens  wrote  to  Grenville2  "  In  general  tho'  this  Court 
certainly  conceive  themselves  to  be  in  strictness  entitled  to 
the  Nomination  of  the  commander  in  chief  of  the  forces  on 
shore,  in  virtue  of  the  agreement  to  that  effect,  which  they 
suppose  to  have  been  concluded  at  the  outset  of  the  business 
between  the  two  admirals,  it  seems  to  me  that  they  are  by 
no  means  disposed  to  insist  pertinaciously  upon  that  Claim, 
being  aware  that  it  it  can  hardly  be  considered  as  reason- 
able now  that  the  Spanish  troops  in  the  garrison  bear  so 
small  a  proportion  to  those  of  Great  Britain  and  her  allies, 
but  their  feelings  are  of  course  very  deeply  wounded  by  those 
expressions  in  Lord  Hood's  letter  to  Admiral  Langara  on 
the  25th  of  October  which  so  positively  assert  that  the  rights 
which  have  been  acquired  over  the  town  and  port  of  Tou- 
lon with  its  ships  belong  not  to  the  two  crowns  jointly  but 
solely  and  exclusively  to  Great  Britain,  contrarary  to  the  no- 
tions which  have  been  hitherto  entertained  by  this  govern- 
ment, which  they  have  so  ostentatiously  announced  to  their 
subjects  and  in  consequence  of  which  they  have  made  such 
great  and  expensive  efforts  for  the  securing  that  important 

1  Record  Office.  Published  by  Cottin. 

2  St.  Helens  to  Grenville,  Nov.  8.  R.  O. 


62 

possession  and  I  therefore  cannot  help  taking  the  liberty  of 
expressing  a  wish  that  their  share  in  this  joint  right  may  at 
least  nominally  be  preserved  to  them,  since  otherwise  there 
is  reason  to  fear  that  besides  their  withdrawing  immediately 
from  Toulon  all  their  ships  and  land  forces  the  effect  of  our 
late  endeavors  to  cultivate  a  good  understanding  with  them 
will  be  entirely  lost  and  that  they  will  cease  to  look  towards 
England  with  any  kind  of  cordiality  or  confidence."  This 
was  his  official  report ;  the  same  day  he  wrote  to  Grenville1 
"  I  am  more  anxious  than  I  can  express  that  for  the  reasons 
mentioned  in  my  dispatch  some  means  may  be  found  for 
calming  the  very  great  degree  of  pique  and  ill-humor  which 
this  court  have  conceived  on  account  of  the  Toulon  business, 
by  giving  them  at  least  nominally  an  equal  share  with  us 
in  the  Possession  or  Trusteeship  of  that  place  and  its  apper- 
tenances.  It  is  certainly  true  that  at  the  outset  of  the  enter- 
prise Admiral  Langara  had  great  reason  to  presume  that  it 
was  upon  that  footing  that  he  had  been  invited  to  concur  in 
it:  witness  his  joint  proclamation  with  Lord  Hood,  the  cere- 
monies of  the  landing  etc.  Besides  which  even  supposing 
that  the  motives  which  he  and  his  court  entertained  upon 
that  head  were  founded  merely  upon  self  delusion,  we  cer- 
tainly were  not  ignorant  that  they  acted  from  the  impulse 
of  that  conception  however  erroneous,  and  therefore  the  de- 
ferring to  undeceive  them  till  the  precise  moment  when 
their  services  were  no  ^longer  needed  would  surely  have  an 
appearance,  if  not  of  ill-faith  at  least  of  Machiavelism,  which 
would  ill  accord  with  the  general  character  of  the  British 
Government.  The  Dukede  la  Alcudia  seems  to  wish  for  some 
written  agreement  upon  this  subject  but  I  imagine  that  that 
will  hardly  be  found  practical."  These  two  letters  just  given 
show  that  even  the  English  ambassador  at  Madrid  saw  the 
justice  of  the  Spanish  claims.  This  dispute  continued  dur- 
ing the  entire  time  of  the  occupation  of  Toulon,  but  before 
following  it  further  it  is  necessary  to  speak  of  the  Commision 
which  was  sent  by  the  English  to  Toulon. 

1  Helens  to  Grenville  Nov.  8.   R.  O. 


63 

O'Hara  had  been  appointed  Governor  of  Toulon  before 
the  end  of  September ;  and  Sir  Gilbert  Elliot,  who  was  to 
have  been  .governor  of  Dunkirk,  was  sent  out  also  to  take 
charge  of  the  civil  affairs.  O'Hara  and  Elliot  were  to  form 
with  Hood  a  joint  commission  for  the  government  of  Tou- 
lon. Elliot  left  England  the  llth  of  October,  but  it  was  not 
until  the  22nd  that  Grenville,  after  consulting  Pitt,  informed 
the  Court  of  Madrid,  through  St.  Helens,  of  the  appoint- 
ment of  this  commission.1  To  settle  on  the  spot  such  ques- 
tions as  may  arise,  His  Majesty  has  "  in  execution  of  the 
trust  undertaken  in  His  name  by  Lord  Hood  authorized  Sir 
Gilbert  Elliot  to  proceed  to  Toulon  to  act  conjointly  with 
His  Majesty's  officers  commanding  his  sea  and  land  forces 
in  the  execution  of  a  Commission  respecting  all  the  points 
of  a  Civil  nature  which  may  present  themselves  in  the  course 
of  events  at  Toulon.  His  Majesty  has  also  in  consequence  of 
the  surrender  of  that  place  and  from  the  sense  of  the  neces- 
sity of  relieving  Admiral  Goodall  from  the  duties  of  a  situ- 
ation incompatible  with  the  naval  service,  appointed  Lieu- 
tenant-General  O'Hara  to  succeed  that  officer  as  Governor  of 
Toulon,  and  to  take  upon  him  the  command  of  His  Majes- 
ty's forces  in  that  part  of  France.  Lord  Hood,  Sir  Gilbert 
Elliott  and  General  O'Hara  are  severally  directed  to  main- 
tain the  most  cordial  and  confidential  intercourse  with  the 
Persons  employed  by  his  Catholic  Majesty,  and  to  endeavor 
to  the  utmost  to  continue  that  good  understanding  which 
has  hitherto  prevailed  there  so  much  to  the  advantage  of 
the  common  cause." 

The  foregoing  was  inserted  in  a  letter  to  St.  Helens  on 
Pitt's  advice.  Pitt  wrote  October  17  to  Grenville;2  "  We 
think  there  ought  to  be  a  sentence  inserted  distinctly  men- 
tioning that  we  have  appointed  a  governor  of  Toulon  in 
consequence  of  the  place  being  surrendered  to  us;  adding, 
of  course,  every  proper  assurance  of  our  desire  to  cooperate 
with  Spain  in  that  question.  We  must  take  this  line  respect- 

1  Grenville  to  St.  Helens  Oct.  22.  R.  O. 

2  Pitt  to  Grenville  Oct.  17.  Mss.  of  Fortesque. 


64 

ing  Toulon  whenever  any  question  occurs  between  us  and 
Spain  on  that  subject."  Pitt  foreseeing  the  possible  objection 
of  Spain  added,  "The  sooner  this  step  is  taken,  the  more 
likely  to  avoid  disgust".  Henry  Dundas  wrote  to  Grenville1 
"  It  occurs  to  Mr.  Pitt  and  to  me  that  it  is  better  not  to  keep 
back  our  having  appointed  a  governor.  The  grounds  on 
which  we  obtained  possession,  and  the  impossibility  of  Hood 
and  the  officers  acting  under  him  continuing  to  exercise  the 
office  and  duties  of  Governor,  are  reasons  too  obvious  for 
adopting  the  measure  to  be  concealed  ". 

Buckingham  wrote  to  Grenville,  asking  about  the  division 
of  command  and  added  refering  to  the  French  ships  at 
Toulon,  2"  it  does  not  seem  wise  to  risk  the  only  safe  deposit 
which  the  war  has  placed  our  hands".  The  foregoing,  as  well 
as  the  tardiness  in  informing  Madrid  of  the  measures  taken 
in  London,  shows  that  the  English  government  was  not 
dealing  openly  with  Spain  in  reference  to  Toulon. 

On  Oct.  18  long  and  detailed  instructions  were  sent  to 
the  English  Commissioners  at  Toulon.  The  substance  of 
these  was  as  follows.  3The  possession  of  Toulon  and  the 
prospect  of  its  extensive  consequences  in  the  South  of  France 
have  given  occasion  for  the  Commission.  It  is  to  have  three 
principal  objects ;  1st,  to  govern  Toulon  ;  2nd,  ("  which  is 
more  extensive  and  more  important ")  to  induce  other  parts 
of  France  to  have  recourse  to  His  Majesty's  protection;  to 
aid  in  the  re-establishment  of  a  regular  government  which 
is  to  end  the  internal  disorders  in  France  and  open  the  way 
to  a  satisfactory  termination  of  the  war:  3rd.,  to  take  charge 
of  any  provinces  or  districts  which  should  be  occupied  by 
his  Majesty's  arms  or  place  themselves  under  his  protection, 
"till  some  regular  and  general  system  shall  have  been  re- 
established and  a  regular  and  a  definite  pacification  con- 
cluded". The  Commission  is  also  to  publish  immediately, 

1  Dundas  to  Grenville  Oct.  20.  Mss.  of  Fortesque. 

2  Buckingham  to  Grenville  Oct.  24th.  Mss.  Fortesque. 
3  Record  Office.  Published  almost  in  full  by  Cottin. 


and  in  His  Majesty's  name,  a  declaration  addressed  to  the 
people  of  Toulon,  "  according  to  the  tenor  of  the  paper 
herewith  transmitted".  The  powers  of  the  other  members 
of  the  commission  must  not  interfere  with  the  authority  of 
the  military  governor  in  any  matters  of  military  detail.  As 
far  as  is  consistent  with  this  principle,  due  regulations  ought 
to  be  framed  for  protecting  as  far  as  possible  the  persons  of 
the  inhabitants  and  for  providing  for  the  ordinary  course  of 
justice  in  civil  affairs.  The  possibility  of  retaining  the  in- 
habitants in  their  civil  and  military  employments  must  de- 
pend upon  the  dispositions  they  manifest  and  upon  circum- 
stances. The  suffering  of  public  meetings,  or  of  authorizing 
and  recognizing  the  deliberations  of  any  committee  must  be 
governed  by  similar  circumstances.  A  power  must  be  ex- 
ercised wherever  it  is  necessary  of  confining,  or  sending 
away,  suspected  persons.  "  On  all  these  points  it  is  im- 
possible to  form  specific  instructions;  the  Commissioners 
will  jointly  exercise  their  discretion."  The  second  general 
head  of  instructions  gives  the  following  :  His  Majesty's 
primary  object  is  to  terminate  the  war  as  speedily  as  possi- 
ble. Whatever  may  be  the  form  of  government  in  France 
His  Majesty  will  feel  himself  entitled  to  demand  such  terms 
as  may  afford  to  himself  and  his  allies  reasonable  indemni- 
fication for  the  past  and  security  for  the  future.  His  Majesty 
is  not  disposed  to  prescribe  any  particular  form,  he  is  per- 
suaded it  is  only  on  the  foundation  of  hereditary  monarchy 
(subject  to  such  limitations  as  may  be  found  advisable)  that 
a  rational  prospect  at  present  exists  of  any  regular  govern- 
ment being  reestablished.  All  parts  of  France  whicli  may 
wish  to  deliver  themselves  from  the  tyrany  of  the  present 
rule  and  concur  in  the  restoration  of  a  regular  government, 
on  the  foundation  of  hereditary  monarchy  and  accept  His 
Majesty's  protection,  shall  be  well  governed,  and  restored  at 
the  conclusion  of  a  definite  treaty  of  peace,  "  unless  by  the 
terms  of  such  treaty  it  shall  be  agreed  that  any  such  place 
or  district  shall,  for  the  purpose  of  indemnification  or  secur- 


2192-6 


UNIVERSITY 

L  Of 


66 

ity  be  ceded  to  any  of  the  powers  who  are  engaged  in  con- 
cert with  His  Majesty  in  the  present  war.  No  idea  is  enter- 
tained of  pushing  that  principle  to  the  extent  of  proposing 
any  plan  of  partition  or  dismemberment  applicable  to  the  in- 
terior of  France  ;  but  it  can  only  relate  to  such  possessions 
on  the  frontiers  as  shall  appear  on  fair  discussion  to  come 
within  the  real  objects  which  are  professed.  As  this  consid- 
eration is  naturally  more  applicable  to  Austria  than  to  any 
other  continental  power  it  does  not  appear  that  in  the  south 
of  France,  this  exception  can  be  material  with  respect  to 
any  district  but  such  as  may  be  contiguous  to  the  frontier 
either  of  Spain  or  Sardinia,  or  possibly  Switzerland,  in  case 
the  Cantons  may  be  brought  to  take  an  active  part  in  the 
war".  No  alarm  is  to  be  created  from  the  idea  of  extensive 
projects  of  aggrandizement  and  dismemberment  such  as  are 
not  in  His  Majesty's  contempletion.  The  declaration  which 
you  are  to  publish  at  Toulon  will  be  circulated  as  speedily 
as  possible  in  the  interior  of  France.  You  will  be  par- 
ticularly careful  to  state  on  all  occasions  His  Majesty's  con- 
viction that  the  acknowledgement  of  a  hereditary  monarchy, 
affords  the  only  probable  ground  for  restoring  regular  gov- 
ernment in  France.  His  Majesty  is  far  from  meaning  to 
pledge  himself  to  any  approbation  of  the  articles  of  the  Con- 
stitution of  1789  and  is  on  the  contrary  persuaded  that 
every  part  of  the  French  nation  which  wishes  for  the  re- 
establishment  of  Monarchy  will  ultimately  see  the  impos- 
sibility of  retaining  many  parts  of  that  constitution,  yet  His 
Majesty  has  not  felt  this  as  any  reason  for  withholding  his 
protection  from  the  people  of  Toulon,  under  the  circum- 
stances in  which  it  was  sought  for.  Under  the  third  bead  of 
instructions  is  found:  'all  such  places  as  choose  to  put 
themselves  under  the  protection  of  His  Majesty  will  be  gov- 
erned under  His  "  general  superintending  power",  but  this 
authority  must  be  subject  to  no  fixed  limitations,  and  must 
in  time  of  war  be  inforced  wherever  it  is  necessary,  by  the 
military  power.  l "  The  Re-establishment  of  the  former 
1  Following  not  published  by  Cottin. 


67 

modes  of  Judicature,  of  the  former  Ecclesiastical  establish- 
ment and  particularly  of  the  Provincial  states  in  the  prov- 
inces where  they  existed  in  a  known  and  established  form 
previous  to  the  late  troubles  seem  likely  if  they  should  be  found 
practicable  to  be  productive  of  great  advantage  and  to  lead 
to  the  restoration  of  Order  and  good  government.  l  But 
even  in  looking  to  these  objects  great  caution  will  be  neces- 
sary not  to  do  violence  to  existing  prejudices  and  it  may  be 
necessary  unless  the  minds  of  the  people  at  large  should  be 
disposed  to  such  measures  as  I  have  stated,  to  postpone  them 
for  a  time  and  to  make  no  alteration  in  whatever  may  be 
the  Train  and  order  of  things  which  you  may  find  exist- 
ing father  than  is  necessary  for  the  fundamental  object  of 
acknowledging  a  monarchical  government."  2"  The  meas- 
ures to  be  taken  with  respect  to  property  which  has  been 
confiscated,  and  afterwards  sold  under  the  authority  of  the 
Convention,  as  well  as  that  which  may  belong  to  persons 
who  may  continue  in  hostility  to  His  Majesty ;  with  respect 
to  the  circulation  or  suppresion  of  assignats,  and  also  with 
respect  to  the  collection  and  appropriation  of  any  public 
revenues,  are  also  points  of  so  much  delicacy,  and  may  de- 
pend so  much  on  local  circumstances,  that  it  is  not  thought 
right,  at  present  to  make  them  the  subject  of  positive  in- 
structions."   

This  resume"  of  the  instructions  sent  to  the  Commissioners 
at  Toulon  shows  the  ideas  of  Pitt,  and  the  political  views  of 
the  English  at  this  time. 

The  declaration  which  was  published  at  Toulon  differed 
from  that  of  Hood  in  two  particulars:  1st;  His  Majesty  was 
not  willing  to  commit  himself  to  the  constitution  of  1789, 
but  simply  regarded  the  reestablishment  of  an  hereditary 
monarchy  as  the  necessary  form  of  stable  government  with 

1  This  proposal  to  reestablish  the  old  provincial  states  as  well  as  the 
idea  that  the  people  of  the  South  of  France  would  care  very  little  what 
was  taken  on  the  frontiers  or  in  the  North  shows  that  the  new  spirit  which 
was  awakened  in  the  large  majority  of  the  French  people  was  ill  under- 
stood in  London. 
2  Following  published  by  Cottin. 


68 

which  he  hoped  to  make  peace.  He  did  not  wish  to  specify 
any  particular  form  nor  to  interefere  with  the  internal  af- 
fairs of  France.  2nd;  It  was  expressly  stated  that  at  the  ter- 
mination of  a  treaty  of  peace  His  Majesty  expected  for 
himself  and  his  allies  a  just  indemnification  for  the  costs 
and  dangers  of  a  war  which  was  forced  upon  him  by  France. 
This  declaration  had  been  drawn  up  after  a  diplomatic  cor- 
respondence with  the  courts  of  Austria,  Spain  and  Sardinia. 
On  Sept.  14  information  was  sent  to  Sir  Morton  Eden  in 
Vienna  that  a  public  declaration  would  be  made  as  to  His 
Majesty's  views  on  the  war  with  France.  On  Sept.  25  Eden 
wrote  to  Grenville,  '  that  Thugut  had  informed  him  that 
Austria  agreed  not  to  take  any  step  toward  the  interior  ar- 
rangement of  France  l"  without  a  previous  and  confidential 

communication  with  his  Majesty Sentiments 

entertained  here  were  he  (Thugut)  added  that  France  should 

be  so  far  weakened  as  no  longer  to  be  dangerous. 

On  the  subject  of  Indemnification  the  acquisition  for 

Great  Britain  being  to  be  looked  for  in  the  Foreign  settle- 
ments and  Colonies  of  France,  no  jealousy,  he  observed,  nor 
clash  of  interests  could  arise."  On  Sept.  27  Grenville  for- 
warded a  draft  of  the  proposed  declaration  to  Eden.  Speak- 
ing of  the  form  of  govenment  in  France1  "it  is  infinitely 
better  that  this  should  be  left  to  the  feelings  and  experiences 
of  the  French  nation  itself  than  that  Foreign  Powers  should 
seek  to  impose  jupon  that  country  particular  points  with 
respect  to  the  modification  of  a  monarchical  govern- 
ment to  which  it  may  still  be  adverse. the 

claim  for  indemnification  is  no  less  carefully  attended  to.  It 
appeared  neither  necessary  nor  advisable  to  specify  particu- 
lar objects  of  indemnification  because  these  must  of  necessity 

depend  on  the  events  of  the  war. If  on  the  whole 

the  proposed  declaration  should  meet  with  the  concurrence 
of  that  Court  it  will  be  right  for  you  to  lose  no  time  in  re- 
turning the  Messenger  in  order  that  it  may  be  published  in 
His  Majesty's  name." 
1  Record  Office. 


69 

On  Oct.  12  Eden  sent  off  his  answer  in  which  he  said 
that  the  Austrian  minister  agreed  with  the  declaration  but 
speaking  of  the  indemnification  wished  l "  that  the  expres- 
sion '  telles  que  les  Puissances  Belligerantes  ne  peuyent  se 
dispenser  de  demander'  might  be  omitted,  as  it  might  give 
a  handle  to  all  those  who  are  engaged  either  actively  or 
only  apparently  in  the  war,  equally  to  bring  forward  claims 
of  indemnification  and  increase  the  difficulties  of  the  paci- 
fication. The  King  of  Prussia  would,  he  (Thugut)  said,  be 
the  first  to  found  on  it  pretensions  for  the  further  aggran- 
dizement to  which  this  court  could  never  assent,  till  it  has 
itself  made  acquitions  equal  to  those  of  His  Imperial  Ma- 
jesty in  Poland.  In  the  place  of  these  words  he  proposed  to 
insert  '  Sa  Majeste  ne  peut  se  dispenser  etc'.  I  told  him  that 
I  would  transmit  his  observations  for  your  Lordship's  con- 
sideration thb'  I  could  not  agree  with  him  in  the  propriety 
of  the  change  proposed,  as  in  a  declaration  of  this  kind  the 
making  no  mention  of  the  other  Belligerent  Powers  might 
give  them  umbrage,  might  make  them  apprehensive  of  a 
separate  peace  without  any  attention  to  their  interests  & 
consequently  render  them  less  inclined  to  cooperate  heartily 
towards  the  termination  of  the  war.  The  invitation  to 
France  to  follow  the  example  of  the  inhabitants  of  Toulon, 
he  said  he  looked  upon  to  be  salutary  as  much  as  it  regarded 
the  towns  situated  at  a  distance  from  those  parts  to  which 
his  Imperial  Majesty's  views  of  indemnification  were  di- 
rected ;  but  he  trusted  that  should  Lille  or  any  other  place 
contiguous  to  the  Belgic  provinces  offer  to  surrender  to  His 
Majesty  on  the  same  conditions  as  Toulon  that  His  Majesty 
would  look  upon  himself  as  an  auxiliary  Power  on  that 
side  of  France,  and  consider  them  as  being  to  form  the  fu- 
ture Barrier  of  those  provinces,  would  accept  them  for  the 
Emperor  &  to  be  governed  in  His  name  till  the  Peace.  This 
afternoon  I  waited  again  by  appointment  on  M.  de  Thugut 
who  delivered  me  a  copy  which  I  have  the  honor  to  inclose, 
of  the  Emperors  proposed  declaration.  In  reading  over  the 

1  Record  office. 


70 

paper  I  pointed  out  to  him  the  words  "  par  les  moyens  que  les 
lois  fondamentales  de  sa  constitution  autorisent".  I  wished 
him  to  supress  them  as  they  appeared  to  go  beyond  your 
Lordship's  meaning  &  they  might  be  construed  to  imply  an 
intention  to  interfere  in  the  internal  arrangement  of  France 
&  I  particularly  insisted  on  the  advantage  of  a  perfect 
union  of  sentiment  on  this  important  point  of  the  declara- 
tion. He  however  adhered  to  these  words  as  being  more 
consistent  with  the  form  of  government  of  his  Imperial 
Majesty's  Dominions — I  spoke  again  to  M.  de  Thugut  on 
the  subject  of  Prussia  and  Sardinia.  As  to  the  former  I  had 
the  satisfaction  to  find  him  disposed  could  the  King  of 
Prussia's  effective  cooperation  for  the  conquest  of  Alsace  and 
Lorainebe  absolutely  secured  to  recommend  to  the  Emperor 
to  make  a  formal  renunciation  of  any  exchange  whatsoever 
for  Bavaria  but  in  such  a  form  as  may  save  the  Emperor's 
dignity.  l  He  seemed  however  to  have  but  little  hopes  of 
any  effective  support  being  procured  from  Prussia  which 
opinion  he  considered  as  sufficiently  justified  by  the  events 
of  the  Campaign.  Offers  of  futher  assistance  may  he  thinks 
be  made,  but  he  expects  to  find  them  clogged  with  such  pro- 
posals of  compensation  as  cannot  be  admitted  in  order  that 
the  refusal  may  be  seized  as  a  pretext  to  withdraw  from  the 
war.  2  He  added  that  his  expectation  would  be  fully  grati- 
fied if  it  could  be  possible  to  obtain  from  His  Prussian 
Majesty  His  several  contingents  to  the  King,  the  Emperor 
and  the  Empire". 

The  foregoing  gives  one  a  further  insight  into  the  political 
relations  at  the  time  of  the  King's  declaration.  The  English 
Court  was  anxious  to  act  in  consert  with  the  Austrian  in 
taking  this  step  and  had  awaited  her  answer  before  publish- 
ing the  declaration.  It  was  not  quite  so  particular  about 

1  It  is  interesting  to  see  now  under  the  influence  of  England  Thugut 
is  willing  to  modify  his  policy. 

2  As  early  as  1793  Thugut  seemed  to  have  foreseen  the  possibility  of  a 
"Treaty  of  Basel." 


71 

Spain.  This  is  shown  by  the  fact  that  the  draft  of  the 
declaration  was  sent  a  week  later  to  Lord  St.  Helens,  and 
that  his  answer  would  not  necessarily  be  waited  for  before 
publishing  the  declaration.  This  is  another  proof  that  Eng- 
land was  less  open  to  the  Spanish  Court  than  to  the  Austrian, 
even  on  the  subject  of  Toulon  where  the  two  Courts  were 
supposed  to  act  in  consert.  The  communication  to  St. 
Helens  is  dated  October  4.  It  ran  as  follows :  l  "  I  transmit 
to  your  Excellency  by  His  Majestys  command  the  draft  of 
a  declaration  which  his  Majesty  proposes  to  publish  for  the 
purpose  of  explaining  to  the  well  disposed  part  of  the 
French  nation  His  Majestys  views  with  respect  to  the  prose- 
cution of  the  present  war.  The  circumstances  of  the  late 
transaction  at  Toulon  and  the  great  probability  that  a 
similar  disposition  exists  in  many  parts  of  France,  have  in- 
duced His  Majesty  to  believe  that  the  present  moment  is 
favorable  for  a  declaration  of  this  nature.  It  is  uncertain 
whether  the  rapid  succession  of  events  by  which  the  present 
crisis  is  marked  may  not  render  it  expedient  not  to  delay 
the  publication  of  this  paper  till  an  answer  can  be  received 
from  the  Spanish  government  respecting  its  contents.  But 
even  in  that  case  His  Majesty  has  felt  that  an  early  and 
confidential  communication  of  it  to  the  Court  of  Madrid 
was  an  attention  on  his  part  due  to  the  union  and  friend- 
ship subsisting  between  the  two  crowns,  and  in  case  circum- 
stances should  admit  of  the  delay,  His  Majesty  will  be 
extremely  desirous  of  receiving  from  the  Catholic  King  the 
fullest  communication  of  His  sentiments  respecting  it.  His 
Majesty  natters  himself  that  in  all  events  the  principles 
manifested  in  that  declaration  are  such  as  will  be  found  to 
correspond  entirely  with  those  of  His  Catholic  Majesty.  I 
feel  it  unnecessary  for  me  to  enter  into  any  detailed  dis- 
cussion of  these,  as  the  paper  itself  will  naturally  suggest  to 
your  Excellency  what  is  to  be  said  upon  it. — You  will  not 
fail  to  remark  that  in  any  intervention  respecting  the  in- 

l  Record  Office. 


72 

terior  of  France  the  King  looks  rather  at  the  affording  sup- 
port to  well  disposed  persons  in  that  Kingdom  than  to  the 
establishing   there   by  external  force  any  particular  gov- 
ernment. In  recommending  to  the  French   to  unite  in   the 
cause  of  monarchy  His  Majesty  advises  that  only,  which 
seems  essentially  necessary  to  the  re-establishment  of  ex- 
ternal or  internal  tranquility,  but  carefully  avoids  discussing 
the  various  modifications  and  limitations  of  that  form.   His 
Majesty  is  persuaded  that  the  entire  re-establishment  of  an 
arbitrary  Monarchy  there,  is  neither  practicable  nor  desir- 
able. His  Majesty  is  on  the  other  hand  far  from  approving 
as  an  ultimate  state  of  things  the  constitution  accepted  by 
the  late  King  during  the  constraint  which  followed  His  being 
brought  back  from  Varennes.  But  all  the  particular  details 
of  any  intermediate  system  must  as  it  appears  be  left  to  the 
discussion  of  the  French  themselves  and  foreign  powers  have 
no  immediate  object  in  looking  farther  than  to  the  general 
principles  stated   in    the  inclosed    draught.    With   respect 
to  the  principle  of  indemnification  I  have  before  stated  to 
your  Excellency  that  His  Majesty  in  asserting  His  right  on 
that  subject  as  resulting  from  the  unprovoked  aggression  of 
France  admits  in  the  most  express  manner  the  right  of 
Spain  founded  on  the  same  rule  of  equity  and  reason.    His 
Majesty  even  authorizes  you  to  assure  the  court  of  Madrid 
of  his  sincere  disposition  to  co-operate  with  that  court  as 
far  as  circumstances  will  permit  in  the  attainment  of  such 
objects  as  His  Catholic  Majesty  may  have  in  view  for  that 
purpose.  And  His  Majesty  will  receive  with  satisfaction  and 
return  with  openness  any  confidence  which  the  King  of 
Spain  may  be  disposed  to  place  in  His  Majesty  on  that  sub- 
ject. Nothing  could  be  more  pleasing  to  His  Majesty  than 
to  see  the  union  and  cordiality  which  has  subsisted  between 
the  naval  and  military  forces  of  the  two  Crowns  on  the  oc- 
casion of   the  late  event  of  Toulon.    His  Majesty  flatters 
himself  that  the  result  of  that  transaction  must  lead  to 
establishing  a  still  more  intimate  union  between  the  two 


73 

courts  as  well  as  among  those  who  are  respectively  employed 
by  them. — it  is  obviously  to  be  desired  that  the  combined 
forces  of  the  powers  engaged  in  the  war  against  France 
should  be  enabled  to  profit  of  further  openings  and  to  make 
Toulon  a  center  of  operations  which  may  extend  themselves 
as  far  as  possible  in  the  South  of  France  where  so  much  dis- 
position exists  to  favour  the  cause  of  monarchy".  On  Oct.  30 
St  Helens  answered  luAlcudia  has  acquainted  me  verbally 
that  His  Majesty's  intended  Declaration  to  the  French  Na- 
tion has  been  read  by  His  Catholic  Majesty  with  much  sat- 
isfaction" The  Spanish  were  preparing  a  similar  declaration. 
On  Nov.  8  St.  Helens  wrote  further  that  the  declaration  of 
Spain  was  quite  satisfactory  and  corresponded  with  the  Eng- 
lish. As  to  the  indemnification;  laYour  Lordship  will 
observe  that  the  Duke  de  la  Alcudia's  Letter  admits  and 
recognizes  the  justice  of  that  Claim  in  the  fullest  and  most 
explicite  terms  so  that  a  discussion  of  the  details  of  that  sub- 
ject may  now  be  brought  forward  whenever  circumstances 
may  render  such  a  measure  advisable."  The  following  is  an 
extract  from  Alcudia's  Letter.  l  "  With  respect  to  the  point 
of  indemnity  it  appears  to  the  King  to  be  just  that  England 
should  demand  it  for  the  expenses  of  the  war  which  the 
French  themselves  have  declared  and  His  Majesty  would 
contribute  so  far  as  he  may  be  able  to  its  being  realized, 
at  the  same  time  that  His  Majesty  claims  the  rights  which 
in  like  manner  belong  to  him  upon  the  self-same  ground, 
being  well  assured  that  both  sovereigns  will  co-operate 
with  mutual  good  faith  in  forwarding  the  just  views 
which  each  of  them  may  propose  to  himself  on  the  point 
in  question." 

Alcuda  stated  also  that  the  Spanish  King  was  quite  satis- 
fied with  the  declaration.  On  Nov.  30  Grenville  wrote  to 
St.  Helens1  "  Monsieur  del  Campo  having  communicated  to 
me  the  draughts  of  the  proposed  declaration  to  be  published, 

l  Record  Office. 


74 

by  the  court  of  Madrid  I  assured  him  in  general  terms  of 
the  King's  approbation  of  that  paper  and  your  Excellency 
will  not  fail  to  express  the  same  sentiments  to  the  Duke  of 
Alcudia.  It  has  however  not  escaped  the  attention  of  this 
court  that  while  in  a  letter  written  to  you  as  well  as  in 
other  communications  between  the  two  governments  the 
principle  of  indemnity  is  not  only  recognized  by  the  court 
of  Madrid  but  it  is  even  insisted  upon  as  applicable  to  the 
situation  of  Spain  110  notice  is  taken  of  any  views  of  this 
nature  in  the  declaration  which  is  to  be  addressed  to  the 
people  of  France.  Whatever  may  be  the  real  views  of  Spain 
in  this  respect  it  seems  very  desirable  that  the  Spanish  Gov- 
ernment should  if  possible  be  brought  to  enter  into  some  ex- 
planation of  this  kind  on  that  important  and  delicate  point. 
—With  respect  to  the  indemnity  of  Spain,  your  Excellency 
will  take  an  early  opportunity  to  enter  into  some  explana- 
tion with  the  Duke  of  Alcudia  on  this  subject  and  you  will 
endeavor  to  convey  to  him  in  a  general  manner  such  as  may 
not  excite  jealously  His  Majesty's  wish  that  in  the  result  of 
the  war  the  Spanish  indemnity  may  be  acquired  on  the 
frontier  of  France,  by  which  means  Spain  would  obtain  a 
great  and  valuable  accession  of  strength,  particularly  as  to 
means  of  defense  and  would  no  longer  be  exposed  to  the  in- 
vasion of  France  and  continue  thereby  in  some  degree  de- 
pendent on  that  Country.  Your  Excellency's  ability  and 
experience  will  suggest  to  you  the  means  of  placing  this 
proposal  in  its  most  favorable  lights  and  of  supporting 
it  by  the  arguments  the  most  likely  to  make  impression. 
In  asking  this  explanation  and  in  urging  this  proposal  it 
will  be  proper  that  your  Excellency  should  avow,  on  His 
Majesty's  part,  that  the  indemnity  to  this  country  can  be 
found  only  in  the  French  Possessions  out  of  Europe,  and 
you  will  therefore  employ  all  your  attention  to  convince  the 
Spanish  minister  how  little  cause  of  jealousy  to  the  Court  of 
Spain  arises  from  such  acquisition,  the  immense  territorial 
possessions  of  Spain  in  America  are  such  as  to  furnish  ample 


75 

scope  for  the  exertions  of  all  the  industry,  capital  and  skill 
which  Spain  can  employ  and  any  acquisitions  particularly 
in  the  Leeward  Islands  may  truly  be  stated  as  being  much 
less  desirable  to  Her  than  to  any  other  of  the  European  Na- 
tions. His  Majesty  conceives  therefore  and  you  will  urge  it 
as  a  proposal  to  the  Spanish  Ministers  that  both  courts  may 
with  advantage  further  the  views  of  each  other  in  the  points 
above  mentioned.  His  Majesty  by  exerting  His  influence  at 
the  peace  as  far  as  circumstances  will  then  admit,  for  pro- 
curing to  Spain  a  valuable  accession  of  territory  on  the  fron- 
tier of  France;  and  the  Court  of  Spain  by  favoring  in  the 
like  manner  His  Majesty's  views  of  acquisition  in  the  Lee- 
ward Islands.  With  respect  to  St.  Domingo  it  is  conceived 
that  the  views  of  Spain  may  not  unreasonably  be  turned  to 
that  Quarter,  and  altho'  the  small  advantage  which  Spain 
actually  derives  from  the  part  of  that  Island  now  in  His 
possession  might  seem  to  afford  a  sufficient  reason  against 
Her  looking  to  further  acquisition  there,  yet  it  is  probable 
that  views  of  that  sort  are  in  fact  entertained  both  by  the 
hope  of  advantage  and  also  as  a  means  of  deriving  security 
against  the  dangers  with  which  the  Spanish  colonies  are 
menaced  from  the  establishment  of  the  principles  on  which 
the  French  have  lately  acted  in  the  West  Indies,  and  partic- 
ularly in  St.  Domingo.  You  will  be  aware  that  His  Majes- 
ty's views  also  are  in  part  directed  towards  that  island,  but 
it  is  by  no  means  conceivable  that  these  projects  entertained 
by  the  two  Courts  are  incompatible  with  each  other.  The 
extent  of  that  Island  and  the  distance  of  the  Spanish  Quar- 
ters from  the  parts  nearest  to  Jamaica  leaving  full  scope  for' 
arrangements  being  taken  in  concert  respecting  this  Island 
such  as  maybe  mutually  beneficial  to  both  Countrie3.  It  is 
not  the  King's  pleasure  that  you  should  actually  propose 
any  precise  plan  for  this  purpose  or  indeed  any  positive 
agreement  with  respect  to  the  other  objects  of  indemnifica- 
tion above  mentioned,  but  it  is  judged  to  be  extreemely  im- 
portant for  His  Majesty's  service  that  your  Excellency  should 


76 

without  delay  enter  into  explanations  on  these  points  with 
the  Spanish  government,  and  endeavour  to  learn  to  what  ex- 
tent the  Court  of  Madrid  would  be  disposed  to  enter  into  en- 
gagements with  His  Majesty  on  the  principles  already  laid 
down,  and  that  you  should  transmit  to  me  an  account  of  the 
result  of  your  conferences  on  this  subject  in  order  that  a 
judgment  may  be  formed  of  the  best  manner  of  bringing 
forward  those  discussions  which  the  situation  of  Two  Courts 
in  the  present  moment  seems  to  render  indispensable". 

In  another  letter  of  the  same  date  Grenville  wrote :  "  With 
respect  to  the  political  considerations  with  which  this  busi- 
ness is  connected,  I  have  in  my  other  dispatch  of  this  date 
stated  to  you  at  large  the  sentiments  and  views  of  His  Maj- 
esty as  tp  the  general  State  of  affairs,  but  I  think  it  right  in 
this  place  to  give  Your  Excellency  the  fullest  authority  for 
entering  into  unreserved  Explanations  with  the  Spanish 
Government  on  the  subject  of  Toulon.  His  Majesty  has  in 
no  case  any  view  respecting  that  place  different  from  that 
which  has  already  been  avowed  in  His  name:  That  at  the 
Conclusion  of  Peace  that  Port  should  be  restored  to  the 
Crown  of  France,  and  that  in  the  Interval  it  should  serve 
in  His  Majesty's  Hands  as  a  means  of  carrying  on  the  war, 
and  as  a  Pledge  of  indemnity  to  Him  and  His  allies,  in- 
cluding in  that  Description  the  Crown  of  Spain  whose  claim 
to  Indemnity  His  Majesty  has  already  distinctly  avowed."1 
Before  its  publication  the  declaration  had  also  been  com- 
municated to  the  Sardinian  Court,  "  as  additional  proof  of 
confidence". 

On  November  20  the  declaration  was  published  at  Tou- 
lon. Elliot  wrote  November  23.  In  regard  to  the  ships  2"  the 
words  "out  e"te*  rendus"  appeared  to  give  a  little  uneasi- 
ness to  one  or  two  members  of  the  deputation  as  it  conveyed 
something  mortifying  to  their  national  spirit.  I  therefore 
substituted  the  word  "  confieV',  which  gave  entire  satisfac- 

1  These  lines  state  clearly  England's  intentions  at  Toulon. 

2  Record  Office.  Commissioners  to  Toulon  1793.  Hood,  Elliot,  O'Hara. 


77 

tion  and  is  at  the  same  time  consonant  with  the  truth  ". 

It  is  hoped  that  the  foregoing  extracts  have  given  a  clear 
idea  of  the  circumstances  under  which  this  declaration  arose. 
It  may  be  regarded  as  the  official  statement  of  England's  in- 
tentions in  the  beginning  of  the  War  of  the  First  Coalition. 
As  the  fortunate  termination  of  this  war  was  regarded  as 
near  at  hand,  this  declaration  was  to  form  a  preliminary 
basis  for  the  peace  negotiations.  Austria  and  Spain  had 
agreed  to  it.  It  was  not  communicated  to  Prussia.  It  was 
Pitt  who  really  framed  the  declaration,  and  his  idea  was  to 
treat  with  any  kind  of  a  stable  government  in  France.  Her 
internal  affairs  as  long  as  she  remained  quiet  were  a  minor 
consideration.  The  ''indemnification"  was  the  main  object 
in  London  as  also  in  Vienna  and  Madrid.  On  October  5 
Pitt  wrote  to  Grenville  1 "  We  can  treat  with  any  form  of 
regular  government  if  it  be  solidly  established".  Austria, 
however,  was  somewhat  concerned  as  to  the  internal  govern- 
ment of  France,  arid  it  was  out  of  consideration  for  her  that 
England  declared  for  hereditary  monarchy.  This  difference 
in  the  drafts  of  the  declaration  had  been  noticed  by  Elliot, 
who  wrote  to  Secretary  Dundas  on  October  18 :  2"  The  de- 
claration as  at  last  settled  by  you  and  Pitt  differs  from  the 
last  draft  as  to  the  following  words,  "  Quand  la  paix  sera 
faite  (et  Sa  Majeste  declare  par  la  presente  qu'elle  sera  prete  & 
la  faire  aussitot  qu'un  gouvernement  regulier  sera  6tabli  en 
France)".  The  words  in  the  draft  as  last  settled  are  "  When- 
ever the  Hereditary  Monarchy  of  France  shall  be  restored 
&  a  Treaty  of  Peace  concluded ". 

The  English  Government  has  been  reproached  for  not 
making  this  declaration  agree  entirely  with  the  proclama- 
tion of  Lord  Hood,  and  with  his  understanding  with  the  peo- 
ple of  Toulon.  In  the  first  place,  Hood  acted  without  positive 
instructions,  and  more  or  less  on  his  own  responsibility ; 
again,  Toulon  was  not  at  that  moment  in  a  condition  to  give 

1  Mss.  Fortesque. 

2  Commissioners  to  Toulon. 


78 

the  people  a  right  to  expect  England,  or  any  nation,  to  ac- 
cept their  terms  unconditionally.  Hood  might  possibly  have 
avoided  the  phrase  "  the  Constitution  of  89  ";  but  the  fact  that 
he  did  not  was  not  sufficient  reason  for  the  English  to  with- 
draw from  the  city,  rather  than  commit  themselves  to  a  form 
of  government  which  might  have  made  a  future  peace  im- 
possible. England's  object  was  to  allow  such  latitude  in  this 
respect  as  to  win  over  the  greatest  number  of  the  inhabitants 
of  France.  "A  stable  form  of  government"  was  Pitt's  idea, 
but  it  was  finally  agreed  to  insist  upon  "  hereditary  mon- 
archy ". 

Although  England  had  now  come  to  a  definite  under- 
standing with  her  allies  Austria  and  Spain,  there  were  still  a 
number  of  questions  pending  between  the  different  Courts; 
questions  which  excited  jealousy  and  distrust,  and  thereby 
prevented  combined  action.  Had  the  Allies  put  as  much 
thought  into  their  military  operations  as  is  found  in  their 
diplomatic  negotiations,  this  vast  scheme  of  indemnification 
might  have  been  realized ;  but  at  Toulon,  as  elsewhere,  the 
reckless  Republican  army,  directed  by  a  few  men  of  genius, 
above  all  by  Napoleon,  proved  more  than  equal  to  the  dis- 
united Allies.  Three  disputed  questions  'preoccupied  the 
courts  at  London  and  Madrid.  First,  were  the  Spanish  to  be 
on  an  equality  with  the  English  in  the  Government  of  Tou- 
lon? Second,  what  was  to  become  of  the  French  ships  in 
case  the  Allies  were  forced  to  retire?  Third,  were  the  broth- 
ers of  the  late  King  to  be  permitted  to  enter  the  city  in  an 
official  capacity,  or  at  all?  Finally,  the  question  of  the  Aus- 
trian reinforcements,  which  were  promised  but  failed  to  ar- 
rive, became  a  serious  one  between  the  courts  of  London  and 
Vienna.  The  first  stages  of  the  dispute  between  England  and 
Spain  as  to  the  command  at  Toulon  have  already  been  men- 
tioned, and  will  be  further  spoken  of  in  connection  with  the 
questions  of  the  French  princes,  and  of  the  fleet. 


79 


CHAPTER  II. 

QUESTION  OF  THE  FRENCH  PRINCES — END  OP  DISPUTE  AS  TO 

AUTHORITY  AT  TOULON QUESTION  OF  THE  EMIGRANTS 

— THE  AUSTRIAN  REINFORCEMENTS. 

Quite  early  the  English  government  received  intimation 
that  the  French  Princes  wished  to  go  to  Toulon.  On  October 
2  St.  Helens  wrote * "  The  Agents  of  the  French  Princes  are 
extremely  desirous  to  obtain  permission  for  Monsieur  to  re- 
pair immediately  to  Toulon,  and  I  am  afraid  that  the  Span- 
ish Minister  has  given  but  too  much  encouragement  to  this 
idea  although  I  have  written  to  engage  him  to  lay  it  aside, 
at  least  for  the  present".  On  October  18  the  Spanish  Minis- 
ter in  London,  Marquis  del  Campo,  wrote  to  Grenville,  and 
speaking  of  the  affair  of  Toulon  as  a  2 "  nouveau  chemin  pour 
parvenir  au  grand  but  de  calmer  les  troubles  qui  agitent  et 
dechirent  la  France",  and  as  "  ce  grand  point  d'appui  pour 
regenererla  monarchic  francaise",  claimed  that  England  and 
Spain  "se  trouvent  dans  1'obligation  de  proportionner  tout 
soutien  ettoute  aide  sinona  son  captif  monarque  Louis  XVII, 
au  moins  a  celui  qui  se  trouve  a  meme  de  representer  sa 
Personne". — "Les  pretentious  de  1'Oncle  du  Roy  doivent 
par  consequent  £tre  regardees  comme  justes". — "II  faut 
qu'il  soit  reconnu  a  Toulon  en  qualite  de  Regent  de  France. 
Ce  Prince  se  trouvant  sur  le  lieu — pourra  agir  d'une  ma- 
nie"re  active,  augmenter  le  parti  du  Roy,  s'attirer  les  esprits 
encore  vacillants  et  contribuer  personelle  et  efficacement  a 
voir  realiser  les  intentions  des  Puissances. — Par  ce  moyen 
nos  deux  souverains  auront  la  gloire  d'avoir  pos6  les  pre- 
miers fondemens  de  la  Paix  dans  le  Royaume  en  Stablissant 
dans  la  dite  ville  le  plus  proche  Parent  de-son  monarque 
legitime:  celui-ci  benira  eternellement  les  auteurs  de  son 
bonheur  et  les  deux  puissances  allies  auront  encore  la  satis- 

1  Record  Office. 

2  Record  Office.  St.  Helens'  papers. 


80 

faction  d'avoir  triomphe  par  sa  puissance  et  sa  justice  de 
tous  les  efforts  de  1'iniquite. — C'est  par  les  ordres  express  de 
ma  Cour  que  j'ai  Phonneurde  transmettre  a  V.  Exce.  ces  con- 
siderations— Le  Roy  mon  maitre  se  flatte  de  trouver  en  elle 
(Sa  M.  Britannique)  la  meme  maniere  de  penser  et  les 
memes  dispositions  &  soutenir  Monsieur  dans  Toulon,  favor- 
isaht  de  toutes  les  mam£res  possibles  son  e"tablissement  dans 
la  dite  ville,  et  ses  progres  dans  cette  partie  de  la  France  ". 
It  may  be  readily  seen  that  del  Campo's  arguments  would 
not  appeal  to  the  English  government.  On  October  22 
Greri ville  wrote  to  St.  Helens  "It  is  by  no  means  part  of 
His  Majesty's  plan  to  exclude  the  late  King's  brother  from 
taking  such  share  in  the  final- arrangement  of  that  business 
(the  internal  affairs  of  France)  as  even  in  the  intermediate 
measures  leading  to  it  as  their  situation  and  events  which 
may  arise  in  the  interior  of  France  may  hereafter  point  out. 
But  when  the  circumstances  which  have  attended  the  sur- 
render of  Toulon  are  taken  into  consideration  it  must  surely 
be  felt  that  the  admitting  the  French  Princes  into  that  Port 
is  a  step  leading  to  the  most  material  and  important  conse- 
quences, and  which  cannot  be  taken  without  mature  delib- 
eration. His  Majesty  is  by  no  means  an  advocate  of  the 
Constitution  of  1789  and  is  on  the  contrary  persuaded  that 
no  persons  sincerely  wishing  the  restoration  of  Monarchy  in 
France  can  ultimately  wish  that  it  should  rest  on  so  precari- 
ous and  insecure  a  footing.  But  it  must  not  be  forgotten 
that  the  people  of  Toulon  have  declared  for  Monarchy  as 
established  by  that  Constitution,  and  in  consequence  of  that 
declaration  put  themselves  under  the  King's  protection ; 
that  under  that  Constitution  as  finally  settled,  the  Comte  de 
Provence  has  no  absolute  claim  to  the  Regency  nor  can  the 
office  of  Lieutenant-General  be  conferred  on  the  Comte 
d'Artois.  And  that  in  general  the  situation  of  the  French 
Princes  and  the  conduct,  principles  and  supposed  resent- 
ments of  the  persons  by  whom  they  are  surrounded  cannot 


81 

be  considered  as  likely  in  the  present  moment  to  conciliate 
the  minds  of  the  inhabitants  of  that  place.  There  is  besides 
an  essential  and  necessary  condition  before  the  King  can 
consent  to  join  His  measures  to  those  of  the  French  Princes 
to  the  degree  that  would  be  done  by  admitting  them  into 
Toulon.  It  is  indispensable  that  they  should  enter  into  pre- 
vious explanation  respecting  the  principle  of  pacification 
and  that  they  should  recognize  the  justice  of  the  claim  of 
His  Majesty  and  His  Allies,  including  the  Catholic  King  to 
a  fair  indemnification  for  the  risques,  expenses  and  losses  of 
a  war  commenced  by  the  unjust  aggression  of  France.  His 
Majesty  by  no  means  wishes  the  Court  of  Madrid  to  under- 
stand this  communication  as  meant  to  operate  as  a  final  bar 
to  the  idea  of  employing  the  French  Princes  in  France  and 
particularly  in  the  South.  But  His  Majesty  expects  that  no 
step  towards  this  important  determination  should  be  taken, 
but  in  consert,  and  He  thinks  it  absolutely  necessary  to  ascer- 
tain beforehand,  first  whether  the  appearance  of  the  Princes 
at  Toulon  would  in  fact  be  advantageous  or  prejudicial  to 
the  common  interests  in  the  present  moment.  Secondly 
whether  the  Princes  themselves  are  disposed  to  act  reason- 
ably and  according  to  the  exigencies  of  the  moment  relative 
to  the  interior  of  France ;  whether  they  and  those  who  advise 
them  are  sensible  of  the  necessity  of  laying  aside  animosities 
and  resentments  of  waving  inadmissable  claims,  and  of  sub- 
mitting to  be  guided  in  their  conduct  by  those  powers  whose 
support  they  ask,  and  lastly  whether  they  are  ready  to  enter 
into  full  and  unequivocal  explanation  respecting  the  princi- 
ples of  indemnification  above  stated".  It  is  interesting  to 
compare  this  communication,  inspired  by  Pitt,  with  the 
foregoing  sentimental  note  from  Del  Campo. 

The  English  had  taken  prompt  and  decided  measures  to 
prevent  the  Spaniards  from  sharing  their  authority  at  Tou- 
lon, and  they  were  naturally  determined  not  to  allow  Mon- 
sieur to  precede  to  that  place  as  regent.  On  October  22,  the 

2192—6 


82 

same  day  as  the  foregoing  communication  was  sent  to  Lord 
St.  Helens,  instructions1  were  forwarded  to  Francis  Drake, 
(the  English  representative  at  Genoa,  where  Monsieur  was 
supposed  to  go  previous  to  embarkmg  for  Toulon,)  to  in- 
form Monsieur  of  the  impossibility  of  his  proceeding  to 
Toulon;  of  "the  inconvenience  which  would  result,  both  per- 
sonally to  that  prince,  and  also  to  the  general  interests  from 
any  eclat  taking  place  on  this  subject";  and  also  of  the  ques- 
tion of  its  being  "agreeable  to  the  inhabitants  of  Toulon". 
Further  if  Monsieur  insisted,  Drake  was  to  inform  the  Com- 
missioners at  Toulon  that  they  were  not  authorized  to  per- 
mit him  to  enter  without  having  first  received  instructions 

from  His  Majesty "but  you  (Drake)  will  use  every 

endeavour  in  your  power  by  respectful  and  conciliatory  rep- 
resentations, to  prevent  recourse  being  had  to  this  extrem- 
ity, and  you  will  endeavour  to  persuade  the  ministers  of  the 
allied  powers  at  Genoa  to  support  you  in  these  representa- 
tions". Meanwhile  Monsieur,  being  in  secret  communication 
with  Spain,  took  the  matter  into  his  own  hands,  and  in- 
formed the  English  government  through  the  Due  d'Har- 
court,  the  representative  of  the  Princes  in  London,  of  his 
decision  to  proceed  to  Toulon  to  assume  the  duties  of  regent. 
The  English  court  was  determined  to  prohibit  him.  On  No- 
vember 30.  instructions 2  were  sent  to  the  Commissioners  at 
Toulon  not  to  admit  him.  On  the  same  day  orders  were 
hurried  to  John  Trevor  in  Turin  to  stop  Monsieur  as  he 
passed  through  the  city:  to  say  to  His  Sardinian  Majesty 
that  it  is  impossible  for  Monsieur  to  go  there  without  the 
approbation  of  the  King  of  Great  Britain.3  "  If  Monsieur 
should  have  already  quitted  Turin  previous  to  your  receiv- 
ing this  despatch  you  will  urge  the  King  of  Sardinia  to  send 
after  him  some  proper  person  for  the  purpose  of  making 
these  representations  both  in  the  King's  name  and  in  that 

1  Record  Office.  Published  by  Cottin. 

2  Commissioners  to  Toulon.  Record  Office. 

3  Foreign  Office,  Sardinia.  Record  Office. 


83 

of  the  King  of  Sardinia  and  in  order  if  possible  to  prevent 
the  eclat  which  must  arise  from  Monsieurs  persisting  in  His 
project  and  being  exposed  to  a  public  refusal  on  the  part  of 
His  Majesty's  officers  at  Toulon  ".  Long  and  precise  instruc- 
tions were  sent  to  St.  Helens,  by  Grenville.  on  November  30.1 
"With  respect  to  the  great  question  of  a  recognition  of  the 
authority  of  Monsieur  as  Regent,  it  seems  to  depend  in  a 
great  degree  upon  the  result  of  discussions  of  the  nature  al- 
ready mentioned  and  also  upon  the  course  of  events  to 
which  the  war  may  give  rise.  His  Majesty  is  by  no  means 
adverse  to  this  recognition  but  in  order  that  it  should  be 
rendered  advantageous  to  the  common  cause  it  must  be 
combined  both  with  circumstances  in  the  interior  of  France 
favorable  to  it,  and  also  with  such  explanations  on  the  part 
of  the  Princes  as  may  shew  that  their  views  are  not  in  op- 
position to  those  of  the  principal  Powers  of  Europe,  whose 
aid  they  seek,  and  that  they  are  willing  rather  to  listen  to 
the  advice  of  those  Powers  and  to  yield  to  the  necessity  of 
the  existing  circumstances  than  to  give  scope  to  the  passions 
and  prejudices  of  those  by  whom  they  are  surrounded.  Soon 
after  the  note  on  this  subject  was  presented  to  me  by  Mon- 
sieur Del  Campo  an  application  was  received  from  the 
Comted'Artois  praying  His  Majesty's  assistance  to  transport 
himself  into  Brittany,  and  to  maintain  himself  there.  The 
answer  .  .  .  was  favourable,  tho'  not  conclusive.  We  ex- 
pressing an  inclination  on  His  Majesty's  part  to  comply  with 
the  request,  but  stating  the  necessity  of  previous  explana- 
tion   You  will  communicate  these  particulars  to  the 

Court  of  Madrid  as  forming  the  answer  to  the  proposal  made 
by  that  Government  on  the  subject  of  Monsieur,  and  as 
manifesting  the  King's  disposition  to  concur  with  His  Cath- 
olic Majesty  by  every  means  in  His  Power  for  the  promotion 
of  those  salutary  objects  which  the  two  courts  have  in  view." 

In  another  letter  of  the  same  date  Grenville  wrote  i1 

1  Record  Office. 


84 

"  In  addition  to  what  I  have  already  written  to  }7our  Ex- 
cellency on  the  subject  of  Toulon  I  am  now  to  mention  a 
circumstance  respecting  that  place  which  his  Majesty  has 
seen  with  much  concern.  A  letter  for  his  Majesty  from  the 
Comte  de  Provence  was  yesterday  delivered  to  me  by  the 
duke  d'Harcourt.  By  the  copy  which  I  enclose  to  your 
Excellency  of  this  letter  you  will  see  that  in  it,  the  Comte  de 
Provence  announces  to  the  King,  as  a  resolution  already 
taken,  His  design  of  going  to  Toulon,  and  that  he  takes  upon 
himself  to  say  that  he  goes  there  to  exercise  the  Functions 
of  Regent,  and  I  am  informed  that  he  is  actually  set  out 
upon  this  journey.  If  no  other  considerations  had  prevailed, 
the  respect  due  to  His  Majesty  required  that  no  steps  should 
be  taken  by  Monsieur  with  regard  to  Toulon,  without  first 
submitting  it  to  His  Majesty's  consideration  &  decision.  The 
Question  whether  the  Comte  de  Provence  should  go  there  at 
all,  in  the  present  moment,  is  one  worthy  of  much  delibera- 
tion. His  going  there  as  regent,  while  the  place  is  in  its 
present  situation,  is  liable  to  still  more  question  ;  but  attempt- 
ing to  take  these  steps  without  the  King's  previous  consent 
while  the  Port  and  Town  of  Toulon  are  held  by  His  Maj- 
esty and  occupied  by  His  Forces,  cannot  in  any  manner  be 
permitted.  It  is  proper  that  I  should  not  conceal  from  Y. 
Exy.  the  suspicion  entertained  here  that  this  step  has  been 
secretly  suggested  or  at  least  encouraged  by  the  Court  of 
Spain,  as  one,  the  success  of  which  would  tend  to  increase 
their  influence  in  Toulon.  The  Possibility  of  this  only  in- 
creases the  necessity  of  your  holding  a  firm  and  decided 
language  both  as  to  the  absolute  command  to  be  exercised 
at  Toulon  by  Governor  O'Hara,  as  also  to  this  particular 
Point  of  Monsieur's  admission  there.  Information  having 
been,  some  time  since,  received  which  seemed  to  make  it 
not  improbable  that  Monsieur  would  take  the  step,  which 
he  has  now  announced,  provisional  orders  were  put  to  his 
Majesty's  Officers  at  Toulon  directing  them  not  to  admit  of 
Monsieur's  coming  there, without  His  Majesty's  previous  con- 


85 

sent  being  signified  to  them,  and  measures  were  taken  to 
prevent  the  eclat  which  a  public  demand  and  refusal  on 
this  subject  might  produce,  by  previously  apprising  Monsieur 
of  the  embarrassment  to  which  such  an  event  would  expose 
him.  I  have  now  taken  further  steps  for  this  purpose,  but 
as  they  may  fail  in  their  effect  I  have  received  the  King's 
orders  expressly  to  instruct  Y.  Exy.  to  represent,  in  the 
strongest  terms,  to  the  Spanish  government  the  disrespectful 
conduct  of  Monsieur  toward  His  Majesty  on  this  occasion, 
and  to  announce  to  them  the  orders  which  His  Majesty  has 
thought  proper  in  consequence  of  it,  to  send  to  Gov.  O'Hara 
positively  prohibiting  him  from  suffering  Monsieur  to  enter 
Toulon.  In  your  communication  on  this  subject  you  will  not 
appear  to  believe  that  the  Spanish  government  could  be 
in  any  way  a  party  to  this  inconsiderate  and  improper  step 
on  the  part  of  Monsieur.  But  you  will  remark  that  this 
instance  of  disrespect  towards  the  King  obliges  him  to  sus- 
pend the  discussions  which  he  had  been  willing  to  open 
with  Monsieur,  respecting  the  recognition  of  His  claim  to 
the  Regency  of  France,  according  to  the  desire  which  had 
been  expressed  by  the  Court  of  Madrid.  You  may  however 
add  that  His  Majesty  on  being  informed  that  Monsieur  has 
abandoned  his  present  Project  and  is  sensible  of  the  impro- 
priety of  his  conduct  towards  His  Majesty,  will  be  ready  to 
resume  the  consideration  of  that  Point  on  the  grounds  which 
I  have  stated  to  you  at  large  in  my  other  letter  of  this  day." 
Before  this  time  the  agents  of  the  Princes  were  active  in 
Toulon  also,  and  apparantly  in  understanding  with  the 
Spaniards.  On  Nov.  23  the  Cornite  de  Surveillance  and  the 
Sections  of  Toulon  announced  to  Elliot  their  desire  for  the 
restoration  of  the  ancient  form  of  government,  for  the  ac- 
knowledgment of  Monsieur  as  Regent,  and  for  the  immedi- 
ate exercise  of  his  authority  in  Toulon.  I  shall  give  here  the 
original  reports  relating  to  this  question.  The  tfrst  is  a  letter 
from  Elliot  to  Henry  Dundas;  l  dated  Toulon  Nov.  24.— "I 

1  Record  Office. 


86 

have  received  the  enclosed  paper  from  the  ComitS  de  Sur- 
veillance and  the  sections  of  Toulon,  by  which  you  will 
see  how  decided  the  public  mind  is  at  Toulon  for  the  res- 
toration of  their  ancient  government.  The  warmth  with 
which  they  desire  the  acknowledgment  of  the  Regent  and 
the  immediate  exercise  of  his  authority  here,  without  touch- 
ing at  all  on  the  constitution  of  1789,  confirmes  extremely 
the  Idea  I  had  formed  of  their  dispositions.  It  is  worthy  of 
remark  that  the  sections  are  the  most  popular  assemblies 
that  can  be  conceived,  being  composed  without  distinction 
of  all  inhabitants  who  think  proper  to  attend  them. — I 
confess  that  every  view  I  have  on  the  subject  inclines  me 
strongly  to  think  that  the  acknowledgment  of  the  Regent 
by  all  the  combined  Powers  is  a  measure  highly  desirable. 
The  interests  of  the  monarchy  which  (though  His  Majesty 
is  not  ultimately  pledged  to  that  principle)  we  have  in  the 
meanwhile  avowedly  espoused,  and  the  restoration  of  which, 
is  infinitely  the  most  important  object  of  the  war,  would 
surely  be  much  promoted  by  the  advantage  of  an  osten- 
sible and  legitimate  representation  of  the  royal  authority. 
I  am  persuaded  it  would  detach  from  us  no  support  on 
which  we  can  depend,  and  it  would  add  a  greater  accession 
of  numbers  and  zeal  to  the  service.  It  is  a  measure  so  likely 
to  work  on  the  imagination  of  Frenchmen  that  one  can  not 
help  considering  it  as  at  least  possible,  that  a  general  and 
sudden  turn  might  be  given  to  the  affairs  of  France  by  this 
single  change  in  our  system.  I  am  aware  that  other  objects 
may  justly,  and  perhaps  must  in  point  of  policy,  as  well  as 
of  fidelity  to  our  allies,  be  taken  into  the  consideration  of 
this  subject  and  that  on  these  accounts,  this  resolution  can 
not  be  adopted  otherwise  than  in  consequence  of  a  previous 
discusion  with  the  Princes,  and  by  a  general  concert  with 
the  combined  Powers.  I  am  therefore  glad  to  hear  that  the 
first  steps  seem  to  have  been  taken,  and  considering  that  one 
of  our  allies,  the  court  of  Spain,  has  already  declared  its 
sentiments,  I  flatter  myself  with  the  hope  of  the  negotiation 


87 

being  brought  to  an  early  and  favorable  conclusion — the 
more  I  learn  of  the  true  nature  of  the  counter-revolutionary 
spirit  in  France,  the  more  I  am  inclined  to  the  opinion,  I 
have  taken  the  libert}7  of  delivering,  and  the  more  essential 
I  think  it  to  our  success  that  the  measure  should  be  adopted. 
With  regard  to  the  application  made  to  me  by  the  sections 
of  Toulon  on  this  subject,  I  shall  be  able  to  prevent  their 
carrying  any  measure  into  execution  until  I  have  the  honor 
of  receiving  His  Majesty's  commands.  I  can  not  say  that  I 
see  any  local  inconvenience  in  the  admission  of  the  Regent 
into  Toulon,  and  the  establishment  of  his  authority  here, 
and  it  might  possibly  produce  a  good  effect  in  the  adjacent 
country,  and  even  in  the  besieging  Army,  at  the  same  time 
it  must  be  observed  that  by  such  a  condescension  His  Maj- 
esty would  perform  his  engagements  for  the  redelivery  of 
Toulon  earlier  than  can  be  claimed  by  the  terms  of  the 
convention :  and  possibly  some  advantage  might  be  lost  in 
treating  for  the  terms  of  peace.  But  if  anything  were  gained 
by  it,  towards  accelerating  the  settlement  of  France,  I  confess, 
I  should  think  all  disadvantages  on  other  points  sufficiently 
compensated.  There  is  too  much  reason  to  fear  that  Austria 
is  more  indifferent  to  the  main  object  of  the  war,  and  more 
attached  to  points  of  her  own,  than  she  professes  to  be. 
Prussia  we  know  is  not  to  be  depended  on,  and  if  Great 
Britain  does  not  throw  her  whole  weight  into  the  scale  of  a 
more  enlarged  and  sounder  policy,  there  is  great  reason  to 
fear  for  the  issue  of  this  contest." 

Elliot  enclosed  the  following:  Answer  of  the  Commis- 
sioners at  Toulon  to  the  comite"  de  surveillance  respecting 
the  Regent.1  27th  of  Nov.  "  Nous  avons  re9U  avec  beau- 
coup  d'interet  la  communication  qui  nous  a  ete  faite  de 
vos  deliberations  et  de  celles  des  sections  de  Toulon,  rela- 
tivement  &  la  Regence.  Nous  y  reconnaissons  avec  le  plus 
grand  plaisir  des  sentiments  dignes  &  la  fois  du  patriotisme 
et  de  la  sagesse  de  cette  ville  .respectable.  Nous  partageons 

l  Record  Office. 


88 

avec  elle  non  seulement  le  d6sir  de  voir  renaitre  1'ordre  sous 
un  gouvernment  fond6  sur  des  bons  principes,  non  sen  le- 
nient les  sentiments  de  Ioyaut6  et  d'attachment  pour  votre 
jeune  et  infortun6  monarche,  mais  aussi  ceux  du  respect  et 
de  la  ve"ne"ratiou,  pour  la  famille  de  vos  rois,  et  surtout  pour 
Pauguste  personnage  qui  est  1'  object  de  vos  veux.   Nous 
nous  trouvons  nSanmoins  dans  PimpossibilitS  de  concourir 
imme'diatement  a  Paccomplissement  de   vous  souhaits   et 
nous  de"sirons  vous  faire  part  des  obstacles  qui  s'y  opposent. 
La  Regence  de  la  France  interesse  1'Europe  entiere  et  sur- 
tout les  Puissances  coalise"es,  puisque  dans  le  circonstances 
actuelles  PautoritS  du  Regent  conime  celle  du  trdne  m6me 
ne  peut  etre  re"alise"e  que  par  leur  s6cours  et  par  des  efforts 
immense  de  leur  part.  Get  object  done  doit  de  toute  ne"ces- 
site",  comme  par  toutes  les  obligations  taute  de  la  saine  poli- 
tique  que  des  sentiments  honngtes  (les  seuls  qui  puissent 
animer  ces  Princes  illustres)  etre  trait6  directement  avec  les 
cours  qui  combattent  les  ennemis  de  votre  Roy.  Une  affaire 
aussi  importante  et  qui   embrasse  des  relations  politiques 
aussi   6tendues  et  aussi  combinees  ne  peut  e^tre  terminee 
avec  effet  ni  peutetre  meme  tente"e  avec  avantage  par  une 
seule  ville  respectable  &  la  verite  a  toutes  sortes  de  titres, 
mais  pour  le  moment  non  seulement  isole"e  du  reste  de  la 
France,  mais  ayant  contracts  pour  P  interet  du  royaume, 
comme   pour   son  propre  salut,  des  relations   re"centes  et 
sacre"es  avec  une  autre  puissance.  II  est  evident  dans  tous 
les  cas  que  les  ministres  de  sa  Majest6  Britannique  doivent 
etre  absolument  iiicompetens  a  decider  sur  ces  objets  sans 
avoir  specialement  consult^  leur  cour  et  obtenu  des  pouvoirs 
directs.  Tout  ce  qu'  ils  pourront  faire  pour  seconder  le  ze"le 
louable  des  habitans  de  Toulon,  est  de  soumettre  sans  delai 
cette  matiere  interessante  a  la  sagesse  et  aux  lumieres  de 
Sa  Majest6   et  d'attendre  ses  ordres.   Jusqu'alors  ne   nous 
trouvant  point  autorise"s  ^  compromettre  sa  Majeste  sur  la 
question  de  la  Regence,  nous  pouvons   encore  moins  con- 
sentir  &,  la  proposition  qui  a  6t6  faite  d'appeller  Monsieur  le 


89 

Comte  de  Provence  a  Toulon,  pour  y  exercer  les  fonctions 
de  Regent  parce  que  ce  serait  destituer  Sa  MajestS  Britan- 
nique  avant  1'epoque  stipule  de  1'  autoritS  qui  lui  a  6te" 
dernierement  confine  a  Toulon.  Ces  raisons  ne  nous  obligent 
cependant  point  de  nous  opposer  au  desir  que  pourraient 
avoir  les  habitans  de  cette  ville  de  parter  leurs  hommages 
aux  pieds  de  ce  Prince  et  de  lui  exprimer  tous  les  voeux 
que  doivent  inspirer  ses  vertus  personelles  ou  que  peuvent 
r^clamer  les  droits  de  sa  naissance. 

A  Toulon  ce  27  de  Novembre  1793.  Signe;  Hood,  Elliot, 
O'Hara. 

Elliot  commented  on  this  answer  in  another  letter  to  Henry 
Dundas,  on  the  same  day:  "We  have  endeavoured  to  con- 
form ourselves  to  the  spirit  of  His  Majesty's  commands  as 
conveyed  in  your  despatch  of  the  22  of  October.  .  . 
But  although  we  have  been  careful  not  to  commit  His 
Majesty  on  the  question  and  have  positively  refused  to  ad- 
mit the  Princes  into  Toulon,  without  His  Majesty's  orders 
we  did  not  think  it  necessary  to  prevent  the  inhabitants 
from  paying  to  him  any  compliment  they  thought  fit,  or 
acknowledging  in  their  own  name  his  right  to  the  Regency. 
We  thought  it  might  even  be  advantageous  that  they  should 
execute  that  part  of  their  intentions  because  in  the  first 
place  it  will  unite  great  numbers  of  them  in  a  measure  in 
which  the  constitution  of  1789  is  not  mentioned,  and  in 
the  next  place,  will  afford  security  for  their  steadiness,  as  it 
renders  their  case  more  desperate  with  the  convention."1 

The  retreat  of  the  Allies  from  Toulon  brought  this  ques- 
tion to  an  end.  The  English  whose  main  object  in  the  war 
was  the  "  indemnification  "  regarded  a  stable  form  of  gov- 
ernment as  the  necessary  condition  for  the  obtaining,  as 
well  as  for  the  peaceful  enjoyment  of,  this  indemnification. 
Toulon  they  intended  to  hold  as  security  for  it.  The  in- 
terests of  the  French  monarchy  for  which  England  had 
declared  principally  out  of  consideration  for  Austria,  and 

l  These  three  communications  just  given  are  all  from  the  Record  Office. 


90 

perhaps  for  her  other  Allies,  were  not  thought  of  as  suffi- 
ciently important  to  justify  her  sacrificing  her  authority  at 
Toulon  by  the  admission  of  Monsieur.  Again,  the  French 
fleet  was  to  be  considered.  Although  nowhere  mentioned,  it 
is  certain  that  the  English  were  conscious  of  the  fact  that 
by  the  admission  of  Monsieur,  the  ships  also  would  be  under 
his  command  and  consequently  neither  come  into  English 
hands  nor  even  be  destroyed.  The  removal  of  the- fleet 
formed  part  of  England's  plan  for  supremacy  in  the  Medi- 
terranean. Spain,  however,  beside  her  natural  inclination 
to  aid  the  French  princes  from  dynastic  interests,  was  not 
at  all  adverse  to  the  idea  of  the  English  authority  at 
Toulon  being  superceded,  more  especially  as  her  own  influ- 
ence would  be  far  greater  with  the  Regent  than  with  the 
English.  The  Sardinian  Court  to  which  the  Princes  had%also 
applied,  was  at  this  time  quite  subject  to  the  interests  of 
England.  Neither  from  Hood's  declaration  which  recognized 
the  constitution  of  89,  nor  from  the  King's  declaration 
which  declared  for  hereditary  monarchy,  was  England 
under  any  binding  moral  obligation  to  recognize  Monsieur 
as  Regent.  Asa  political  move  it  is  hard  to  say  what  would 
have  been  the  result.  In  all  probability  Monsieur  would 
have  arrived  too  late  to  have  had  any  material  influence 
upon  the  affairs  of  Toulon. 

The  dispute  as  to  the  division  of  authority  always  re- 
mained an  unsettled  one.  In  the  beginning  of  November 
St.  Helens  advised  Alcudia  to  wait  until  he  (St.  Helens)  re- 
ceived news  from  England  and  meanwhile  that  both  Gen- 
erals should  command.  On  November  8  St.  Helens  wrote  to 
Grenville:  luThe  Duke  de  la  Alcudia  has  nominated  M. 
Ocarez  (who  was  charge"  d'affaires  in  France,  at  the  time  of 
the  death  of  the  late  King)  to  reside  at  Toulon  as  Plenipo- 
tentiary from  this  court;  an  appointment  which  seems  to 
have  been  created  in  imitation  of  that  of  Sir  Gilbert  Elliot, 
however  I  do  not  find  that  he  is  invested  with  any  similar 

1  Record  Office 


91 

Commission,  his  instructions  being  merely  to  correspond 
regularly  with  the  Department  of  the  first  secretary  of  State." 
On  November  13.  St.  Helens  wrote  further:  1  that  the  dis- 
pute between  the  admirals  continued,  but  that  Hood  assured 
him  that  it  would  not  interfere  with  the  cause,  "O'Haraand 
Gravina  waving  entirely  the  Question  relative  to  the  chief 
Command:" — on  November  27,  that  the  differences  were 
arranged  and  that  O'Hara  was  to  have  the  chief  command 
of  the  combined  forces  on  shore  and  Gravina  the  govern- 
ment of  the  city.  Hood  however  was  not  in  a  very  concilia- 
tory mood  especially  as  he  had  a  very  low  opinion  of  the 
Spanish.  As  early  as  October  11  he  wrote  to  Trevor  2"  I 
must  mention  to  you  in  confidence  that  no  dependence  can 
be  placed  in  the  Spanish  or  Neopolitians,  they  cannot  be  left 
anywhere  to  themselves."  On  November  20  Elliot  wrote  to 
St.  Helens,  complaining  of  the  quality  of  the  Spanish  sol- 
diers; 3"  It  is  his  (O'Hara' s)  opinion,  and  I  believe  Lord 
Hood's,  that  if  you  can  by  any  means  obtain  better  troops, 
or  if  not,  if  you  can  even  withdraw  those  that  are  here  you 
will  render  a  service  to  the  Garrison If  any  dis- 
aster should  take  place  here  it  will  become  a  very  serious 
question,  in  what  manner  the  French  ships  should  be  dis- 
posed of.  In  that  event  if  Spain  in  persuance  of  their  present 
notions  of  equality  should  set  up  any  claim  of  participation 
in  the  possession  of  those  ships  our  measures  will  be  ex- 
posed to  great  Embarrassement.  I  need  say  no  more  to  satisfy 
your  Lordship  of  the  Importance  of  this  matter  and  we  leave 
it  with  great  confidence  in  your  hands".  This  shows  con- 
clusively that  even  Elliot,  who  falsely  regarded  the  restora- 
tion of  monarchy  as  the  principal  object  of  the  war,  and  who 
was  in  favor  of  recognizing  Monsieur  as  Regent,  had  no  in- 
tention of  ad  mi  ting  any  "  equality  ",  in  fact  any  share,  in 
the  distribution  of  the  French  ships.  In  such  a  state  of  af- 
fairs a  more  serious  turn  in  the  old  dispute  seemed  inevita- 

1  Record  Office. 

2  Foreign  Office.  Sardinia  1793.  R.  O. 

3  Commissioners  to  Toulon  1793.  R.  O. 


92 

ble;  but  the  position  of  the  Allies  having  become  gradually 
quite  precarious,  the  political  questions  fell  into  the  back- 
ground. Even  before  November  30,  the  English  more  than 
doubted  the  strength  of  their  hold  on  the  town.  On  Nov. 
23  Elliot  wrote  to  Dundas  l  "  It  seems  to  me  that  the  posses- 
sion of  this  place  is  precarious,  and  that  every  day  is  criti- 
cal ":  the  next  day  to  Lady  Elliot,  "O.Hara  thinks  as  ill  as 
possible  of  this  business  as  it  now  stands;  but  reinforce- 
ments may  be  expected  before  the  worst  may  happen.  Lord 
Hood  is  over  confident  and  will  never  admit  the  slighest 
doubt  of  our  keeping  the  place." 

The  English  had  changed  their  opinion  on  another  ques- 
tion also.  On  Oct  19.  Mulgrave  wrote  to  Trevor3  "You 
must  not  send  us  one  emigre  of  any  sort;  they  would  be  a 
nuisance,  they  are  all  so  various  and  so  violent  in  their 
principles  of  gouvernment  whether  for  despotism,  Constitu- 
tion or  Republic,  that  we  should  be  distracted  with  their 
quarrels  and  they  are  so  assuming,  forward,  dictatorial  and 
full  of  complaints,  that  no  business  could  go  on  with  them. 
Lord  Hood  is  adverse  to  receiving  any  of  them.  You  must 
therefore  put  them  off  as  civilly  as  you  can."  A  little  more 
than  a  month  later  Elliot  informed  Dundas4  that  they  had 
sent  to  Italy  for  twenty  to  eighty  emigrant  officers,  and  on 
December  8,5  Hood,  Elliot  and  Dundas  informed  the  emi- 
grants that  they  might  serve  under  their  own  officers,  but 
subject  to  the  Government  of  Toulon.  Not  many  were  to 
serve  as  officers,  but  principally  as  private  soldiers  which 
"1*  amour  de  la  Patrie  eyait  coneilier  avec  1'honneur  de  la 
noblesse  Fran9aise".  They  were  also  directed  to  ask  the  ap- 
probation of  the  Princes  as  that  would  help  the  cause.  On 
Dec.  18.  Trevor  wrote  to  Grenville,6  "The  emigrants  wait 

1  Commissioners  to  Toulon.  R.  O. 

2  Life  of  Elliot,  Minto. 

3  Sardinia,  Foreign  Office.  R.  O. 

4  Letter  Nov.  27th.  Commissioners  to  Toulon. 

5  Elliot  to  Trevor.  Dec.  8.  Foreign  Office.  Sardinia.  R.  O. 

6  Foreign  Office.  Sardinia.  R.  O. 


93 

for  His  Royal  Highness  orders  before  they  determine  upon 
accepting  our  offers  of  receiving  them  at  Toulon.  I  cannot 
doubt  but  that  he  will  tell  them  to  go."  The  emigrants  were 
still  negotiating  in  Switzerland  when  Bonaparte's  batteries 
had  driven  the  Allies  from  Toulon.  On  Dec.  1.  Elliot  wrote 
to  Dundas: l  "Nothing  very  important  has  occured  in  the 
political  affairs  of  this  place  and  indeed  that  department  is 
naturally  rather  in  the  background,  while  our  situation  is  so 
critical".  This  marks  the  end  of  the  dispute  between  the  two 
nations  in  the  city  itself.  Other  thoughts  occupy  their  atten- 
tion. Elliot  wrote  Dec.  9.2  "I  consider  our  possession  of  this 
place  very  precarious,  which  is  not  surprising,  considering 
that  I  have  heard  that  opinion  from  every  military  man  of 
rank  since  I  came  here":  On  Dec.  12 " General  Dun- 
das  is  in  very  low  spirits  and  seems  to  dispond  more  than 
ever".  The  tone  of  the  two  courts,  especially  of  the  Spanish, 
was  far  from  being  conciliatory.  The  two  following  cum- 
rnunications  show  that  the  disputed  question  bade  fair  to 
become  insoluble.  The  fall  of  Toulon  rendered  a  solution 
unnecessary. 

Grenville  to  St.  Helens.  Whitehall.  Dec.  1.  "The  original 
tenor  as  well  as  the  particular  expressions  of  Monsieur  Del 
Campo's  late  notes,  are  so  entirely  inconsistent  with  the  rela- 
cions  in  which  the  two  courts  have  been  placed  with  respect 
to  each  other  by  the  late  negotiations  and  by  the  circum- 
stances which  still  exist  that  it  is  thought  absolutely  neces- 
sary that  Your  Excellency  should  ascertain  whether  the  form 
and  language  of  those  notes  were  prescribed  to  him  by  his 
court,  or  whether  they  arise  solely  from  ill  disposition  to- 
wards this  country  of  which  he  has  given  such  repeated 
proofs.  And  if  the  latter  should  be  found  to  be  the  case  Your 
Excellency  will  no  doubt  judge  it  absolutely  necessary  to 
adopt  some  proper  expedient  by  which  the  Duke  of  Alcudia 
may  be  apprised  how  little  Monsieur  Del  Campo's  conduct 

1  Commissioners  to  Toulon.  R.  O. 

2  To  Lady  Elliot.  Life  of  Elliot.  Minto. 


94 

appears  calculated  to  promote  union  and  good  understand- 
ing between  the  two  countries." 

St.  Helens  wrote  to  Grenville  on  Dec.  25.  "  But  at  any  rate 
I  think  it  my  duty  to  acquaint  your  Lordship  without  Loss 
of  time,  that  this  court  does  not  hitherto  appear  to  be  dis- 
posed to  relinquish  voluntarily  their  pretended  Right  to  the 
perpetual  nomination  of  the  Commander  in  Chief  of  the 
combined  Forces  in  Toulon  unless  it  be  on  the  evidently  in- 
admissable  condition,  of  their  being  allowed  to  remove  from 
that  Port  and  to  retain  under  their  sole  Custody,  the  greater 
part,  if  not  the  whole,  of  the  French  fleet  now  lying  there: 
....  and  that  they  have  also  rendered  the  arrange- 
ment of  this  disputed  point  still  more  difficult  than  before 
by  nominating  to  the  command  of  the  Spanish  Troops  at 
Toulon  the  celebrated  Count  O'Reilly  who  (not  to  mention 
the  objections  that  might  be  stated  against  his  personal  char- 
acter and  dispositions)  is  a  Lieutenant  General  of  near  30 
years  standing  and  consequently  superior  in  Point  of  senior- 
ity to  any  officer  of  that  Rank  in  the  British  Army  ". 

One  other  question  which  preoccupied  the  British  cabinet 
during  the  entire  siege  was,  that  of  the  Austrian  reinforce- 
ments. In  the  rapprochement  between  London  and  Vienna 
which  came  about  in  the  War  of  the  First  Coalition,  and 
which  had  by  the  publication  of  the  King's  Declaration 
taken  the  form  of  an  explicit  policy  of  "indemnification", 
the  English  court  had  expected  the  assistance  of  from  12 
to  15,000  Austrian  troops  for  any  offensive  operations  which 
might  take  place  from  the  Mediterranean.  On  hearing  of 
the  surrender  of  Toulon,  Pitt  wrote  to  Grenville  telling  him 
to  press  the  Emperor  to  send  troops,  and  on  Sep.  14  such 
instructions  were  sent  to  Eden.  As  early  as  Sep.  11  Eden 
informed  Grenville1  that  he  had  demanded  troops  from 
Thugut,  who  made  excuses  saying  that  they  were  needed  on 
the  Rhine,  and  complaining  of  the  backwardness  of  Prussia. 
On  Sept.  25  Eden  wrote  that  he  urged  that  a  force  should 
be  sent  to  Toulon  and  Thugut  replied  that  he  would  recom- 

1  Austria.  Sir  Morton  Eden.  Record  Office. 


95 

mend  it  to  His  Majesty.  Butt  at  the  same  time  Eden  wrote 
to  Trevor  telling  him  that  the  troops  were  coming;  as  if  it 
had  been  already  settled.  Austria  did  promise  the  troops 
however,  but  under  conditions.  Eden  wrote  to  Auckland1 
"This  country  gives  us  5000  men  .  .  .  but  will  not  allow 
them  to  be  employed  offensively  to  make  conquests  for  the 
King  of  Sardinia  unless  that  Sovereign  will  (if  any  are  made) 
yield  them,  though  in  a  very  inferior  proportion  something 
in  return  for  the  share  of  this  court  in  the  Novarese ". 
Thaon  de  Revel  says  in  his  Memoirs;  "Les troupes  autrich- 
iennes  qui  6taient  dans  les  garnisons  de  Fe"tat  de  Milan  y 
etaient  restees  paisiblement  an  lieu  de  marcher  sur  Lyon,ce 
qui  en  eut  empeche  la  chute  et  port6  un  coup  mortel  &  la 
revolution.  L'Angleterre  demandait  que  les  Autrichiens 
reunis  aux  Piedmontais  chassassent  les  Franyais  du  comte 
de  Nice  d'une  partie  de  la  Provence  et  que  Foil  entr'ouvrit 
uue  communication  directe  et  sure  avec  Toulon.  L'appre- 
hension  de  la  Gourde  Vienne  que  le  Eoi  de  Sardaigne  n'eut 
des  succes,  s'opposa  dans  cette  occasion  comme  dans  toutes 
les  autres  a  tout  ce  que  le  lien  commun  de  la  coalition  con- 
seillait  si  fortement.  Elleesperait  que  si  le  Hoi  de  Sardaigne 
se  trouvait  dans  Fembarras  il  consent! rait  &  lui  ceder  une 
partie  des  acquisitions  faites  anciennement  sur  Fetat  de 
Milan." 

This  jealousy  of  Sardinia,  a  distrust  of  England  and  a 
failing  to  see  any  tangible  and  immediate  gain  were  the 
real  reasons  why  Austria  did  not  send  the  troops.  The 
reasons  she  put  forward  were  others.2  On  Oct.  30  Eden 
wrote:  3  "  In  a  conversation  with  the  Austrian  minister  he 
repeated  with  some  appearance  of  alarm  the  danger  of  their 
present  situation  unsupported  b}^  Prussia  and  the  Dutch  and 
their  numbers  reduced  by  repeated  losses,  particularly  in 
the  affair  before  Maubeuge,  and  asked  me  if  in  the  case 

1  Correspondence  of  Auckland. 

2  On  Nov.  4.  Thugut  received  information  from  London  "assez  propre 
a  calmer  nos  inquietudes  sur  les  intentions  des  Anglais  relativement  & 
Dunkerque. ' '  Vertrauliche  Briefe  von  Thugut.  von  Vivenot. 

3  Eden  to  Grenville  R.  O. 


96 

Toulon  should  be  found  from  the  reinforcements  already  ar- 
rived there  not  to  stand  in  need  of  the  troops  promised  from 
hence." 

The  troops  were  looked  for  at  Toulon  and  Hood  dis- 
patched Admiral  Goodal  to  Genoa  to  bring  them  but  the 
ships  returned  as  empty  as  the  departed.  Finally  however 
the  English  Cabinet,  impatient  at  this  delay,  assumed  more 
and  more  express  terms  in  demanding  the  troops,  as  the  fol- 
lowing instructions  to  Eden  will  show.  They  are  dated 
Nov.  11.  1 "  You  will  remonstrate  in  the  strongest  terms 
against  this  delay  as  a  positive  breach  of  faith  and  as  likely 
to  be  in  its  consequences  highly  injurious  to  the  common  in- 
terests." .  .  .  Nov.  24.1  "  You  will  therefore  now  admit 
of  no  further  excuse  but  formally  claim  the  immediate 
execution  of  the  engagement  and  lose  no  time  in  apprizing 
me  of  the  result."  On  Dec.  8  Eden  replied  1 "  I  called 
on  Thugut  ....  and  in  obedience  to  your  Lord- 
ship's express  directions  demanded,  in  His  Majesty's 
name,  an  order  for  the  immediate  march  of  the  reinforce- 
ments promised  to  His  Majesty  for  the  support  of  Toulon." 
It  was  not  until  Dec.  16.  that  Eden  was  finally  able  to 
assure  John  Trevor  that 2u every  Difficulty  is  removed  "  and 
"that  His  Imperial  Majesty  has  issued  his  orders  for  the 
immediate  march  of  the  troops  for  Toulon."  This  time  the 
Austrians  were  undoubtedly  sincere  but  as  is  seen,  it  was 
too  late.  Before  this  note  could  reach  Trevor,  Toulon  was 
lost.  The  English  had  been  over-confident  at  Toulon.  Al- 
though Dundas,  the  secretary  of  war,  had  been  repeatedly 
warned,  he  could  not  realize  that  it  was  possible  to  lose  the 
place.  He  counted  too  much  on  the  bad  quality  of  the  Re- 
publicans. As  late  as  Dec.  27.  troops  were  being  em- 
barked at  Cork  for  Toulon,  3  and  but  a  few  days  before  Pay- 
master General  Lennox  was  sent  from  London.4 

1  Record  Office. 

2  Letters  from  Dundas.  British  Museum.    Mss.  Additional  27,  594. 

3  War  Office  Letter  Books.  Commander-in-chief.   (1792-94)  R.  O. 

4  Admiralty  Records,  War  Office.   (1782-1794).  Dec.  20.  R.  O. 


97 


CHAPTER  III. 

NEWS  OF  THE  FALL  OF  TOULON  IN  SPAIN,  FRANCE  AND  ENG- 
LAND— RESULTS  OF  THE  FALL  OF  TOULON — FATE  OF 
SHIPS  AT  TOULON — ROLE  OF  BONAPARTE — MEMOIRES 
OF  BARRAS — INFLUENCE  OF  THE  SIEGE  ON  BONAPARTE. 

The  news  of  the  fall  of  Toulon  caused  in  republican 
France  and  especially  in  Paris,  the  wildest  joy.  On  Dec.  24. 
it  was  announced  by  Barrere  in  the  Convention.  At  the  same 
time  he  made  a  motion  that  "  I>armee  dirigee  contre  Toulon 
a  bien  merits  de  la  Patrie."  The  entire  assembly  arose  with 
loud  shouts  of  approbation.  A  few  days  later  Robespierre 
began  one  of  his  long  speeches  with,  "  laissons  1'Europe  et 
1'histoire  vanter  les  miracles  de  Toulon  et  preparons  de  nou- 
veaux  triomphes  a  la  liberte".  The  Convention  decided  to 
declare  a  general  holiday  and  on  Dec.  30.  the  great u  fete  de 
rejouissance  "  took  place.  David  was  ordered  to  prepare  it. 
The  entire  Convention  took  part  in  the  tremendous  proces- 
sion. For  weeks  the  Theaters  gave  popular  performances 
"  en  rejouissence  de  la  reprise  de  Toulon,"  and  "  La  prise  de 
Toulon"  was  often  read  in  the  papers  of  that  time  as  the 
title  to  a  play  which  was  supposed  to  win  popular  favor. 
Not  only  in  Paris  and  in  France,  but  even  in  America  and 
in  Constantinople  one  celebrated  the  fall  of  Toulon.  As  to 
the  reception  of  the  news  in  Spain,  St.  Helens  wrote  on  Jan- 
uary 8.1  "With  regard  to  the  sensations  produced  here  by 
the  late  abandonment  of  Toulon  it  seems  to  me  that  if  this 
court  feel  any  concern  on  that  account  it  arises  rather  from 
certain  collateral  considerations  than  from  their  conceiving 
that  event  to  be  in  itself  prejudicial  to  the  common  inter- 
ests   the}'  are  of  the  opinion  that  by  the  destruc- 
tion of  the  arsenal  and  shipping  of  Toulon  we  have  secured 
all  the  essential  advantages  which  the  surrender  of  that  place 
was  ever  likely  to  have  afforded  without  the  Burthen  and 

1  Record  Office. 
2192-7 


98 

Risk  of  maintaining  possession  of  it,  this  seems  to  be  like- 
wise the  opinion  of  the  public  at  large".  Lord  St.  Helen's 
opinion  was  corroborated  by  the  Gazetta  de  Madrid  which 
gave  the  accounts  of  the  evacuation.  But  from  now  on,  an 
enmity  gradually  developed  between  England  and  Spain, 
and  in  the  Declaration  of  War  by  Spain  in  1796  is  found 
the  following  passage  "  This  ill  faith  became  manifest  in 
the  most  critical  moment  of  the  1st.  campagne  .from  the 
manner  in  which  Lord  Hood  treated  my  fleet  at  Toulon 
where  he  attended  to  nothing  but  the  destruction  of  what  he 
could  not  carry  away  with  him."  As  the  Spaniards  were  by 
no  means  an  inactive  party  to  the  destruction  referred  to, 
this  passage  is  open  to  some  criticism ;  but  it  shows  none 
the  less  that  the  differences  between  the  English  and  Span- 
ish left  some  impression.  Later  on  it  was  even  stated  openly 
in  London  that  the  Spanish  blew  up  the  ships  in  the  harbor 
of  Toulon  purposely  to  destroy  the  English  boats.  This  state- 
ment is  no  doubt  false,  but  it  shows  to  what  extent  the  ill 
feeling  between  the  two  countries  went. 

In  England  the  news  was  received  with  surprise  but  with 
no  great  amount  of  disappointment.  The  Opposition  wel- 
comed it  however  as  they  hoped  to  use  it  against  the  gov- 
ernment. Nelson's  opinion  was  in  general  the  most  preva- 
lent one.1  "  For  England  the  getting  rid  of  such  a  place  is 
a  most  happy  event.  Our  money  would  have  gone  very  fast. 
The  quitting  of  Toulon  by  us  I  am  satisfied  is  a  national 
benefit".  The  Earl  of  Elgin  wrote  to  Grenville  on  the2  "  un- 
fortunate news"  but  added  "  the  destroying  the  fleet  and 
arsenal  and  saving  the  garrison  are  great  palliatives".  At 
the  opening  of  Parliament  on  Jan.  21,  1794.  the  following 
reference  is  made  to  Toulon,  in  the  King's  speech:  "the 
temporary  possession  of  the  town  and  post  of  Toulon  has 
greatly  distressed  the  operations  of  my  enemies;  and  in  the 
circumstances  attending  the  evacuation  of  that  place  an  im- 

1  Nelson's  Dispatches. 

*  Elgin  to  Grenville.  Dec.  29.  Fortesque  Mss. 
4 


99 

portant  and  decisive  blow  has  been  given  to  their  naval 
power,  by  the  distinguished  conduct,  abilities  and  spirit  of  my 
commanders,  officers  and  forces  both  by  sea  and  by  land  ". 
This  was  to  a  great  extent  the  opinion  in  official  circles. 
Lord  Star  in  the  address  of  thanks  replied  "Since  the  mem- 
orable battle  of  La  Hogue  a  more  brilliant  enterprise  had 
not  been  achieved  than  that  at  Toulon  by  Lord  Hood.  The 
destruction  of  the  Arsenal  and  naval  stores  of  the  second  sea- 
port of  France  was  a  circumstance  that  she  could  not  repair 
for  years.  It  must  necessarily  cripple  her  navy  for  the  pres- 
ent and  for  years  to  come  and.  prove  the  most  fatal  blow 
that  was  struck  at  the  French  marine".  The  Opposition  in 
Parliament  however  used  the  affair  at  Toulon  as  an  oppor- 
tunity of  condemning  the  conduct  as  well  as  the  object  of 
the  war.  Fox  was  especially  bitter  in  his  criticism,  while 
Pitt  defended  the  government.  On  the  opening  of  the  session 
in  Jan.  94.  in  his  attack  upon  the  government  Fox  referred 
frequently  to  Toulon.  "  When  we  have  been  driven  from 
Toulon  in  a  manner  so  afflicting  if  not  disgraceful  "  .  .  .  . 
He  then  pointed  out  the  difference  between  the  object  of 
gaining  "some  solid  advantage  for  ourselves,  as  an  indem- 
nification for  the  expenses  of  the  war  and  that  of  giving 
such  a  government  to  France  as  ministers  might  think  it 
safe  to  treat  with "  ....  "Toulon  was  taken  by  the 
British  in  consequence  of  certain  conditions  stipulated  by 
the  inhabitants.  And  yet  even  with  the  certainty  of  the 
guillotine  before  them  these  inhabitants  were  so  unwilling 
to  assist  the  British,  that  no  other  than  an  ignominious  evac- 
uation could  be  effected.  If  it  was  right  so  to  take  it,  it  be- 
came a  matter  of  indespensible  duty  to  defend  it.  Toulon, 
purchased  by  compromise  you  have  lost  with  disgrace;  you 
have  placed  yourselves  in  a  point  of  view  entirely  new  to 
British  character,  you  have  proved  yourselves  neither  use- 
ful as  friends,  nor  respectable  as  enemies  ".  On  May.  30.  in 
speaking  of  the  King's  declaration  he  said  ;  "A  declaration 
in  the  name  of  his  majesty  afterwards  came  out  different 


100 

indeed  from  this:  verbose,  obscure  and  equivocal  like  the 
production  of  men  who  are  afraid  of  saying  anything  dis- 
tinctly, who  wish  not  their  meaning  to  be  clearly  under- 
stood :  that  stript  of  all  the  elegant  rubbish  with  which  it 
was  loaded  declared  only  this,  that  the  restoration  of  mon- 
archy without  specifying  what  kind,  was  the  only  condition 
upon  which  we  could  treat  with  France".  Pitt  replied;  "the 
right  honorable  gentleman  proceeded  to  bring  forward  a 
charge  of  inconsistency  from  the  declaration  of  Lord  Hood 
at  Toulon  and  that  afterwards  published  by  His  Majesty, 
addressed  to  the  people  of  France.  These  declarations,  I 
affirm,  are  perfectly  consistent.  That  of  Lord  Hood  only 
promises  protection  to  the  people  of  Toulon,  as  far  as  he 
could  grant  it  without  specifying  any  particular  form  of 
government  they  chose  to  pledge  themselves  to  the  Consti- 
tution of  1789.  The  declaration  of  His  Majesty  offers  pro- 
tection to  all  the  people  of  France,  who  shall  approve  of  an 
hereditary  monarchy".  Pitt  was  not  quite  honest  here  as  he 
gave  rather  how  he  wished  Hood's  declaration  should  be 
interpreted,  than  how  it  was  in  reality.  It  will  be  remem- 
bered that  the  English  government  was  not  satisfied  with  it. 
The  affair  of  Toulon  remained  however  a  favourite  point  of 
attack  for  Fox,  and  as  late  as  March.  95  he  made  allusion 
to  it. 

From  a  military  stand -point  the  results  of  the  fall  of  Tou- 
lon were  the  following.  First.  The  moral  effect  of  the  ex- 
pulsion of  the  combined  forces  of  four  nations  from  the  soil 
of  France  was  great.  Second.  The  large  army  employed  at 
Toulon  was  now  free  to  swell  the  ranks  of  the  armies  of 
Alpes  and  of  the  Pyrenees ;  the  friends  of  royalty  in  the 
south  of  France  had  no  longer  a  "point  d'appui"  in  Toulon, 
and  the  barbarous  punishment  of  the  rebellious  city  could 
not  but  have  its  effect  upon  other  cities  with  similar  inten- 
tions. Third.  The  occupation  of  Toulon  by  the  Allies  had 
struch  a  severe  blow  at  the  French  navy,  a  very  large  part 
of  which  was  stationed  here.  It  was  of  this  fact  that  the 


101 

English  most  boasted  and  with  which  they  consoled  them- 
selves for  the  forced  evacuation.  Of  the  31  ships  of  line  in 
the  harbor,  11  were  burnt,  4  sent  away  with  the  French  sea- 
men at  the  begining  of  the  siege  (this  caused  a  good  deal  of 
criticism  in  England),  3  were  carried  off  by  the  English  and 
the  rest  saved,  thanks  to  the  rapid  advance  of  the  Republi- 
cans on  the  last  two  days  of  the  siege.  Of  the  12  frigates,  5 
entered  the  service  of  the  English,  1  was  given  to  Sardinia, 
3  burnt  and  the  rest  saved  by  the  Republicans.  There  were 
13  corvettes  of  which  7  went  to  England,  1  to  Spain,  1  to 
Naples,  2  burnt  and  the  rest  saved  by  the  Republicans.  As 
is  seen,  the  English  received  about  all  the  ships.  They  were 
taken  to  be  guarded  for  the  King  of  France :  which  meant 
that  the  English  had  the  use  of  them  until  the  Restoration, 
20  years  afterwards.  She  then  made  excuses  for  keeping 
those  of  them  which  were  left  at  that  time.  Besides  the  ships, 
the  yards  and  naval  stores  of  all  kinds  were  destroyed  at 
Toulon;  but  the  large  guns,  as  well  as  the  fortifications 
erected  by  the  Allies  themselves,  could  not  be  destroyed  for 
want  of  time.  Bonaparte  rejoicing  over  this  fact  wrote  on 
Dec.  24.  "Toulon  est  plus  dans  le  cas  de  sedefendre  aujour- 
d'hui  que  jainais." 

As  to  the  historical  significance  of  the  affair  of  Toulon,  its 
fall  was  one  of  the  most  important  successes  of  the  Repub- 
licans which  rendered  the  peace  of  Campo  Formio  possible; 
its  occupation  by  the  Allies  was  the  occasion  of  England's 
forming  a  brilliant  scheme  of  indemnification,  which  ex- 
pressed her  intentions  during  the  War  of  the  First  Coalition. 
But  the  siege  of  Toulon  will  be  known  principally  as  the 
action  in  which  Napoleon  first  distinguished  himself.  The 
exact  part  which  he  played  in  this  important  event  has  be- 
come a  question  of  dispute,  giving  rise  to  various  opinions. 
After  studying  the  question  I  have  become  convinced  and 
hope  to  be  able  to  prove  that  those  who  attribute  to  Napo- 
leon a  great  part  in  the  success  of  the  Republican  Army  are 
quite  right.  The  grounds  upon  which  they  base  their  opin- 


102 

ion  may  often  be  false  however.    It  has  frequently  been  said 
that  Napoleon  alone,  with  the  eye  of  a  genius,  discovered 
the  one  vulnerable  point  in  the  outskirts  of  Toulon,  namely 
the  Eguillette,  and  by  this  one  act  decided  the  fate  of  the 
city.    This  is  false.    He  choose,  as  any  other  well  schooled 
officer  would  have  done,  the  Eguillette  as  a  point  of  attack, 
but  he  is  entitled   to  no  great  credit  for  having  done  so. 
Again  according  to  his  own  statement  and  to  that  of  the 
Representatives,  this  plan  corresponded  practically  with  that 
sent  on  from  Paris;  and  again,  the  Allies  themselves  recog- 
nized the  importance  of  this  point,  and  seized  and  fortified 
it  before  the  Republicans  could  take  advantage  of  it.    This 
was  due  to  the  slowness  of  Carteaux.    The  great  merit  of 
Bonaparte  lay  in  the  fact  that  he  alone  organized  and  com- 
manded the  artillery,  which  at  all  sieges  and  most  especially 
at  Toulon,  played   the  important  part.     Bonaparte  showed 
the  greatest  activity  in  the  equiping  as  well  as  in  the  direc- 
tion of  this  arm.    Even  many  of  the  officers  were  called  to 
Toulon  by  him  personally.    He  showed  excellent  judge- 
ment in  placing  his  batteries;  so  much  so  that,  as  has  been 
seen,  the  shots  from  the  first  one  erected,  after  Bonaparte  had 
been  but  a  few  days  at  Toulon,  announced  to  the  Allies  the 
possibility  of  their  being  forced  to  evacuate  the  place.   The 
notes  of  the  Spanish  Minster,  of  the  English  ambassador  at 
Madrid,  and  of  Hood  are  eloquent  proofs  of  this.    Almost 
up  to  the  end   the  Republican  Army  was  in  a  most  deplor- 
able state.  The  Artillery  was  the  one  redeeming  feature,  the 
one  arm  which  gave  the  Allies  any  concern.   All  their  sallies 
were  made  in  order  to  destroy  the  steadily  approaching  bat- 
teries.   The  daring  and  disasterous  sortie  in  which  O'Hara 
was  captured,  was  rendered  necessary  by  the  opening  of  the 
fire  of  the  Convention.     The  great  part  which  the  artillery 
played  in  the  final  attack  on  Eguillette  has  been  seen.    The 
shots  from  the  newly  erected  batteries  were  what  forced  the 
Allies  to   hasten  their  retreat  on  the  last  day,  and  conse- 
quently made  it  impossible  for  them  to  complete  their  work 


103 

of  burning  the  ships  and  yards.    In  fact  the  proofs  of  the 
great  activity  of  the  artillery  stand  out  in  vivid  contrast  to 
the  inefficiency  of  the  other  branches  of  the  army.    The  ar- 
tillery was  entirely  the  work  of  Bonaparte ;  he  had  the  sole 
command  until  the  arrival  of  Du  Thiel,  and  the  real  com- 
mand even  then,  for  Du  Theil  was  old,  ailing  and  could 
not  take  any  active  part.    The  council  of  war  had  approved 
all  the  batteries  erected   by  Bonaparte,  and  the  positions  of 
all  those  erected  after  Du  Theil's  arrival   had  been  chosen 
by  Napoleon  ;   and  most  of  them  already  commenced.    Du 
Theil  was  brave,  well  instructed  and  made  a  good  impression 
on  Dugommier.    He  recognised  immediately  the  talent  of 
Bonaparte  as  is  shown  by  the  following  lines  written  to  the 
Minister  of  war  on  the  day  of  the  entrance  of  the  Republi- 
cans in  Toulon.1  "  Je  manque  d'expression  pour  te  peindre  le 
merite  de  Bonaparte ;  beaucoup  de  science,  autant  d'intelli- 
gence,  et  trop  de  bravour,  voila  une  faible  esquisse  des  vertus 
de  ce  rare  officier.     C'est  &  toi  citoyen  ministre  de  les  con- 
sacrer  a  la  Gloire  de  la  Republique."     Victor  wrote  in  his 
Memoirs ;  "  Or  ces  puissantes  moyens  (the  artillery)  etaient 
diriges  par  Bonaparte  ;  car  le  general  Dutheil  emerveille  de 
la  justesse  et  de  la  superiorite  de  ses  vues  s'etait  complete- 
ment  efface  devant  lui ;  noble  et  rare  abnegation  !  hommage 
magnifique  qui  honore  a  la  fois  celui  qui  le  rendait  et  celui 
qui  en  fut  Fobjet".     The  Due  de  Raguse  wrote  in  his  Me- 
moirs; "  Duthiel  fut  venu  pour  prendre  le  commandement 
en  chef  de  1'Artillerie.    Celui-ci  vit  le  pouvoir  en  si  bonnes 
mains  et  si  bien  exerce  et  les  commandements  avaient  sou- 
vent  alors  des  consequences  si  graves  qu'il  laissa  faire  le 
jeune  officier  et  ne  prit  aucuue  part  a  la  direction  du  siege." 
He  made  the  same  statement  as  Victor,  but  attributed  Du 
ThieFs  action  to  different  motives.    His  implying  that  Du 
Thiel  feared  the  responsibility  of  the  command  is  no  doubt 
unjust.    General  Doppet  said   in  his  Memoirs,  written  in 
1797  ;  "  Duthiel  fit  avec  moi  la  visite  des  batteries  etablies 

1  War  Archives.    These  lines  have  been  frequently  published. 


104 

avant  mon  arrive  et  je  vis  avec  aatant  d'etonnement  et  de 
satisfaction  que  cet  ancien  Artilleur  applaudit  a  toutes  les 
mesures  qu'avait  prit  le  jeune  Bonaparte."  Many  other 
less  important  proofs  are  found  in  the  writings  of  those  who 
took  part  in  the  siege.  Carteaux's  final  praise  of  the  Artil- 
lery and  Dugommier's  and  Salicetti's  special  mention  of 
Bonaparte  during  the  siege  have  already  been  spoken  of. 

Barras  also  wrote  in  his  Memoirs  on  the  siege  of  Toulon, 
and  it  is  principally  upon  his  writings  that  those  who  deny 
the  importance  of  Bonaparte's  role,  base  their  opinion.  That 
Barras'  Memoires  are  hostile  to  Napoleon  is  admitted  by  all 
who  know  them.  That  Barras'  account  of  the  siege  of  Toulon 
is  full  of  mistakes  and  consequently  almost  worthless  as  a 
source,  will  be  seen  by  everybody  who  compares  it  with  any 
trustworthy  acount  of  the  siege.  And  yet  he  tried  to  demon- 
strate that  Bonaparte's  role  at  Toulon  was  only  secondary. 
It  seems  to  me  that  he  has  really  proved  the  contrary.  Here 
are  a  few  of  his  sentences.  "  Des  sa  premiere  recontre  avec 
moi  je  fut  frappe  de  son  activite  ".  .  .  .  "je  lui  donnai 
devaut  tout  le  monde  des  preilves  de  ma  -bienviellance". 
.  .  .  "  Bientot  ad  mis  a  ma  table  il  fut  toujours  place  It 
cote  de  rnoi  ".  .  .  .  "  Dugommier  accorda  de  suite  la 
plus  grande  confiance  &  celui  qu'il  appelait  "  mon  petit  prot- 
ege ".  Bonaparte  ne  tarda  pas  ^  enabuser ;  il  prit  bientot  un 
ton  absolute  et  decisif  qui  deplut  au  general  en  chef  ".  .  .  . 
"  Bonaparte  commandait  rartillerieprovisoirement.  Ce  n'etait 
pas  assez  pour  lui  de  ce  cornmandement  important,  il  fallait 
qu'il  se  mela  de  tout  et  de  tout  le  monde  ".  These  lines 
show  that  Napoloen  made  himself  everywhere  conspicuous. 
The  hostile  tone  of  the  same  may  easily  be  attributed  to 
Barras'  prejudice,  Further  he  continued.  "  Bonaparte  donna 
quelques  prouves  de  son  talent  militaire  qui  commenyait  a 
se  developper;  mais  il  n'agit  que  secondairement  dans  cette 
circonstance :  je  le  repete  le  veritable  "  preneur"  de  Toulon, 
c'est  Dugommier."  When  one  recalls  the  fact  that  on  the 
13th.  Vendemiaire  Barras  placed  his  entire  fortune  in  the 


105 

hands  of  Bonaparte,  and  a  few  days  later  said  to  the  Con- 
vention, "J'attirai  Pattention  de  la  Convention  nationale 
sur  le  general  Buona  Parte,  Vest  lui,  c'est  &  ses  dispositions 
savantes  et  promptes  qu'on  doit  la  defense  de  cette  enciente 
autour  de  laqaelle  il  avait  distribue  des  postes  avec  beaucoup 
d'habilite  ",(he  then  proposed  him  for  " general  en  second  de 
1'armee  de  Finterieur ")  and  when  one  remembers  that 
Barras  was  largely  instrumental  in  procuring  for  Bonaparte 
the  command  of  the  army  of  Italy,  one  is  justified  in  believ- 
ing that  his  opinion  of  Bonaparte  at  this  time  was  somewhat 
different  from  that  at  the  time  he  wrote  his  Memoires. 
Barras'  contempory  opinion  of  Dugommier  has  been  pre- 
served and  differs  much  from  that  which  he  gave  in  his 
Memoires.  On  Nov.  29.  he  wrote  to  the  Comite  du  Saint  Pub- 
lic "  La  situation  de  1'armee  n'est  pas  satisfaisante.  Je  suis 
loin  d'inculper  le  general  Dugommier.  Cependent  ce  general 
questionne  par  moi  n'a  pu  me  dire  le  nombre  de  troupes 
qu'il  commande ;  il  ignore  le  nom  des  bataillons  arrivees,  le 
nom  et  le  nombre  de  ceux  qu'il  attend ;  il  n'avait  encore 
fait  ni  fait  faire  aucune  revue,  il  ne  connaissait  pas  la  situa- 
tion de  ses  principales  batteries ;  je  1'ai  exhorte  a  s'occuper 
plus  serieusement  de  la  grande  affaire  dont  vous  1'avez 
charge  et  de  surveiller  toutes  les  parties  de  l'administration 
qui  m'ont  paru  tres  negligees ;  il  m'a  tout  promis  ;  il  m'a 
paru  tres  bien  intentione,  puisse-t-il  tenir  parole  ".  Barras' 
opinion  of  Dugommier  may  be  of  no  great  value  but  it  seems 
strange  to  see  him  write  in  this  tone  of  him  whom  he  after- 
wards termed  the  "  veritable  preneur  de  Toulon."  Further 
he  wrote.  "La  prise  du  general  O'Hara  attribue  a  Bonaparte, 
le  vaiseau  qu'il  aurait  coule  bas,  le  plan  de  campagne  auquel 
il  aurait  participe  sont  autont  d'assertions  fausses,  imaginees 
par  celui  qui  en  a  imagine  bien  d'autres,  repetees  par  ses 
flatteurs  le  jour  ou  il  a  eu  1'argent  pour  les  payer."  These 
lines  show  the  style  and  spirit  in  which  Barras  wrote  of 
Napoleon.  The  statements  are  quite  false.  It  is  true  that 
Bonaparte  did  not  personally  take  O'Hara  prisoner,  and  he 


106 

nowhere  said  that  he  did.  It  is  however  practically  certain 
that  he  commanded  the  body  of  troops  who  found  the 
wounded  English  General.  As  for  the"vaisseau  anglais," 
he  sank  several  shortly  after  his  arrival  at  Toulon,  as  has 
been  seen.  As  for  the  plan  of  attack,  it  has  been  shown  how 
he  selected  it  as  the  proper  one  from  the  very  first  and  fol- 
lowed it  up  to  the  end.  Barras'  ideas  on  the  proper  manner 
of  attacking  Toulon  I  have  found  in  a  letter  -written  by  him 
at  that  time,  and  as  it  is  unpublished  I  have  given  it  in  full, 
(see  Appendix  II)  Reading  it  one  cannot  but  admit  that  it 
is  merely  a  mass  of  phrases  put  together  by  one  who  feels 
he  is  bound  to  say  something  on  a  subject  of  which  he 
knows  little.  It  shows  that  Barras  is  not  a  military  man  : 
consequently  his  opinion  of  Bonaparte's  participation  in  a 
plan  which  he  himself  did  not  appreciate,  is  worthless.  On 
Nov.  29.  he  wrote  of  the  plan  decided  upon  by  the  council  of 
war.  .  .  .  "  Je  1'ai  trouve  tr£s  bien  ecrit,  fort  bien  redige, 
meme  assez  bien  concu."  Again  nothing  but  phrases,  where 
Barras'  criticises  the  handwriting  and  literary  merit  of  a 
military  plan.  It  must  surely  be  admitted  that  to  judge  of  Na- 
poleon's role  at  the  siege  of  Toulon  from  Barras'  memoires 
is  quite  untrustworthy,  in  fact  worse,  as  they  are  incorrect 
and  biased.  Others l  who  have  written  on  this  event,  say  that 
nothing  in  the  official  records  shows  the  great  role  played 
by  Bonaparte.  It  is  true  that  in  the  War  Archives  in  Paris 
there  is  no  exact  statement,  nor  is  it  mathematically  demon- 
strated that  Bonaparte  played  the  principal  part  in  the 
siege  of  Toulon :  but  indirect  proofs  abound  even  here  and 
are  also  to  be  found  in  the  sources  of  the  English  and  of  the 
other  Allies.  History  is  not  an  exact  science ;  therefore  a 
fact  which,  even  through  an  indirect  proof  appeals  to  the 
reason  of  an  unprejudiced  person  is  taken  as  truth.  It  is 
quite  as  wrong  to  deny  a  fact  which  is  clear,  as  to  assert  one 
which  is  false.  Toulon  was  Bonaparte's  opportunity  and  he 
took  every  advantage  of  it. 

l  Jung  ;  Krebs  and  Morris. 


107 

It  is  instructive  to  follow  as  closely  as  the  material  per- 
mits, Bonaparte's  actions  during  these  three  important 
months:  to  see  how  during  this  time  of  jealousy,  distrust 
and  open  enmity  between  the  different  officers,  and  between 
the  commanding  officer  and  Representatives,  Bonaparte 
understood  how  to  remain  on  excellent  terms  with  them  all 
and  to  continue  his  part  of  the  undertaking,  conscious  of  his 
aim  and  uninterrupted  in  his  progress.  Napoleon,  spured 
on  by  his  restless  ambition  and  armed  with  an  excellent 
technical  instruction,  needed  yet  something  more  to  forward 
him  in  his  wonderful  career;, to  keep  him  on  the  proper 
path,  and  from  wasting  his  untiring  energy  against  impos- 
sibilities. He  needed  a  broad  knowledge  of  men  and  a  clear 
insight  into  the  conditions  of  his  day.  Without  this  he  might 
have  been  a  Hoche,  a  Kleber  or  a  Ney,  but  never  a  Napoleon 
nor  even  a  Bernadotte.  His  intuitive  genius  could  not  of 
itself  have  supplanted  such  knowledge;  it  made  him  quick 
in  comprehending,  arranging  and  generalizing  his  experi- 
ence, but  the  experience  itself  was  necessary.  Napoleon  may 
have  needed  less  than  others,  but  he  needed  some.  Such  an 
experience  of  the  world  of  his  day  could  not  have  been  ac- 
quired in  an  artillery  school  in'Brienne,  nor  in  the  little 
Island  of  Corsica,  dealing  with  a  unique  people,  nor  had 
Bonaparte  obtained  it  as  yet  in  France.  His  Souper  de  Beau- 
caire  shows  that  his  views  and  ideas  were  still  limited.  It  is 
first  at  Toulon  that  he  acquired  this  broader  and  valuable 
experience.  Here  he  took  an  active  and  important  part, 
right  in  the  center  of  an  event  of  European  importance.  He 
was  in  touch  with  revolutionary  France,  with  the  represen- 
tatives, and  generals;  an  interested  spectator  of  party  strife 
and  of  the  conflict  of  political  and  social  ideas.  He  came 
into  contact  with  the  European  nations,  lived  in  an  atmos- 
phere of  uncertainty,  danger  and  intrigue.  Even  from  a 
military  stand-point  he  must  have  learned  a  great  deal. 
Here  he  witnessed  the  combined  action  of  the  different 
arms,  with  a  preponderance  of  his  own  special  one.  He  real- 


108 

ized  the  importance  of  that  department  which  provides  for 
the  provisioning  of  the  army.  All  this  must  have  made  a 
vivid  and  lasting  impression  on  the  mind  of  Bonaparte, 
then  a  young  man,  awaiting  an  opportunity.  How  well  he 
understood  human  nature  is  demonstrated  by  the  tact  with 
which  he  won  the  confidence  of  all  those  with  whom  he 
came  in  contact,  the  Representatives,  among  them  Barras; 
the  Generals  Dutheil,  Doppet  and  Dugommier.  His  naming 
an  exposed  battery  in  which  the  gunners  hesitated  to  serve, 
La  batterie  des  Hommes-sans  peur,  and  in  this  way  so  touch- 
ing their  pride  that  everyone  strove  for  the  honor  of  serving 
in  it,  shows  how  well  he  understood  his  soldiers.  One  is  re- 
minded of  his  address  to  his  army  in  Italy  two  years  later. 
Napoleon  made  many  friends  at  Toulon;  among  them  several 
of  his  future  lieutenants,  Junot,  Marmont,  Victor  and  others. 
His  relations  with  the  younger  of  the  Robespierres  nearly 
dragged  him  down  in  their  fall,  and  it  was  undoubtedly 
here  that  arose  the  enmity  between  Napoleon  and  his  coun- 
tryman Arena  who  was  afterwards  executed  for  an  attempt 
on  the  life  of  the  First  Consul.  But  these  were  exceptions. 
It  was  certainly  not  at  Toulon  that  lie  won  the  hatred  of 
Barras;  quite  the  contrary.  Men  as  well  as  conditions  he 
used  to  his  best  advantage.  Yet  one  cannot  accuse  him  of 
ingratitude.  All  of  those  who  still  lived  when  he  was  in 
power,  and  the  sons  and  grandsons  of  those  who  did  not 
were  rewarded;  many  of  them  in  his  will  from  St.  Helena. 
It  is  a  grand  sight  to  see  how  the  dethroned  Emperor  re- 
calls and  rewards  those  who  helped  him  in  his  early  career. 
All  this  experience,  good  luck  and  self-satisfaction  was  no 
doubt  what  made  Napoleon  feel  that  his  history  should 
begin  with  the  siege  of  Toulon.  Yet  he  seemed  to  forget 
that  his  thoughts,  sentiments  and  actions  before  this  period 
were  also  of  great  interest  to  those  who  wished  to  study  the 
career  of  one  of  the  world's  exceptional  men. 


109 
APPENDIX  I. 

[Record  Office.] 
Trevor  to  Grenville.  TURIN  Dec.  14. 

'• Monsieur  is  expected  here  the  16th 

and  your  Lordship  may  depend  on  a  faithful  Execution  of 
the  Instructions  therein  alluded  to,  the  Importance  of  which 
I  see  in  the  strongest  sense  and  the  more  so  because  sus- 
picions I  have  for  sometime  entertained  are  more  than  ever 
confirmed  that  the  Spaniards  are  at  the  bottom  of  a  secret 
intrigue  of  placing  Monsieur  at  Toulon  in  his  Character  of 
Regent.  Your  Lordship  heard  enough  of  their  Behavior  at 
Toulon  to  conceive  what  suggestisns  and  what  hopes  their 
jealousy  and  disappointed  Pride  may  have  given  birth  to. 
The  Princes  of  the  blood  have  had  some  secret  agents  at 
Toulon  and  I  learn  from  thence  in  a  private  Letter  of  the 
seventh  Instant  that  His  Majesty's  commissaries  knew  noth- 
ing of  Monsieur's  Journey  towards  that  place  that  the  Span- 
iards had  found  means  to  gain  a  Party  amongst  the  sections 
and  that  a  sort  of  wish  had  been  expressed  by  them  that 
Monsieur  should  be  called  there  as  regent  that  this  Idea 
had  been  communicated  to  Sir  Gilbert  Elliot  and  that  he  did 
not  seem  to  consider  it  liable  to  any  great  inconvenience. 

If  it  is  indeed  true  the  dispositions  at  Toulon  are 

such,  a  part  of  our  objections  would  be  removed  but  there 
still  remains  others  which  I  shall  consider  as  an  Insult,  till 
I  receive  from  your  Lordship  positive  orders  to  the  Con- 
trary; and  first  the  surreptitious  manner  in  which  it  appears 
to  be  conducted  and  the  want  of  any  previous  application 
for  His  Majesty's  Permission  which  was  equally  necessary 
from  a  Principle  both  of  Policy  and  Respect  and  secondly 
the  weighty  consideration  that  it  is  not  enough  that  this 
measure  should  be  thought  politic  by  the  Inhabitants  of 
Toulon.  It  must  also  be  considered  so  by  His  Majesty's 
Ministers  and  as  consistent  with  those  Principles  which 
constitute  the  wish  for  the  support  of  a  vigorous  govern- 
ment." 


110 


APPENDIX  II. 

.     [Archives  Nationales.] 

Paul  Barras  ft  ses  wllegues  &  Ollioules. 

J'ai  reflechi  mes  chers  collegues  sur  le  plan  d'attaque  pro- 
pose par  le  general  et  approuve  par  vous.  je  crois  devoir 
vous  reiterer  par  ecrit  et  pour  Finteret  de  la  Republique 
une  partie  de  mes  observations.  Les  deux  divisions  de 
Fouest  et  de  Test  dirigees  contre  Toulon  doivent  attaquer 
dans  toute  leur  etendu  tous  les  postes  des  ennemis,  parmis 
ces  attaques  il  en  est  d'effective  et  de  fausses.  J'ose  croire 
d'abord  que  les  principales  de  ces  attaques  doivent  e~tre 
diriger  contre  Pharon,  la  chartreuse  Paiguillette  ou  Balag- 
uier  et  Malbousquet.  Deux  attaques  que  je  regarde  comme 
decisives  et  devant  produire  subitement  la  prise  de  Toulon 
si  elles  reuississent  sont  celles  de  Pharon  et  de  Malbosquet. 
Je  pense  done  qu'il  faut  surtout  s'attacher  plus  particulaire- 
ment  a  la  pris  de  ses  deux  positions  et  que  les  colonnes  ou 
les  differentes  corps  destines  pour  ces  deux  attaques  doivent 
etre  nombreuses  et  bien  choisis.  Je  pense  que  les  aproches 
doivent  etre  faites  avant  le  jour  et  le  lendemain  d'une  grande 
canonade  qui  aura  d6mont6  les  canons  de  Fenemie  et  de- 
moli  ses  travaux.  Je  pense  qu'il  doit  6tre  defendu  de  tirer 
un  seul  coup  de  fusil,  qu'il  faut  joindre  Fennemi  et  user  de 
Farme  blanche,  qu  Fimpetuosite  francaise  rend  presque  tou- 
jours  favorables.  Je  pense  qu'il  faut  aussi  prevoir  tous  les 
cas ;  que  le  resultat  des  attaques  les  mieux  conbinees  est 
quelque  fois  contrariS  et  qu'alors  des  pointes  de  ralliement 
doivent  etre  convenues  ;  des  lignes  ou  retranchements  Sieves 
pour  y  recevoir  les  troupes  repousses  ou  poursuivis  ainsi  que 
des  pieces  de  position  placees  dans  ces  retranchements.  Je 
pense  qu'il  faut  choisir  les  travailleurs  et  preparer  en  ab- 
bondance  tout  ce  qui  sera  necessaire  pour  se  loger  et  se 
retrancher  aussitot  qu'on  sera  maitre  de  quelque  poste  en- 
nemie.  Si  des  postes  et  Pharon  surtout  sout  pris  le  general 
doit  s'  attendre  a  de  grands  efforts  de  la  parte  des  ennemis 


Ill 

pour  reprendre  ces  positions  d'ou  depend  leur  salut;  il  doit 
en  consequence  s'y  fortifier  sur  le  champ  y  caserner  des 
troupes  sures  et  nombreuses,  en  longer  meme  sur  les  derri- 
eres  pour  les  appeller  au  besoin.  Pour  attaquer  &  la  fois  une 
lingue  aussi  etendue  que  celle  de  la  droite  de  la  rade  de 
Toulon  a  sa  gauche  il  faut  de  bonnes  troupes,  je  suis  d'avis 
d'attaquer  sans  retard  mais  je  tiens  a  ce  que  6000  soient  sur 
le  champ  detaches  de  Farmee  d'ltalie  et  envoye  sur  Toulon 
alors  je  ne  considere  plus  le  succes  de  F  attaque  projettee 
comme  incertaine,  alors  je  n'hesite  plus  d'assurer  que  les 
infames  brigands  renferes  dansjoulon  n'auront  autre  parti 
que  la  fuite  et  la  mort  qui  les  poursuivera.  Quelles  sont  les 
forces  effectives  de  Farmee  de  la  Republique  sous  les  murs 
de  Toulon?  quelest  le  nombre  des  bataillons  qui  les  compo- 
sent?  je  n'ai  pu  avoir  a  cet  egard  qu'une  donnee  aproxima- 
tive  qui  la  porte  a  30,000  homines  et  parmi  laquelle  on 
pent  compter  moitie  de  p. requisition.  Si  1'ennemi  a  15,  18 
ou  vingt  mille  hommes,  car  je  n'ai  encore  a  cet  egard  aucune 
certitude  vous  hasardez  peutetre  en  attaquant  de  cette  ma- 
niere  iion  seulement  le  sort  de  Farmee  francaise  mais  celui 
du  midi;  vous  perdez  au  moins  Fespoir  d'  entreprendre  de 
nouvelles  attaques  et  vous  etes  obliges  d'attendre  les  forces 
et  Fattirall  immense,  mais  necessaire  pour  faire  un  siege 
auquel  1'ennemi  aura  tout  le  temps  de  se  preparer.  observez 
encore  que  par  la  distance  et  la  nature  de  vos  positions  il 
est  impossible  qu'elles  se  soutienent  et  se  protegent  mutuelle- 
ment.  L'armee  d'ltalie  est  f'ermee  par  les  neiges,  le  tableau 
que  nous  en  a  fait  Dugomier  est  tres  rassurant.  6000 
hommes  de  troupes  experimentees  et  agueries  en  seroient 
detachers  pour  1'attaque  de  Toulon,  cela  nous  donnerait 
alors  une  masse  de  force  une  preponderance  une  confiance 
meme  a  nos  troupes  qui  nous  assure  du  succes.  Ces  6000 
hommes  seroient  rem places  a  Farmee  d'ltalie  par  des  batail- 
lons de  premiere  requisition,  ainsi  nul  inconvenient  d'exe- 
cuter  de  suite  cete  mesure.  Je  vous  soumisde  nouveau  toutes 
ces  observations  peser  les  dans  votre  sagesse  communiquez 


112 

les  au  general,  ne  perdez  pas  de  vue  que  la  destruction  de 
Toulon  tient  au  salut  du  midi  qu'il  n'est  aucun  sacrifice 
aucune  consideration  qui  doivent  vous  arreter  lorsque  il  est 
question  de  chasser  1'ennerai  de  ce  post  important  observez 
aussi  qu'alors  vous  pourrez  disposer  d'une  armee  victorieuse 
et  sauver  la  Republique  en  admettant  tous  les  moyens  que 
je  vous  ai  demontre.  Au  reste  il  faut  que  Toulon  soit  attaque 
et  qu'il  le  soit  vigoreusement  si  mes  observations  sont  rejet- 
tees  je  me  rendrai  a  1'armee  et  avec  nos  propres  moyens 
nous  executerons  le  plan  propose. 

A  Marseille  le  8  frimaire  Fan  2  de  la  Republique. 

PAUL  BARRAS. 


113 


Contents. 


Page 
Contemporary  Accounts  and  Bibliography iii 

Preface iv 

PART  I. 

Conditions  Under  Which  Toulon  Surrendered  to  the  Eng- 
lish and  Siege  of  the  Town viii 

Chapter  I. 

France  in  1 793 — Topographical  description  of  Toulon — Negotiations 
preceding  Surrender — Proclamation  of  Hood — Hood's  Entrance 
— Arrival  of  News  in  London — Political  situation  of  Allies  at 
time  of  Siege — Opinions  on  Hood's  Declarations — English  idea 
as  to  Retention  of  Toulon 1 

Chapter  II. 

Arrival  of  Carteaux  in  Marseilles — First  Engagement — Arrival  of 
Bonaparte — Representants  du  Peuple — Effect  of  First  Batteries — 
Attack  on  Heights  of  Grasse — Attack  on  Mont  Faron — Misun- 
derstanding between  Carteaux  and  Lapoype — Attack  on  Sab- 
lettes — Attack  on  Cap  Brun — Departure  of  Carteaux — Bonaparte 
during  absence  of  Generals — Arrival  of  Doppet — Engagements 
on  Nov.  15 14 

Chapter  III. 

Dugommier — Marescot— Council  of  War — Bonaparte's  Plan — Mare- 
scot's  influence  upon  the  Siege — Attack  on  Convention — Artil- 
lery before  Final  Attack— Attack  on  Eguillette— Council  of  War 
— Departure  of  Allies — Destruction  of  the  Ships — Entrance  of 
Republicans — Bonaparte  and  the  Massacres 38 

PART  II. 

Diplomatic  Correspondence  of  the  Allies  and  Results  of 
the  Fall  of  Toulon.. . .  58 


114 


Chapter  I. 

Dispute  between  Hood  and  Langara — Commissioners  at  Toulon — In- 
structions to  Commissioners — Declaration  published  at  Toulon 
— Correspondence  with  Austria  as  to  Declaration — Correspond- 
ence with  Spain  as  to  Declaration — England's  object  in  holding 
Toulon — Publication  of  Declaration 58 

Chapter  II. 

Question  of  the  French  Princes — End  of  Dispute  as  to  authority  at 
Toulon — Question  of  the  Emigrants — The  Austrian  reinforce- 
ments   79 

Chapter  III. 

News  of  the  fall  of  Toulon  in  France,  Spain,  and  England — Results 
of  the  Fall  of  Toulon— Fate  of  the  Ships  at  Toulon— Role  of 
Bonaparte — Memoires  of  Barras — Influence  of  the  Siege  on 
Bonaparte 97 

Appendix     I.  Letter  from  Trevor  to  Grenville  Dec.  14 109 

Appendix  II.  Letter  from  Barras  to  his  Collegues  at  Toulon 110 


SEP  29  1932 

24Mar'58;T 
•     REC'D  LD 

MAR  10 1333 


1 7 1964 

WTER-LIBRARY 


SENT  ON  ILL 

MAR  2  3  199 

U-C.  BERKELY 


,'32 


176927 


